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ALL AT ONE POINT:  
THE NEW PHYSICS OF ITALO CALVINO AND JORGE LUIS BORGES 
By:  
Mark T. Rinaldi 
 
Adviser: Dr. Giancarlo Lombardi 
 
This work of comparative literary criticism focuses on the presence of mathematical and 
scientific concepts and imagery in the works of Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges, beginning 
with an historical overview of scientific philosophy and an introduction to the most significant 
scientific concepts of the last several centuries, before shifting to deep, scientifically-driven 
analyses of numerous individual fictions, and finally concluding with a meditation on the 
unexpectedly fictive aspects of science and mathematics. The close readings of these authors’ 
fictions are contextualized with thorough explanations of the potential literary implications of 
theories from physics, mathematics, neuroscience and chaos theory. While the mathematical 
studies highlight concepts such as “Zeno’s Paradox,” Cantorian set theory, and representations of 
numerical infinity, the discussions of physics isolate theoretical structures such as black holes, 
parallel universes and quantum-entangled particles for use in discussing the fictions of both 
authors. 
Underlying the main goals of this work is an equal focus on the existence of an “ideal 
intellectual” or, more broadly, an ideal liberal arts education that draws together concepts from 
diverse and seemingly-unrelated fields of knowledge with the intention of generating unexpected 
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and novel ideas and connections. By demonstrating the numerous appearances of scientific and 
mathematical imagery in the works of Calvino and Borges, this work emphasizes the shared 
fictive basis of all human knowledge and strives to set science and fiction alongside each other as 
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Introduction – “The Two Cultures” 
In 1959, the British chemist and novelist C.P. Snow presented a controversial lecture 
entitled “The Two Cultures,” which condemned the gulf separating scientific disciplines and the 
humanities. From the start, Snow established himself as a member of both groups, or rather as an 
intellectual who dwelt in the center of this expanse. “By training I was a scientist: by vocation I 
was a writer. That was all.” (Snow 1) Citing the British educational system’s failing in over-
emphasizing humanities studies at the expense of scientific advancement, Snow lamented the 
negative consequences of such a single-minded approach to knowledge: “This polarisation is 
sheer loss to us all. To us as people and to our society. It is at the same time practical and 
intellectual and creative loss, and I repeat that it is false to imagine that those three 
considerations are clearly separable.” (ibid. 11) Snow’s lecture went on to skewer the rigid 
physical scientist and the huffy Shakespearian alike, indicting both for their closed-mindedness 
and refusal to see the merits of any discipline outside of their own. 
Snow concluded his lecture with the postulation that  
the clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two cultures – of two galaxies, 
so far as that goes – ought to produce creative channels… Of course, that isn’t the 
way that science could be any good to art. It has got to be assimilated along with, 
and as part and parcel of, the whole of our mental experience, and used as 
naturally as the rest. (ibid. 16) 
 
This desire to merge not only the two “cultures” of science and art but all forms of human 
knowledge into one integrated, generative continuum is echoed in the writings of the Italian 
writer of fiction, Italo Calvino, and his Argentine inspiration and contemporary, Jorge Luis 
Borges. The study that will follow is an attempt to define and expand the existing body of 
research on the interdisciplinary approaches of both of these authors, with a particular focus on 
their employment of scientific and mathematical themes within their fictional and non-fictional 
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works. By drawing together a diverse group of studies of Calvino and Borges undertaken by 
scholars of both “cultures,” as well as establishing a strong foothold in the scientific and 
mathematical theories of their time (and ours), we can hope to explicitly define the role of 
interdisciplinarity in each of these authors’ literary and personal philosophies. In doing so, we 
will reshape the image of the ideal intellectual as one who is equally versed in scientific theories 
and literary traditions, rooted firmly in methodological rigor but empowered with the agility to 
creatively harvest inspiration from any form of human knowledge. 
 
Calvino’s Call to Interdisciplinarity 
Italo Giovanni Calvino Mameli was born in Santiago de las Vegas, Cuba, in 1923, to 
scientist parents. Soon after his birth, his family relocated to San Remo, Italy, which was 
Calvino’s father’s ancestral home and where his parents would cultivate and study a large variety 
of exotic fauna on a large estate. Calvino later recounted his childhood experiences in a piece 
entitled “Personal Portrait,” eventually published in a biographical collection entitled Hermit in 
Paris. “I am the son of scientists: my father was an agronomist, my mother a botanist; both were 
university professors.” (Calvino 13-14)  It might have seemed reasonable to expect that Calvino 
would follow in his parents’ footsteps, but that was not to be the case. “After secondary school I 
made some attempts to follow the family’s scientific tradition, but my head was already full of 
literature and I gave up.” (ibid. 14) This departure from the family’s preferred occupation placed 
Calvino in a lonely position, especially since his only brother would go on to become a noted 
geologist. Calvino notes in Six Memos for the Next Millennium that “…in [his] family, a child 
could only read educational books, particularly those with some scientific basis.” (Calvino 35) 
The force of his family’s push to promote scientific studies is given some justification in another 
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discussion about his life, this time in Una pietra sopra, a self-curated collection of Calvino’s 
essays and media articles. 
Tra i miei familiari solo gli studi scientifici erano in onore; un mio zio materno 
era un chimico, professore universitario, sposato a una chimica; anzi ho avuto due 
zii chimici sposati a due zie chimiche […] io sono la pecora nera, l’unico letterato 
della famiglia. (Calvino XIV-XV)
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Despite being considered a “black sheep,” Calvino did not give up all scientific studies. In fact, 
as he mentions in Hermit in Paris, he did make an honest attempt to become a scientist before 
committing himself fully to literary pursuits. He elaborates on these experiences in “Behind the 
Success,” another essay taken from the same volume.  
…After getting my school-leaving certificate I made a choice which might have 
seemed, and perhaps was, determined by my family background, and enrolled in 
the Agriculture Faculty of Turin University where my father had taught up until a 
few years previously (he had retired by now) courses on ‘Tropical cultivation’ and 
‘Tree-growing’. What I had in mind was that for me writing could be a side-line 
to a ‘serious’ profession: the latter would keep me in touch with reality and let me 
travel the world, like my father who had spent nearly twenty years of his life in 
Central America, and had lived through the Mexican Revolution. This attempt at 
realigning myself with a family tradition did not work, but the basic idea was not 
a bad one: if I had been able to remain faithful to my plan of pursuing a 
profession with writing as an activity that was on the margins of this life-
experience, sooner or later I would have become a writer anyway, but with 
something extra. (222-23) 
 
At the time of writing these thoughts, Calvino apparently recognized the value that his 
scientific training would have for his fiction and his philosophical system. Indeed, his training 
was not paltry – according to the chronology in Una pietra sopra, Calvino “supera quattro esami 
del primo anno, senza peraltro inserirsi nella dimensione metropolitana e nell’ambiente 
universitario… In gennaio [del 1943] si trasferisce alla Facoltà di Agraria e Forestale della Regia 
Università di Firenze, dove sostiene tre esami.” (Calvino XVII-XVIII) The young Italo Calvino 
had, by this record, completed almost half of his training toward a scientific degree (a 
                                                          
1
N.B. For the duration of this study, unless an English translation of a work has appeared in press, all quotations will 
remain in their original language. - MR  
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considerable portion of a typically detailed course of study) despite his ultimate decision to 
abandon the pursuit of science in favor of writing. 
 Perhaps in spite of himself, though, Calvino’s thirst for scientific knowledge did not 
disappear – on the contrary, he remained the devoted student of a variety of different fields of 
scientific knowledge. As a young man, he and his friends “talked a lot about science, cosmology, 
[and] the fundamentals of knowledge: Eddington, Planck, Heisenberg, Einstein.” (Hermit in 
Paris 140) Eddington, the foremost researcher of the luminosity of stars; Planck, the father of 
quantum mechanics; Heisenberg, whose Uncertainty Principle upended the very foundation of 
human knowledge; Einstein, whose discovery of relativity stood and stands as the most 
important scientific discovery of the twentieth century – these were not small concepts, and that 
Calvino was not only apprised of them but could actively discuss them with other writers and 
students is a hallmark of how robust his connection with scientific inquiry had remained. He had 
begun, already, to fuse his creative impulses with an understanding of concrete scientific fact, a 
tendency that he himself would come to recognize as a defining principle – if not the defining 
principle – of his particular brand of fiction. His persistent urge to “know” would propel his 
creativity: 
But the cosmos does not exist, not even for science, it is only the horizon of a 
consciousness that goes beyond the individual, where all chauvinistic and 
particularistic ideas of humanity are overcome, and one can perhaps attain a non-
anthropomorphic perspective. I have never indulged in cosmic euphoria or 
contemplation in this ‘ascent’. More a sense of responsibility toward the universe. 
We are part of a chain that starts at sub-atomic or pre-galactic level: giving our 
actions and thoughts the continuity with what came before us and what will come 
after is something I believe in. And I would want this to be something that could 
be gleaned from that collection of fragments that is my oeuvre. (Hermit in Paris 
187) 
 
One of Calvino’s most salient influences in merging the logical devices of mathematics 
and science with the structures of fiction was the experimental French novelist and poet 
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Raymond Queneau. We can once again return to the previously-cited chronology in Una pietra 
sopra for details on Calvino’s exposure to Queneau:  
[Calvino] finisce di tradurre I fiori blu di Raymond Queneau. Alla poliedrica 
attività del bizzarro scrittore francese rinviano vari aspetti del Calvino maturo: il 
gusto della comicità estrosa e paradossale (che non sempre s’identifica con il 
divertissement), l’interesse per la scienza e per il gioco combinatorio, un’idea 
artigianale della letteratura in cui convivono sperimentalismo e classicità. 
(Calvino XXXIII-XXXIV) 
 
Later, in an interview for L’Approdo Letterario in 1968, Calvino discussed Queneau’s historical 
significance with respect to the innovations he engendered through his own work and that of 
Oulipo, the experimental literary movement Queneau co-founded in Paris.  
[Raymond] Queneau is a writer whose hobby is mathematics, and he has more 
friends among mathematicians than among men of letters… He stresses the place 
that mathematical thought, through the increasing ‘mathematicization’ of the 
human sciences, is now acquiring in humanistic culture, and therefore in literature 
as well. (Uses of Literature 30)  
Calvino’s intimate exposure to Queneau, not only as a reader but as his translator, served as 
validation, perhaps, for his own literary-scientific tendencies, and further functioned as a model 
for what would come to be Calvino’s call for an open and truly interdisciplinary approach to 
human knowledge. 
This distinctive, creative impulse to bridge disciplinary gaps and unify all forms of 
human knowledge under the banner of fictive exercise is a tendency that Calvino depicted in a 
number of ways. Near the end of his life, in a lecture intended for presentation at Harvard 
University, he wrote: “My work as a writer has from the beginning aimed at tracing the lightning 
flashes of the mental circuits that capture and link points distant from each other in space and 
time.” (Six Memos 48) Like the neural network of the primate brain – wholly similar to the brain 
of the modern human – so must the map of human knowledge be represented, with connections 
made apparent between concepts that, while seemingly unrelated on the surface, actually serve to 
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bring forth new and unexpected meaning on a macroscopic level. This incarnation of an 
overhead view of societal intelligence, nurtured through exposure to both scientific and 
humanistic disciplines, unveiled itself to Calvino during a 1959 trip to the United States. As a 
guest lecturer at a number of Ivy League schools, Calvino toured several scientifically significant 
facilities in the U.S, and spoke highly of American scientists’ role in their own society.  
…I have formed the idea that scientists are the only group which can lead to 
something new in America, because many of them possess alongside what is 
predictably the most advanced technical expertise a highly sophisticated 
knowledge of the humanities, and above all they are the only intellectuals with 
any power, and with any say… (Hermit in Paris 103) 
We might propose, then, that the qualities for which Calvino revered these cultured and erudite 
researchers are the same for which we now hold Calvino himself in high regard – technical 
expertise, a varied and deep education, and the agency to work freely based on one’s own 
methodological philosophy. These scientists mirror, in a way, the Calvino of Cosmicomics and T 
zero, both monumental works which will be discussed in great depth later in this study. 
 The ideal of a unified conception of human knowledge was not a new idea. Literary 
scholar Guy Raffa connects Calvino to Italy’s medieval gold-standard, Dante Alighieri, by way 
of their shared “desire to provide a unified image of knowledge and culture.” (Raffa 388) He 
posits that  
Italo Calvino identifies the common attitude toward discovery and invention in 
science, literature and politics as the key to forging a unified culture… In Dante’s 
day there existed a total view of knowledge, exemplified by the summas and 
encyclopedias of the preceding centuries and conveniently grounded in the liberal 
arts curriculum of the trivium and the quadrivium. Against the 
compartmentalization of philosophers and theologians, moreover, Dante saw in 
poetry the possibility for bringing together disparate strands of knowledge and 
forging new configurations. (ibid. 388)   
Calvino, then, has joined a long line of thinkers that includes Thomas Aquinas, Dante and 
Galileo, as well as the more contemporary C.P. Snow, who sought a holistic representation of the 
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universe through the fusion of all forms of human knowledge. The way to approach this ideal, 
according to both Raffa and Calvino, is to draw from a number of disciplinary fonts. “Calvino 
seems to revel in the interplay among hermetic, poetic and scientific discourses,” writes Raffa 
(ibid. 396). In his estimation, Calvino “seeks to enrich his literary imagination by drawing on 
scientific and mathematical discourses.” (ibid. 398) 
 One matter of importance that we have not yet touched upon is the methodology behind 
such an idealist aspiration – how can a writer draw from the deep wells of both science and 
fiction in order to bring together the best elements of both? We can return to an earlier interview 
with Calvino in order to hear his own perspective: 
In certain situations it is literature that can work indirectly as a spring to propel 
the scientist along, providing an example of imaginative courage in taking a 
hypothesis to its ultimate consequences, and so on. Similarly, in other situations it 
can work the other way around. At the moment the language of mathematics, of 
formal logic, can save the writer from the disrepair that words and images have 
fallen into as a result of being misused. Even so, the writer should not think that 
he has found anything valid absolutely. Here, too, the example of science can be 
of use to him, and teach him the patient modesty of considering each and every 
result as being part of a possibly infinite series of approximations. (Uses of 
Literature 37-38) 
Here, the author reminds us that language is the locus of the exchange between disciplines – with 
one being more formal and the other more flexible, a writer should simply choose the best to 
represent the concept or image he/she currently wishes to bring into being. When the language of 
pure fiction fails, the rigorous, logical qualities of scientific and mathematical language can 
actually serve to rejuvenate the spirit of a text, alternately loaning it authority and modesty. Both 
languages can be used judiciously and in balance to achieve a particular goal.  
 Indeed, the language chosen for a particular work can predetermine its readership and 
potentially expand its influence to uncommon spheres; Calvino himself notes this in “Whom Do 
We Write For?” by stating that “a literary situation begins to get interesting when one writes 
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novels for people who are not readers of novels alone, and when one writes literature while 
thinking of a shelf of books that are not all literary.” (Uses of Literature 82) Later, in a lecture 
entitled “Lightness,” Calvino restates even more eloquently this philosophy of uniting the 
disparate.  
Whenever humanity seems condemned to heaviness, I think I should fly like 
Perseus into a different space. I don’t mean escaping into dreams or into the 
irrational. I mean that I have to change my approach, look at the world from a 
different perspective, with a different logic and with fresh methods of cognition 
and verification… But if literature is not enough to assure me that I am not just 
chasing dreams, I look to science to nourish my visions in which all heaviness 
disappears.” (Six Memos 7-8) 
A tether to the real world and a balm for the sometimes unrelenting heaviness of the imagination, 
scientific language, for Calvino – and for Borges, as we will soon see – can verify the rational 
and contextualize the irrational.  
 Several of Calvino’s final lectures, taken along with “Lightness” from Six Memos for the 
Next Millennium, echo this sentiment, framing it as a defining thought during what would come 
to be the last days of his life. In “Visibility,” Calvino decodes the spirit behind the structure of 
his Cosmicomics:  
In Cosmicomics (1965) the procedure was a little different, since the point of 
departure was a statement taken from the language of science; the independent 
play of the visual images had to arise from this conceptual statement. My aim was 
to show that writing using images typical of myth can grow from any soil, even 
from language farthest away from any visual image, as the language of science is 
today. Even in reading the most technical scientific book or the most abstract 
book of philosophy, one can come across a phrase that unexpectedly stimulates 
the visual imagination.” (Six Memos 89-90) 
Rather than simply overlay scientific themes onto the traditional framework of literary fiction, 
Calvino instead chose to start from scientific seed and cultivate a distinct breed of “science 
fiction” that would be rooted in logic and experimental observation. In this set of lectures, which 
essentially serve as a tally of Calvino’s values at the end of his life, his wish for an imaginative 
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and scientifically-informed literary language is well-stated. In “Multiplicity,” the last of the 
lectures, he leaves us with a final exhortation: “Among the values I would like passed on to the 
next millennium, there is this above all: a literature that has absorbed the taste for mental 
orderliness and exactitude, the intelligence of poetry, but at the same time that of science and 
philosophy.” (ibid. 118) 
It is one thing to exhort, of course, and another to put such a personal philosophy into 
active use. Calvino appears to have anticipated this criticism and, at a number of times, delved 
into more technical discussions of his craft. Six Memos for the Next Millennium – a 
posthumously published work that stands as the sum total of his literary philosophy – provides us 
with a vividly scientific metaphor that stresses the plurality found in good writing. “Even if the 
overall design [of a book] has been minutely planned, what matters not is the enclosure of the 
work within a harmonious figure, but the centrifugal force produced by it – a plurality of 
languages as a guarantee of truth that is not merely partial.” (Calvino 116) The centrifuge – an 
essential piece of equipment in even the simplest of scientific laboratories – is used to separate 
materials from an object or substance according to their relative densities. It is fitting that 
Calvino reinforced the unimportance of a “harmonious figure” when, in fact, what constitutes his 
ideal of literature can essentially be described as what has been spun out of the substance, and 
not the original substance itself. Calvino’s scientific and interdisciplinary bent places 
informational objects in a literary centrifuge and extracts vocabulary, imagery, style, tone, and 
spirit, readying such elements for recombination according to his aesthetic and philosophical 
judgment.  
 But what can power a “literary centrifuge”? There must be a catalyst or sustaining effort 
that defines its operation and connects it to reality; here, again, our neurotically forward-thinking 
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Calvino seems to have anticipated such criticism. Rigor, he explains, can act as a control to 
literary experimentation.  
…I do believe in a type of education by means of literature; a type of education 
that can yield results only if it is difficult and indirect, if it implies the arduous 
attainment of literary stringency. Any result attained by literature, as long as it is 
stringent and rigorous, may be considered firm ground for all practical activities 
for anyone who aspires to the construction of a mental order solid and complex 
enough to contain the disorder of the world within itself; for anyone aiming to 
establish a method subtle and flexible enough to be the same thing as an absence 
of any method, whatever. (Uses of Literature 99) 
  
By outlining what basically amounts to a literary-scientific methodology, Calvino expresses an 
approach to fiction-writing that harnesses rigorous structuring to give the illusion of a lack of 
structure – in other words, a fiction that dissolves all traces of its own methodology. If the 
artifice behind fiction can be masked or erased, then little is left to define it as “fiction” per se. In 
fact, as Calvino justifies in “La sfida al labirinto,” fiction and science are both achieved by way 
of the same methodology, and thus are already intrinsically fused by virtue of their common 
genesis. 
Già l’atteggiamento scientifico e quello poetico coincidono: entrambi sono 
atteggiamenti insieme di ricerca e di progettazione, di scoperta e di invenzione. 
L’atteggiamento politico anche (in senso lato: cioè del far storia, culturale e 
civile). La via per rendere una la cultura del nostro tempo, altrimenti così 
divergente nei suoi discorsi specifici, è proprio in questo comune atteggiamento. 
(Una pietra sopra 102) 
 
These two disciplines are so often separated from each other through the perception that one may 
hold utilitarian value while the other may not, but Calvino resists succumbing to this fragmented 
approach to knowledge and emphasizes the crucial function of a literature that truly brings 
together diverse and disparate forms of human intelligence: “Oggi cominciamo a richiedere dalla 
letteratura qualcosa di più d’una conoscenza dell’epoca o d’una mimesi degli aspetti interni degli 
oggetti o di quelli interni dell’animo umano. Vogliamo dalla letteratura un’immagine 
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cosmica…” (ibid. 116) Like his predecessors Galileo and Dante, Calvino sees the “cosmic 
image” that is an ideal literature’s goal, and he is clear, as well, about why this is a goal worth 
striving for.  
  In order to see the value in a system of creative writing that is fully inclusive of scientific 
disciplines, it is necessary to first see the specific structural connections between these two 
concepts. There is much more connecting them than there is dividing them; in “Exactitude,” for 
example, Calvino highlights some of these links.  
[The] taste for geometrical composition, of which we could trace a history in 
world literature starting with Mallarmé, is based on the contrast of order and 
disorder fundamental to contemporary science. The universe disintegrates into a 
cloud of heat, it falls inevitably into a vortex of entropy, but within this 
irreversible process there may be areas of order, portions of the existent that tend 
toward a form, privileged points in which we seem to discern a design or 
perspective. (ibid. 69) 
 
By mimicking within a work of fiction the inherent geometrical systems of nature – that is to say, 
by contrasting elements of disorder and order within its established parameters – a writer can 
grant the reader access to such so-called “privileged points” that allow a glimpse into the 
macroscopic structure of a work. This is most certainly not to say that any particular work will be 
imbued with a distinctive meaning by way of this approach, however; on the contrary, the work 
will instead continue to faithfully reproduce the essential labor of human experience – the 
production of provisional meaning in an otherwise neutral and autonomous universe.   
 In the spirit of this denial of absolute truth, Calvino explains the importance of the 
“comic” in good writing – his own included – based on comedy’s traditional role of calling into 
question its own authority.  
Gli anni Sessanta sono un’epoca di rinnovamento dell’orizzonte culturale, vista 
l’inadeguatezza del modo di conoscenza umanistica a comprendere il mondo. 
Linguistica, antropologia strutturale, semiologia: la frequentazione di questi 
territori si fa sentire nei miei scritti di questa stagione, anche se non mi abbandona 
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la riluttanza di fondo ad affidarmi interamente a un metodo che tenda a diventare 
sistema onnicomprensivo. Preferisco disporre intorno a me una congerie 
d’elementi disparati e non saldati tra loro: le scienze della natura oltre alle 
<<scienze umane>>, l’astronomia e la cosmologia, il deduttivismo e la teoria 
dell’informazione… E non per caso, contemporaneamente all’esplorazione delle 
possibilità espressive dei linguaggi scientifici, sostengo la dimensione 
<<comica>>, grottesca dell’immaginazione come il linguaggio di più alta 
affidabilità in quanto il meno menzognero. (Una pietra sopra X) 
 
Comic language, then, “lies the least” – in Calvino’s terms, this shrugging, winking framework is 
ideal for combining unlikely bedfellows from widely-separated disciplines and allowing the 
reader to simply contemplate their presence alongside each other. They resist fusion or 
resolution, but the light-hearted absurdity of a comical tone serves to remove a measure of 
investigative pressure on the reader, thereby allowing him/her to contemplate freely without 
rendering a final decision. If the comic cannot be trusted, there is no expectation that the reader 
do so – we might guess that the perpetually anxious Calvino no doubt considered this a very 
generous gift on his part! 
 Kerstin Pilz, perhaps the foremost researcher of Calvino’s scientific tendencies, weighs in 
on this potential farrago of disciplines and archetypes, championing an image of Calvino as a 
literary scientist in an article entitled “Calvino’s (Post)modern Re-evaluation of Cosmogony”: 
Calvino’s brand of cosmology blends different forms of knowledge, from 
literature to myth, from philosophy to the visual arts, amongst which science is 
but one form of knowledge… In other words, [Calvino] weave[s] a synchronic 
narrative of knowledge – inclusive of different genres and cognitive branches – 
that demonstrates how literature can serve science as an example of a different 
form of imagination.” (Pilz 199)   
This particular form of imagination eschews, or rather de-emphasizes the traditional scientific 
goal of resolution in favor of pure thought and free contemplation. For Calvino, it seems to be 
enough to allow oneself to simply gaze, to let the mind attempt an endless array of combinations 
and arrangements of elements culled from absolutely everywhere – a process that might well 
elicit a knowing smile from Henri Poincaré, whom we will encounter in a later chapter. 
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 As a purely literary philosophy, thereby shielded from the historically concrete 
expectations of scientific philosophy, this approach of Calvino’s may seem to be somewhat 
incomplete. Indeed, there are irresolvable conflicts – both external and internal – but as will be 
shown later in this study, these same conflicts plague science just as virulently as they do fiction, 
with a prime difference being that literature has perhaps come closer to accepting this undeniable 
fact. Pilz is careful not to represent Calvino’s system as perfect or complete, and even remarks 
on what seems to be Calvino’s continual struggle with resolution: “Yet… whilst in theory 
Calvino was ready to embrace new epistemological perspectives inclusive of chance and 
disorder… he did so reluctantly, as expressed in the anguish and disorientation his characters 
experience.” (ibid. 204) Through Palomar’s ever-increasing anxiety, Kublai Khan’s spiraling 
confusion and even the befuddling second-person narration of If on a Winter’s Night a 
Traveler…, an astute reader can trace the trajectory of Calvino’s efforts both to hypothesize and 
to solve. This tension hearkens back to the well-documented dualism of his childhood, in which 
he craved fiction but was fed mostly science.
2
 
 In 1985, just prior to his death, Calvino mused on the difficulty created by the role of 
random chance in human knowledge.  
What tends to emerge from the great novels of the twentieth century is the idea of 
an open encyclopedia, an adjective that certainly contradicts the noun 
encyclopedia, which etymologically implies an attempt to exhaust knowledge of 
the world by enclosing it in a circle. But today we can no longer think in terms of 
a totality that is not potential, conjectural and manifold. (Six Memos 116) 
 
Almost as if it were the result of all of the experimentation of his past works, this statement 
carries with it a note of resignation, but also excitement. By accepting that knowledge cannot be 
encircled – that it cannot be totalized or completed – Calvino also allows himself to engage in 
                                                          
2
“I have always greatly admired and loved the rigour of philosophy and science, but always from a bit of a 
distance.” (Hermit in Paris 249) 
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the pure enjoyment and freedom of unfettered experimentation. He has come to grips, we could 
be led to think, with the reality of a shared ceiling for both fiction and science – the unknowable.   
 Before moving on to an analysis of the crossroads of Calvino and one of his greatest 
influences, Jorge Luis Borges, it would serve our study well to consider the relative importance 
of what has been discussed so far. Why compare fiction with science? Why bother assembling a 
mélange of elements from such varied and seemingly unrelated disciplines? In “Whom Do We 
Write For?” Italo Calvino focuses on the role of awareness in expanding human knowledge; 
The effect that an important book, literary or scientific, can have on the general 
struggle in progress is to raise the struggle to a higher level of awareness, to add 
to its instruments of knowledge, of foresight, of imagination, of concentration, 
etc… the decisive element in judging a work with reference to the struggle is the 
level it is on, the step ahead it enables awareness to take. (Calvino 87) 
 
Each aspect, element or trope taken from an isolated field of study and added to the sum total of 
human knowledge is precious, inasmuch as it functions as a tool to pry open, examine and 
manipulate reality and its laws. Regardless of the discipline within which it was conceived, each 
new work pushes humanity forward. The task of the writer, then, is to combine, distill and 
innovate in order to nurture this ongoing creative and imaginative process.  
 
Calvino’s Awareness of Borges 
 Calvino was in no way shy about the magnitude of Borges’ influence on his own literary 
philosophy. Citations and examples from Borges abound in Calvino’s non-fiction production, 
ranging from passing mentions in interviews to full, essayistic discussions in his lectures. It will 
be useful to highlight a number of these in order to better define precisely what aspects of 
Borges’ model may have been filtered into Calvino’s own methodology. 
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 Hermit in Paris, a posthumous collection of Calvino’s autobiographical writing, details, 
among other things, his 1959 journey to the United States, a country that long captivated 
Calvino’s fascination. During this trip he had occasion to visit a number of important 
monuments, historical sites and scientific facilities. One mention of Jorge Luis Borges appears in 
a section entitled “The Monument,” which recounts a stint in San Francisco and gives the reader 
a rather delightful glimpse of what “Borges” had come to mean to Calvino at that particular time 
in his life. 
Going through a park near the Golden Gate, suddenly you find yourself facing a 
huge neoclassical construction, all surrounded with columns, reflected in a lake, a 
thing of immense proportions; it is in ruins, with plants growing inside it and this 
huge ruin is all made of papier mâché and rounded off with great care. It produces 
a surreal, nightmarish effect, not even Borges could have dreamt up anything like 
this. (Calvino 78)  
The writing style of Borges, here, is analogous in meaning to “surreal” and “nightmarish,” a set 
of terms that have often been used to describe the fictions of Franz Kafka as well. By 1959, the 
majority of Borges’ most well-known and notorious works of short fiction had been published; 
because of this, we can be reasonably certain that Calvino’s opinion was informed by at least a 
cursory exposure to works such as “The Aleph,” “The Library of Babel” and any number of 
other short stories by Borges that suggest the horror and immensity of the infinite.   
 Later in Hermit in Paris – and further along on Calvino’s American itinerary – the editor 
offers readers an essay entitled “My City is New York,” which is a loving description of the 
frantic and exceptional city that entranced Calvino during his sojourn. He eventually segues into 
a brief discussion of American literature, and during this excursus we find another mention of 
Borges, this time aside other esteemed company. 
I am a writer of short stories first and foremost more than a novelist, so one area 
of reading which has certainly influenced me, right from childhood, if you like, 
and not just in an American context but in absolute terms, I would say is Edgar 
Allan Poe, since he is a writer who knows how to do everything, in terms of the 
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short story. Within its confines he is an author of limitless possibilities; and also 
because he seems to be a mythical figure, a hero of literature, a cultural hero, 
founder of all the narrative genres that would be developed after him. For this 
reason one can trace lines which link Poe with, for instance, Borges or Kafka: you 
could trace extraordinary links like this that never end. (ibid. 236) 
Within a constellation of exceptional writers, Calvino has situated Borges as an equal to the likes 
of Poe and Kafka. In addition to further demonstrating the high opinion that Calvino clearly held 
of Borges, the link with Kafka also reinforces his earlier comments about the “nightmarish” 
structure and often exponentially vertiginous implications of Borges’ prose. The connection 
drawn with Poe, as well, might be based on both writers’ shared ability to seamlessly bring 
together the real world and the imaginary, or the concrete and the dreamlike.   
 An extension of this last concept can be found in another essay by Calvino, this time 
taken from The Uses of Literature, a 1987 English-language collection of his major philosophical 
and didactic writings and interviews. In an article titled simply “Philosophy and Literature,” 
Calvino describes Borges’ as “a literature that breathes the air of philosophy and science but at 
the same time keeps its distance, while with a gentle puff it blows away both theoretical 
abstractions and the apparent concreteness of reality.” (Calvino 46) As before, he depicts 
Borges’ writing as possessing an inherent airiness, able at once to approach the solidity of 
scientific language and yet disperse it in a single fiat. The literary connections continue here, as 
well; 
Queneau, Borges, Arno Schmidt – all have different relations with different 
philosophies, and use these to nourish vastly diverse visionary and linguistic 
worlds. Common to all of them is the habit of holding their cards close to the 
chest. Their philosophical sorties appear only through allusions to the great texts, 
metaphysical geometry, and erudition. From one moment to the next we expect 
the secret filigree of the universe to be made manifest: an expectation that is 
always disappointed, as is only right. (ibid. 47-48) 
 
Again we encounter a semblance of coherent rigidity, and again an ultimate dissolution, as if 
reality itself were a fabric that could be shredded and unraveled at will. The perennial 
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disappointment mentioned here gains further significance if we add to the discussion more 
modern events such as the perplexing hunt for the elusive Higgs boson, or our almost-hopeless 
quest to “see” dark matter. This “secret filigree of the universe” is indeed being groped for in 
both the literary and scientific domains, and Calvino seems to have carried no doubt as to the 
importance of Borges’ writing toward this end. 
 Una pietra sopra, an indispensible work that we have cited previously, provides 
additional discussions of Borges’ style that serve to further define the aspects of it that were most 
important to Calvino. “La sfida al labirinto” offers a description of Borges’ most famous literary 
subject as “il labirinto delle immagini culturali di una cosmogonia più labirintica ancora,” a mise 
en abime in which the structures of human society cannot help but mimic the structures of a 
much larger – or infinitely larger – universe. Careful not to imbue this image with supernatural 
qualities, however, Calvino goes on to state that Borges “cerca di comporre una immagine 
dell’universo non mistica anche se desunta da teologi e visionari.” (Calvino 115) 
 A relatively obvious question that has not been addressed thus far confronts what may 
amount to the most direct influence possible between two authors – a face-to-face meeting and 
interaction. The “Cronologia” in Una pietra sopra (a work that was curated by Calvino himself) 
describes two possible moments where he and Borges could have, but ultimately did not, cross 
paths: “[Calvino] compie in aprile [del 1984] un breve viaggio in Argentina. In settembre è a 
Siviglia, dove è stato invitato insieme con Borges a un convegno sulla letteratura fantastica.” 
(ibid. XL) Aside from these recounted situations, there is unfortunately precious little 
information regarding any other possible encounters between these two men. 
 Much as Calvino seems to have suggested in his earlier descriptions of Borges’ fiction – 
specifically when employing the adjectives “surreal” and “nightmarish” – the litany of Borgesian 
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qualities espoused in Calvino’s final work re-states and elaborates on the true foundations of 
Calvino’s awe for Borges, which seems to hinge largely upon what may have previously 
perturbed him about the Argentine. He identifies Borges as a master of the “quick” form, and as 
an enduring symbol of the open-ended literary processes that are also found in Queneau, 
Calvino’s other inspirational archon. 
The last great invention of a new literary genre in our time was achieved by a 
master of the short form, Jorge Luis Borges. It was the invention of himself as 
narrator, that ‘Columbus’ egg,’ which enabled him to get over the mental block 
that until nearly forty years of age prevented him from moving beyond essays to 
fiction… What I particularly wish to stress is how Borges achieves his approaches 
to the infinite without the least congestion, in the most crystalline, sober, and airy 
style. In the same way, his synthetic, sidelong manner of narration brings with it a 
language that is everywhere concrete and precise, whose inventiveness is shown 
in the variety of rhythms, the syntactic movements, the unfailingly surprising and 
unexpected adjectives. Borges has created a literature raised to the second power 
and, at the same time, a literature that is like the extraction of the square root of 
itself. It is a ‘potential literature’… (Six Memos 50-51) 
“Potential literature,” at first blush, could be understood as an empty phrase, an ironic and clever 
piece of jargon with no real definition; that is, until one encounters its apotheosis in Borges. As 
Calvino explains, Borges’ narrative and structural approach seems to be in conflict with the rules 
of any corresponding genre – it elbows its way into a room crowded with formulaic signs and 
symbols and it modifies, denies, subverts – “estranges,” as Viktor Shklovsky might have put it
3
 – 
reimagining a genre from the ground up and retrofitting it with new adornments. The function of 
surprise and disappointment in Borges’ oeuvre cannot be understated, as this is precisely where 
his fresh “potentiality” is to be found.  
 Other essays in Six Memos for the Next Millennium provide additional insights; 
“Exactitude,” for example, describes a trajectory of narrative that we will refer to as “entropic,” 
inasmuch as it mimics the natural thermodynamic process of entropy (a concept to be discussed 
                                                          
3
Viktor Shklovsky. Theory of Prose. Elmwood Park, Ill.: Dalkey Archive Press, 1991. 
19 
 
in great depth in the next chapter). For now, Calvino’s presentation of this image will suffice in 
defining it, as well as in illustrating the proposed connection to Borges. 
This taste for geometrical composition, of which we could trace a history in world 
literature starting with Mallarmé, is based on the contrast of order and disorder 
fundamental to contemporary science. The universe disintegrates into a cloud of 
heat, it falls inevitably into a vortex of entropy, but within this irresistible process 
there may be areas of order, portions of the existent that tend toward a form, 
privileged points in which we seem to discern a design or perspective. A work of 
literature is one of these minimal portions in which the existent crystallizes into a 
form, acquires a meaning – not fixed, not definitive, not hardened into a mineral 
immobility, but alive as an organism. (ibid. 70) 
According to Calvino, the definition of apparent meaning as the representation of a single, 
temporary instant during a larger-scale process of universal disintegration is a hallmark of “a 
whole constellation of poets and writers,” among them “Jorge Luis Borges of Argentina.” (ibid. 
70) Whether these writers were cognizant of this interpretation is, of course, irrelevant – 
Calvino’s reading may be fittingly seen as a “potential” interpretation of what, in turn, has been 
included within the broader category of “potential literature.” 
 In what is alleged to have been the last essay written by Calvino before his death, he 
names Jorge Luis Borges as the ideal model for the writer of the next millennium. 
If I had to say which fiction writer has perfectly achieved Valéry’s aesthetic ideal 
of exactitude in imagination and in language, creating works that match the 
rigorous geometry of the crystal and the abstraction of deductive reasoning, I 
would without hesitation say Jorge Luis Borges. The reasons for my fondness for 
Borges do not end here, but I will mention only the main ones. I love his work 
because every one of his pieces contains a model of the universe or of an attribute 
of the universe (infinity, the innumerable, time eternal or present or cyclic); 
because they are texts contained in only a few pages, with an exemplary economy 
of expression; because his stories often take the outer form of some genre from 
popular literature, a form proved by long usage, which creates almost mythical 
structures. (ibid. 118-119) 
In short, Calvino finds Borges’ writing to be the embodiment of many of the ideals he has 
outlined in this short collection of essays: lightness and universality; multiplicity and 
multiplication; economy and precision of expression. It would be difficult for any serious scholar 
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of Borges’ work to disagree with Calvino’s glowing appraisal, although it remains for this 
current study to prove the unbroken line between these two authors – a line that moves ever 
forward, thermodynamically, beyond the ends of both of their lives.  
 
Borges’ Scientific Understanding 
 Fortunately for our study, the path to understanding Borges’ scientific background is well 
tread. Several scholars have produced expansive works that delve in great detail into the 
mathematical and practical implications of the images found in Borges’ fiction, with one of the 
most notable among these scholars being William Goldbloom Bloch, who has penned an 
exceptional study entitled The Unimaginable Mathematics of Borges’ Library of Babel. A 
massively dense work of comparative literary scholarship, this book shines light into the most 
remote corners of Borges’ infamous “Library” and decodes its physical dimensions and contents 
from every possible angle. There are no unanswered questions that remain about the Library 
following the publishing of this work, and our present study is greatly indebted to Bloch’s labor.  
 Bloch’s interest in Borges is not purely mathematical – better said, Bloch seems to be 
primarily interested in Borges’ mathematical exercises as a means of demonstrating the creative 
side of scientific inquiry. He tells us early on in his book that: 
Mathematics can be creative, whimsical, and revelatory all at once. More to the 
point, as embodied in the different meanings of the word ‘analysis,’ it is 
simultaneously a process and an intellectual structure. Borges, a great imbiber of 
mathematics, seems to have understood this idea and instantiated it in many of his 
stories… His imagination works in, through, out, about, and all around logical 
structures. (Bloch XII) 
In exact symmetry with Calvino’s educational and literary ideal, Bloch feels that Borges also 
fuses a robust fictive imagination with scientific rigor in a symbiotic union of creativity and 
logic. Borges’ universes exist according to well-defined scientific parameters, and even when 
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these parameters are transgressed Borges is adept at disguising this guile as an “unknown,” or an 
“unknowable” – a point that Bloch goes on to prove at several junctures in his analysis. 
 Bloch delves more deeply than purely textual analysis, though – he even goes as far as to 
travel to Argentina to scour Borges’ archives for evidence of his scientific education. 
While visiting the National Library of Argentina, I had the great pleasure of 
perusing the math and science books Borges donated to the collection… I 
discovered that Borges marked the back end leaves of his volumes with his name, 
the year of acquisition, and the page numbers –coupled with a succinct phrase – 
of passages that especially interested him. (ibid. 143) 
Thanks to this rather obsessive tendency toward note-keeping, Borges fortunately left a trail for 
literary scholars to follow in their pursuit of historical information related to his study habits and 
reading preferences. 
 Bloch’s research leads to several striking discoveries, the first of which delivers an 
insight that will become more meaningful in the next chapter of this study. 
There are at least two candidates from Borges’ personal library to which it is 
tempting to assign influential status in the development of his mathematical 
thought. The first is Henri Poincaré’s 1908 book Science et Methóde. Borges’ end 
leaf notations, dated 1939, indicate an interest in Lesage’s discredited theory of 
gravitation and, more tellingly, in geometry and Cantor. (Bloch 144-145) 
 
Georg Cantor and Henri Poincaré, as will be demonstrated, are the representatives of 
mathematical philosophies and ideas that came to form the bases of a number of Borges’ short 
fictions. The most notorious of these concepts, Cantor’s theory of transfinite sets, would come to 
be mentioned by name in several of Borges’ essays and stories
4
, and clearly served as the 
unspoken inspiration for many others.   
 Bloch goes on to expand his study of Borges’ personal library –  
                                                          
4
See: “The Aleph” in Jorge Luis Borges: Collected Fictions. (Andrew Hurley, ed.) New York: Penguin Books, 1999; 
“The Doctrine of Cycles” and “A History of Eternity” in Jorge Luis Borges: Selected Non-Fictions. (Andrew 
Hurley, ed.) New York: Penguin Books, 2000. 
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The other book from Borges’ library, philosophically opposed to Poincaré’s, is 
Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. The book was originally published 
in 1903, and Borges’ copy is a 1938 printing… The easiest opening of this 
volume, and the first page singled out by Borges, concerns a resolution of 
Parmenides’ paradox. The next page pleasantly segues into a discussion of Zeno’s 
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise.  (Bloch 145-146) 
Parmenides’ paradox – briefly: that everything always exists and that nothing ever changes – and 
the paradox of his student Zeno – that space is infinitely divisible – appear in various forms in 
Borges’ fictions and essays, often by name and most explicitly in a 1929 work entitled “The 
Perpetual Race of Achilles and the Tortoise.” Bloch acknowledges that these citations serve as 
signposts to a number of recurring symbols, themes and tropes in Borges’ imagined universes, 
and that they illustrate the breadth and scope of Borges’ exquisite scientific and philosophical 
education.   
 Another major scholar of the scientific Borges, Floyd Merrell, will provide additional 
counsel throughout our study; for now it will be necessary to dwell on a few of his statements 
regarding Borges’ successful enterprise in fusing the scientific and the literary. Early on in his 
1991 work Unthinking Thinking: Jorge Luis Borges, Mathematics and the New Physics, Merrell 
focuses explicitly on Borges’ fictive exercises and just how much his methodology mimics that 
of the scientists. 
The impossibility of penetrating the divine plan of the universe… does not 
discourage Borges from inventing limited human constructs, always remaining 
mindful that they can be no more than provisional… Mathematics, in Borges’ 
tales, is accordingly fictive… An affinity between literary fiction-making and the 
use of mathematical fictions might possibly be validated, then, since both are 
based on a fictional standard. (Merrell 20-21) 
The invocation of this cross-disciplinary affinity justifies our own premise, and also acts as a hub 
in which Calvino and Borges’ literary ideals can be shown to coexist. In addition to allowing us 
the justification to compare style and motive across disciplines, Merrell’s insight also lays bare 
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the provisional basis that is the foundation of both literature and science – an idea that will be 
cast in deep relief during our discussion of Kurt Gӧdel in the next chapter. 
 Interestingly, Merrell notes an even more specific distinction within science itself – 
namely the conceptual gap between mathematics and physics – with the objective of further 
developing his concept of the fictional bases of the “hard” sciences.  
Mathematics is not, ipso facto, about ‘reality’. It is, however, appropriated by the 
physicist to describe an intangible, and for practical purposes, incomprehensible 
world. But this description can be no more than a…fiction. When one abstract 
formulation no longer effectively accounts for the ‘facts’, it is to be conveniently 
discarded and another embraced. So all scientific frameworks, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent, are merely temporary; and they are conventional. Borges 
creates alternative worlds in his metaphysical fictions. But scientists and 
mathematicians have always exercised the same prerogative. (ibid. 23) 
There is no difference, then, between the “alternative worlds” created in literature and those 
theorized in science – both are conventions, or artificial supports that function to temporarily 
prop up an idea or philosophy. We create the image of a world or a universe – Tlӧn, for example, 
in the case of Borges, or the adjacent and concurrent multiverses of Hugh Everett III in the case 
of physics – in order to establish a functional basis for postulation. Without these imaginary 
pylons we cannot visualize, and therefore we cannot theorize. The fictive act, then, is crucial to 
the basic operation of creative thought regardless of its final goal or the particular 
methodological process employed.   
 Merrell continues his analysis with an impressive logical insight that further strengthens 
our own study:  
Borges repeatedly erects elaborate mental constructs, but he knows the fiction 
must soon end, that his relating a particular or a collection of particulars to the 
universal is ephemeral. So he demolishes his edifice, the fiction comes to a close, 
and we are left in our own perishable world… Like Borges’ fictions, all world 
pictures will eventually be demolished. If every scientific theory except those 
accepted today is considered to a greater or lesser degree falsified, then there is 
virtually an infinitely greater probability that today’s theories are false rather than 
true. (ibid. 30) 
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The scientific disciplines continually discard and renew the provisional edifices that they 
construct in order to shed those elements that are non-functional, as well as to polish and amend 
theories to the best of the current base of knowledge. Similarly, writers of fiction – with Borges 
among them – create temporary universes that are to be demolished after they have served their 
purpose in provoking thought and sparking, in turn, further creativity. “Absolute Truth” remains, 
for both disciplines, a necessarily unattainable goal. A work of fiction cannot live forever – in 
fact, it cannot live at all. It can only potentially exist: a distinction that functions identically for 
scientific theories and brings our own study closer to linking the flights of potentiality (by way of 
Queneau and Oulipo) to be found in Italo Calvino’s philosophy and literary production with the 
ephemeral, superposed universes generated by modern physics and nurtured by Jorge Luis 
Borges. 
As a South-American writer, Borges has unsurprisingly received a preponderance of 
attention from scholars based all over the continent of his birth. Several have focused on the 
scientific aspects of Borges’ body of writing, and among these scholars stands out Guillermo 
Martinez, the author of a 2003 series of lectures presented at the Museo de Arte Latinoamericano 
de Buenos Aires entitled Borges y la matemática. A much less detailed overview than those 
provided by Bloch and Merrell and intended, apparently, for those with a more passive or lay 
interest in the scientific aspects of Jorge Luis Borges’ writing, this collection nevertheless adds 
several exhibits to the mound of proof for Borges’ scientific bent. 
Podríamos encontrar o forzar al texto a decir cosas que el texto no dice, ni tiene 
ninguna intención de decir. Un error di erudición. Por otro lado, si desconocemos 
en absoluto los elementos de matemática que están presentes reiteradamente en la 




It can be easy to misread Borges, specifically because of the potentiality inherent in his writing 
style, but Martinez argues that in certain cases we can be very sure of our judgment in reading 
Borges mathematically. He goes on to specify that 
…está claro que Borges sabe por lo menos los temas que estan contenidos en el 
libro que él prologa, Matemáticas e imaginación [by Kasner and Newman], y que 
son bastantes… Se tratan allí las paradojas lógicas, la cuestion de las diversas 
clases de infinito, algunos problemas básicos de topología, la teoría de las 
probabilidades. (ibid. 10-11) 
 
While this is not exactly a groundbreaking discovery on Martinez’ part – as even a casual 
reading of Borges would introduce the reader to these concepts – this statement serves to 
reinforce what Bloch and Merrell have already demonstrated and proven with regard to Borges’ 
fixation on the mathematical, the infinite, and the probabilistic. In apparent agreement with 
Merrell, Martinez delineates the shared ground between Borges’ fictive process and the 
traditionally accepted scientific method: 
Borges es un escritor que procede desde una idea: <<en el principio era la idea>>, 
y concibe sus ficciones como encarnaciones o avatares de una concepción 
abstracta. Hay también fragmentos de argumentación lógica en muchos de los 
relatos. Este tipo de matriz ensayística…es, indudablemente, uno de los elementos 
que marcan cierta similitud con el pensamiento científico. (ibid. 41)  
 
Borges’ structural signature in fiction-making can therefore be compared with great success to 
the matrices required for forming and executing experimental scientific hypotheses. The 
presence of logical argumentation (even when involving fictional precepts) allows Borges to 
proceed along the same trajectory as one would within a physical experiment or mathematical 
proof, and, as we have seen stated a number of times already, permits him to obtain end result 
that is as inevitably devoid of objective truth as anything that scientific inquiry can produce.    
 Before turning to Borges’ own words on this topic, we must include the work of another 
literary scholar who authored a 2007 article entitled “Borges en el territorio de la ciencia: 
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escrituras y lecturas” – Guillermo Boido, a professor of physics and astronomy and an expert on 
the writing of both Calvino and Borges. In this essay, Boido characterizes Calvino and Borges as 
authors who work astride “dimensiónes ficcionales de las ciencias formales y naturales”; this 
notion quite accurately categorizes Calvino’s entire fictional output as “una tarea seguramente 
transdisciplinaria.” (del Toro 59) This is equally true, according to Boido, for both authors. We 
might imagine, then, that if Calvino’s ideal literature were to function as a map of the universe, 
then Borges’ literary ideal may be depicted as a library that contains the universe within itself. 
Boido’s words reflect the consensus that has been seen so far among many literary-scientific 
scholars, and he goes on to add more evidence to the case being made of Borges-as-scientist by 
virtue of the Argentine author’s education and interests. 
El joven Borges fue contemporáneo de algunas de las revoluciones cientificas 
formales y naturales: la revisión de los fundamentos de la lógica y la matemática, 
la teoría de la relatividad, la fisica cuántica y el desarollo de la genética moderna 
datan del primer tercio del siglo. Célebres científicos, como Bertrand Russell, 
Albert Einstein o Julian Huxley, escribían por entonces o poco después libros de 
alta divulgación para poner al alcance del profano las nuevas ideas científicas en 
circulación. Sabemos incluso los títulos de algunos de ellos que Borges, 
insaciable lector de la cultura de su época, sin distinción de fronteras, leyó en 
distintos momentos de su vida… En múltiples escritos, Borges incursiona por las 
autoreferencias y las regresiones infinitas de la lógica, los numeros transfinitos, 
las series infinitas, la infinita divisibilidad del espacio y el tiempo, la 
irreversibilidad termodinámica, las simetrías, los universos paralelos, la 
cosmología, la memoria o la universalidad del azar, temas que, de un modo u otro, 
son patrimonio de la investigación científica actual.  (ibid. 47-48) 
 
With a justified lack of brevity, Boido enumerates the most important mathematical and 
astrophysical concepts of which Borges showed at least a measure of awareness. We must 
assume that Borges attained this knowledge through either chronological proximity to the 
appearances of these concepts in the intellectual zeitgeist, or through his own varied and esoteric 
tastes. In addition to listing what scientific concepts Borges knew about – which ranged from 
transfinite numbers to thermodynamics – Boido also echoes Martinez and Merrell in 
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emphasizing that the language shared by Borges’ literary output hews closely to that of typical 
scientific methodology.  
 Borges had a penchant for resisting the interpretations that scholars generated about his 
fiction; at times, he would wryly admit that the astonishing connections and symbols that literary 
critics found in his works were in no way intentional, and that he had no awareness of having 
woven such tropes and themes into his short stories.
5
 On matters of scientific knowledge, 
however, we are fortunate to have access to a considerable store of undeniably explicit proof in 
Borges’ non-fiction works. Here, we can allow Borges to speak for himself. 
 
Borges’ Scientific Formation 
 In order to trace the development of Borges’ understanding of scientific topics it would 
be best for us to move chronologically through a selection of his non-fiction works, beginning 
with “Verbiage for Poems,” written in 1926. Amid a discussion of poetic language, Borges states 
the following:  
I am insisting on the inventive character of any language, and I do so 
intentionally. Languages construct realities. The various disciplines of the 
intelligence have engendered worlds of their own and possess an exclusive 
vocabulary to describe them. The mathematical sciences wield their particular 
language made of digits and signs, no less subtle than any other. Metaphysics, the 
natural sciences, the arts, have all considerably increased our general store of 
words. (Selected Non-Fictions 21-22)   
This early position held by Borges seems to have already hinted at a well-formed understanding 
of the shared foundations of science and literature, with both disciplines functioning as equal 
contributors to the unified body of human language. In stating that “languages construct 
realities,” Borges also demonstrates an agreement with those – like Kurt Gӧdel – who first 
posited the provisional nature of the sciences and the distance created, through language, 
                                                          
5
“Jorge Luis Borges; The Art of Fiction No. 39” in The Paris Review, Winter-Spring 1967, No. 40. (Flushing, NY) 
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between that which exists and that which can be described. Despite this quotation’s placement at 
the early end of Borges’ career, it nonetheless represents an opinion that would not change 
significantly during the rest of his life.  
 A year later Borges presented “An Investigation of the Word,” and like many of his early 
essays it focuses specifically on language, but this time with a direct link to combinatorial 
mathematics. 
Llull – inspired by Jesus, they say – invented the so-called thinking machine, a 
kind of glorified lottery, though with a different mechanism; Spinoza did not 
postulate more than eight definitions and seven axioms to level the universe for 
us. As we can see, neither the latter with his geometric metaphysics nor the 
former with his alphabet translatable into words, and these into sentences, 
managed to elude language. Both systems were nourished by it. (ibid. 39)  
 
Raymond Llull and Baruch Spinoza – both icons of metaphysical science – attempted to 
circumvent language in their approaches to the Absolute, but here Borges notes the primacy of 
language in what may first appear to be “pure” mathematical exploits. Arithmetical ideas, no 
matter how simple, cannot be expressed except through a language, and simply switching the 
code from a spoken language to the shorthand language of logic – or even removing human 
thought from linguistic exercises entirely – will not succeed in shedding the albatross of 
language. It is not surprising, given the obstacle that language represents to the work of moving 
beyond finite human understanding and toward the Absolute, that Borges exhausted so many 
pages working out his own philosophy on the matter. 
 1929 would bring one of Borges’ better-known treatises on science: an essay entitled 
“The Perpetual Race of Achilles and the Tortoise.” It is as much a discussion of Bertrand Russell 
as a refutation of the postulations of Zeno and Parmenides, and will be analyzed in greater detail 
in the coming chapters. However, it is valuable to our current discussion in showing Borges’ 
familiarity with the philosophical icons who appear within its lines: the Greek mathematician 
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Parmenides and his disciple Zeno; Henri Bergson, a French philosopher who was also cited a 
number of times by Italo Calvino and whose philosophy focused on the role of intuition and 
creativity in understanding the structures of time and space; and Bertrand Russell, whose 
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and Knowledge of the External World Borges had 
avidly read and wryly defined as “unsatisfactory, intense book, inhumanly lucid.” (ibid. 46)  
 We can unexpectedly watch Borges beginning to flirt with astrophysics in “A Defense of 
Basilides the False,” wherein he mentions, in passing and with no additional context, “Richter’s 
discarded theory about the stellar origins of life and its chance dissemination on this planet.” 
(ibid. 68) Further research would come to show that Borges was referring to an extremely 
esoteric 1865 theory by Hermann Eberhard Richter which defined the concept of “cozmozoa” – 
specifically, that the organic life found on Earth might be essentially eternal, and that meteors 
could have carried such organic life around the cosmos, seeding it onto planets where they 
inevitably crashed. This is, of course, a terribly fanciful and ambitious hypothesis, given that 
there was (and is) no physical evidence of its veracity. In Borges, though, this theory simply 
serves to further demonstrate his far-reaching scientific curiosity and insatiable appetite for 
arcane knowledge. 
 By 1936, we can see Borges beginning to include more astrophysical themes in his non-
fiction essays, with “The Doctrine of Cycles” being a noteworthy example. On a general level, 
Borges seems to have written this piece to address Nietszche’s doctrine of “eternal return,” or 
infinite regress, from Die Unschuld des Werdens (1931) and Also sprach Zarathustra (1892). By 
the end of this uncharacteristically lengthy essay, Borges has nevertheless also managed to show 
off a great deal of scientific knowledge. He discusses the atomic characteristics of hydrogen: 
“The diameter of a hydrogen atom has been calculated, with some margin of error, to be one 
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hundred millionth of a centimeter.” (ibid. 115); he mentions “Georg Cantor and his heroic theory 
of [transfinite] sets” (ibid. 116); and he lays out the tenets of the second law of thermodynamics, 
even going so far as to address the concept of entropy, thereby demonstrating his awareness of 
the astrophysical nomenclature for what, at the time, was a very advanced and difficult topic. 
The first law of thermodynamics declares that the energy of the universe is 
constant; the second, that this energy tends toward isolation and disorder, though 
its total quantity does not decrease. This gradual disintegration of the forces that 
make up the universe is entropy… The second law of thermodynamics declares 
that some energetic processes are irreversible. Heat and light are no more than 
forms of energy. It suffices to project a light onto a black surface to convert it to 
heat. Heat, however, will never return to the form of light. (ibid. 121-122)  
 
Spring-boarding from this last thought, Borges goes on to detail the expected fate of the universe 
according to the processes of thermodynamics: an eventual entropic “heat-death.” 
Once maximum entropy is reached, once different temperatures have been 
equalized, once any action of one body on another has been neutralized (or 
compensated for), the world will be a random assemblage of atoms. In the deep 
center of the stars, this difficult, mortal equilibrium has been achieved. By dint of 
constant interchange, the whole universe will reach it, and will be warm and dead. 
Light is gradually lost in the form of heat; the universe, minute by minute, is 
becoming invisible. It grows more inconstant, as well. At some point, it will no 
longer be anything but heat: an equilibrium of immobile, evenly distributed heat. 
Then it will have died. (ibid. 122)  
 
As desperately hopeless as it is fascinating, this concept is presented by Borges in language that 
is lucid, clear and didactic while still remaining poetic. That he could not only explain entropy 
but do so artfully is a testament to his talent as well as his exceptional intelligence, and serves to 
link him even more strongly to Italo Calvino, whose Cosmicomics and T-zero accomplish a 
similar feat of transdisciplinary creativity.   
 In the same year as the previous essay, Borges also produced the confidently-titled “A 
History of Eternity,” which amounts to little more than a restatement of Bertrand Russell’s own 
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position on infinity – itself standing in direct opposition with Borges’ other beloved concept of 
transfinite sets. 
The Eleatic refutation of movement raises another problem, which can be 
expressed thus: It is impossible for fourteen minutes to elapse in eight hundred 
years of time, because first seven minutes must pass, and before seven, three and 
a half, and before three and a half, one and three-quarters, and so on infinitely, 
so that the fourteen minutes will never be completed. Russell rebuts this argument 
by affirming the reality and even the triteness of infinite numbers, which, 
however, by definition occur once and for all, and not as the “final” term of an 
endless enumerative process. Russell’s non-normal numbers are a fine 
anticipation of eternity, which also refuses to be defined by the enumeration of its 
parts. (SNF 124)  
Borges’ provides no hint as to whether he stands in philosophical agreement with Russell, but he 
was, as we have seen, such an avid reader of Russell’s that we can presume him to have drawn 
from Russell’s prose on a structural and even logical level. In fact, the real importance of this 
essay seems to actually be its function as an example of a Borges who flits from thinker to 
thinker, lighting briefly upon arguments and culling elements from often contradictory positions. 
His is an unbridled creativity in the spirit of Feyerabend and Kuhn (to be discussed in the next 
chapter), in which the individual parts of a theoretical structure need not be necessarily or 
entirely coherent – fostering, in a sense, a fiction that sits atop scientific philosophy.   
 Borges returns to the person of Raymond Llull in 1937, in a dedicated discussion of the 
13
th 
century inventor entitled “Raymond Llull’s Thinking Machine.” Lull had infamously created 
a mechanism that was touted to “think for itself” by generating random combinations of words 
without any human intervention. While certainly unprecedented, and also potentially able to 
create a large number of combinations, Borges notes that Llull’s machine did not “think” so 
much as simply play out a process initiated by a human mind, and was in this respect a failure. 
(ibid. 154) Following this dismissal, however, Borges softens his criticism with a measure of 
understanding and respect for Llull’s intentions. “We (who are basically no less naïve than Llull) 
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would load the machine differently, no doubt with the words Entropy, Time, Electrons, Potential 
Energy, Fourth Dimension, Relativity, Protons, Einstein.” (ibid. 157) Rife with provocative 
astrophysical terminology, this short list keys the reader into Borges’ growing familiarity with 
the then-current scientific paradigm. He continues: “The circumstances and objectives of this 
machine… no longer interest us, but its guiding principle – the methodological application of 
chance to the resolution of a problem – still does.” (ibid. 157) The type of machine built by Llull 
is worthless for mimicking human thought, then, but still holds immense literary value as its 
random combinations can inspire creativity and challenge rational thought. Just as interesting 
and germane to the purposes of our study are Calvino’s own thoughts on combinatorial writing, 
which are rooted in Raymond Queneau’s experimentation on “potential writing” and the 
subsequent works of the Oulipo writing group. Calvino would, in fact, go on to produce an entire 
novel by following the whims of random selection – The Castle of Crossed Destinies can be 
broadly described as the literary treatment of unplanned groupings of tarot cards, each 
haphazardly arranged according to chance. The implications of Borges’ interest in Llull, then, are 
far-reaching, especially within the parameters of a comparison with Italo Calvino. 
 Moving forward to 1939, we find a titillating excerpt in which Borges recounts his first 
memory of contact with the infinite – an infinite that is present, in one way or another, in the vast 
majority of his works of fiction. He takes us back to a scene from his childhood in “When 
Fiction Lives in Fiction”:  
I owe my first inkling of the problem of infinity to a large biscuit tin that was a 
source of vertiginous mystery during my childhood. On one side of this 
exceptional object was a Japanese scene; I do not recall the children or warriors 
who configured it, but I do remember that in a corner of the image the same 
biscuit tin reappeared with the same picture, and in it the same picture again, and 




This “vertiginous” mise en abyme sparked a conflagration in the mind of the young Borges. Like 
a flame placed between two mirrors, the endlessly recurring biscuit tin seemed to arch into 
eternity, its permanence tempered only by the limitations of human sight and the speed of light. 
It is worth reminding ourselves that, at the time of the penning of this memory, Borges was 
already well-aware of Cantorian set theory and its boggling structure of infinite sets contained 
within even more infinite sets. The concepts are identical: if the infinite exists, it exists for all 
things, and for all time. It is not difficult to see why a mind like Borges’ found unlimited fodder 
in such a concept.    
 Permutations of infinity would become heavily recurrent in the period following this 
essay. Again in 1939 with “The Total Library,” Borges encloses further thoughts on Cantor and 
the infinite as described by French thinker Blaise Pascal
6
 within the structure of a hypothetical, 
absolute library whose volumes would contain absolutely everything in the universe. His 
description is startlingly clear: 
Everything would be in its blind volumes… Everything: but for every sensible 
line or accurate fact there would be millions of meaningless cacophonies, verbal 
farragoes, and babblings. Everything: but all the generations of mankind could 
pass before the dizzying shelves – shelves that obliterate the day and on which 
chaos lies – ever reward them with a tolerable page. (ibid. 216)  
 
We can intuit that Borges fully understands the immense operation of combinatorial mathematics 
involved in a theoretical exercise on the scale of the “The Total Library.” The infinite is not a 
“number” in the conventional sense so much as it is a totality, or, inversely, an innumerability. 
Such a concept does not mesh readily with the finite structures of the human mind; our inability 
to conceive of totality can lead to ideations of horror, fear or anxiety. 
                                                          
6
Coupled with another essay entitled “Pascal’s Sphere” (see Selected Non-Fictions, pp. 351-353), this piece 
demonstrates Borges’ familiarity with Blaise Pascal’s strange orientation between religion and science, and his 
maddening obsession with infinity. 
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One of the habits of the mind is the invention of horrible imaginings. The mind 
has invented Hell, it has invented predestination to Hell, it has imagined the 
Platonic ideas, the chimera, the sphinx, abnormal transfinite numbers (whose 
parts are no smaller than the whole), masks, mirrors, operas, the teratological 
Trinity: the Father, the Son and the unresolvable Ghost, articulated into a single 
organism… (ibid. 216) 
In equating Cantor’s transfinite sets with monsters, theological mysteries and even Hell itself, we 
can be sure that Borges was no stranger to the terror that can be conjured through extended 
reflection on the implications of an infinite universe. 
 One of the briefest examples of Borges’ advanced understanding of physics and 
mathematics can be found in 1940’s “Time and J.W. Dunne.” Borges effectively introduces the 
reader to the concept of a fourth physical dimension, and quite correctly apprises us of a very 
common “bad intellectual habit” of “conceiving of time as a fourth dimension of space.” (ibid. 
219) The subtlety of this observation is exquisite; Borges is identifying the difference between 
what is technically known as “Minkowski space” – or, more colloquially, “spacetime,” in which 
time is defined as a non-Euclidean fourth dimension that acts upon the three better-known 
physical dimensions – and true, spatial four-dimensionality within Euclidean space. Most likely 
gleaned from his many readings in physics and geometry, this distinction drawn between such 
theoretical minutiae is especially impressive when coming from relative layman such as Borges. 
 More on Borges’ studies of the fourth dimension can be predictably found in an un-
translated essay entitled “La cuarta dimensión.” Borges begins by noting, possibly, the first 
known usage of the term “fourth dimension” by Henry More in 1670, prior to which these two 
simple words had been “antes no combinadas.” (Textos Recobrados 95) He then moves into an 
explication of this idea’s development, while listing a number of scientific and mathematical 
icons along the way: Kant; Fechner; Helmholtz; Riemann; Whitehead; Einstein; Hinton; and 
Uspenski. (ibid. 95) After this brief preamble, Borges once again flexes his understanding of the 
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nuanced distinction between Euclidean and non-Euclidean space. In brief, lucid prose he 
provides a basic introduction to three-dimensional geometry: 
Generalmente, los alegatos por una cuarta dimensión derivan de las definiciones 
preliminares de la geometría euclideana. Ésta procede de manera sintética: 
empieza por el punto convencional, que se postula sin dimensión de ninguna 
clase; pasa después a la línea convencional, que se postula como longitud sin 
anchura; pasa después a la superficie convencional, que se postula como simple 
extensión, sin profundidad; y arriba así al volumen o cuerpo, que abarca las tres 
dimensiones. (ibid. 96)  
 
Almost immediately, though, and much in line with what has already been established regarding 
the provisionality of the foundations of science and language, Borges doubles back to clarify 
what he has just presented: “Conviene repetir que esa operación está a cargo de símbolos y que 
no se concibe el momento en que los puntos inextensos empiezan a trazar una línea, o las líneas 
sin anchura una superficie, o las superficies un cuerpo.” (ibid. 96) The established description of 
three-dimensional space, then, is a convention that enables us to conceive of its existence, and 
does not function as a literal description of the actual structure of space and time. 
Points, as he explains, do not “engender” lines, nor do lines surfaces, nor do surfaces 
volume; all things exist in three dimensions, and only in three dimensions. (ibid. 96) Logically, 
these three dimensions do not engender a fourth; if a fourth dimension (or fifth, or sixth…) 
exists, it always does and always has. “La superficie, el punto y la línea son ideales geométricos, 
pero asimismo lo es el volumen y asimismo lo puede ser el hipervolumen, de cuatro 
dimensiones.” (ibid. 97) Again, Borges astounds with his knowledge of a subject so traditionally 
foreign to that of literature, along with his ability to distill such knowledge into a simplified and 
engaging format that is suitable for varied readership. 
 It is the latter section of “La cuarta dimensión” that is especially germane to our study, 
particularly in its representation of science as instrumental in feeding the imagination – an 
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exercise that is crucial to the production of good fiction. Borges cites Charles Hinton, the 
“father” of four-dimensional geometry: 
No habrá en el Universo material un solo trángulo absolutamente equilátero, pero 
lo podemos intuir; no habrá un solo hipercono, pero alguna vez lo intuiremos. Esa 
promesa nos da el libro de Hinton, Una Nueva Era del Pensamiento, que consta 
de una serie de ejercicios con cubos de diversos colores, para educar la 
imaginación. (ibid. 97) 
 
We therefore can hope to imagine that which does not exist, and such an endeavor is made much 
easier when we are given the germ of an idea before we have begun to visualize. Science, in its 
process of generating successive hypotheses, can aid in the creative process by stretching the 
limits of that to which our minds have access. Borges, as always, says it best: “Rehusar la cuarta 
dimensión es limitar el mundo; afirmarla es enriquecerlo.” (ibid. 97) 
 Borges was known as much for his book reviews and newspaper columns as he was for 
his fictions. Several of these reviews, which were intended for a general audience, can assist us 
in further delineating the extent of his scientific knowledge, with his 1940 review of Edward 
Kasner and James Newman’s Mathematics and the Imagination at the forefront. His commentary 
on this work illustrates an awareness of scientific debates regarding the fourth dimension, 
transfinite numbers, the paradoxes of Zeno, and Euclidean geometry.  
Its four hundred pages lucidly record the immediate and accessible charms of 
mathematics, those which even a mere man of letters can understand, or imagine 
he understands: the endless map of Brouwer, the fourth dimension glimpsed by 
More and which Charles Howard Hinton claims to have intuited, the mildly 
obscene Moebius strip, the rudiments of the theory of transfinite numbers, the 
eight paradoxes of Zeno, the parallel lines of Desargues that intersect in infinity, 
the binary notation Leibniz discovered in the diagrams of the I Ching, the 
beautiful Euclidean demonstration of the stellar infinity of the prime numbers, the 
problem of the tower of Hanoi, the equivocal or two-pronged syllogism. (SNF 
249) 
In a clear effort to emphasize the accessibility of Kasner and Newman’s book to the layman, 
Borges also finds a way to wryly editorialize the narrative behind these scientific concepts, 
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injecting lightness into a genre that can often come across as terribly dry. One can argue that this 
approach is analogous to that which Calvino would set forth as an educational ideal; by fusing 
the emotional capacity of creative writing with the theoretical structure of scientific philosophy, 
Borges prefigured Calvino’s vision for the future transmission of human knowledge. 
 Borges’ writing on film was not devoid of scientific subject matter, either; in a very short 
piece entitled “On Dubbing,” he again invokes the horror of infinity in order to outline the 
consequences of mixing numerous languages with fixed visuals. 
The art of combination is not infinite in its possibilities, though those possibilities 
are apt to be frightening. The Greeks engendered the chimera, a monster with the 
head of a lion, the head of a dragon, and the head of a goat; the second-century 
theologians, the Trinity, in which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are 
inextricably linked; the Chinese zoologists, the ti-yiang, a bright red, supernatural 
bird equipped with six feet and six wings but with neither face nor eyes; 
nineteenth-century geometrists, the hypercube, a four-dimensional figure 
enclosing an infinite number of cubes and bounded by eight cubes and twenty-
four squares. (ibid. 262) 
 
This hypercube, mentioned in an earlier citation by Borges from “La cuarta dimension,” is 
placed alongside such fearful creations as the chimera and the ti-yiang and represents the 
potential insanity that four-dimensionality could cause within the rational and limited human 
mind, which struggles to conceive of it. Going further, Borges also invokes the tesseract
7
, 
another approximate representation – along with the hypercube – of a four-dimensional figure in 
three-dimensional space. Such an object, if it could ever really exist, would be an abomination in 
its capacity to boggle and short-circuit human understanding. That Borges could weave such an 
esoteric discussion into a treatise on film dubbing is proof of his unique ability to harmoniously 
fuse varied forms of knowledge. 
                                                          
7
“Hinton spent years developing ingenious methods by which the average person and a growing legion of followers, 
not only professional mathematicians, could ‘see’ four-dimensional objects. Eventually, he perfected cubes that, if 
one tried enough, could allow one to visualize hypercubes, or cubes in four dimensions. These would eventually be 
called Hinton’s cubes. Hinton even coined the official name for an unraveled hypercube, a tesseract, which found its 
way into the English language.” (Kaku, Hyperspace 69-70)   
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 We have so far reviewed a great number of non-fiction works by Borges which have 
dealt with mathematical and scientific themes, often with a particular focus on the implications 
of the infinite, and just as often in the midst of wholly non-scientific subject matter. A last area 
for us to explore, then, is Borges’ insertion of such themes into the works of others – specifically 
in prologues written for Ray Bradbury and Charles Howard Hinton. 
 Ray Bradbury’s 1950 short-story collection The Martian Chronicles – a fictional future-
history of the human race’s escape from a benighted Earth and their subsequent exodus to Mars – 
was translated into Spanish in 1954, and included a prologue by Borges that invoked the memory 




In the seventeenth century, Kepler wrote a Somnium Astronomicum that purports 
to be a transcription of a book read in a dream, whose pages reveal at great length 
the appearance and habits of the lunar snakes, which take shelter in deep caves 
during the heat of the day and venture out at nightfall. (SNF 418) 
 
Three-hundred years before Bradbury, Kepler had engaged in the same exercise of imagining 
and detailing a strange civilization on a foreign planet. This “astronomical dream” of Kepler – 
the product of unrestrained creative freedom and intended as a satire of earthly exploits as seen 
from the moon – was uncharacteristic of the normally meticulous and rational Kepler, and was 
not published during his lifetime. Its function in Borges’ prologue seems to be that of bridging 
not only the chronological gulf between the present and the past but also underlining the 
constancy of certain “big” human questions: Why are we here? Is there life anywhere else? If so, 
what is it like? Bradbury and Kepler – two minds situated far apart in time and space – appear to 
have both attempted the same exercise, and Borges, noting this, links them in order to add 
significance and weight to a fictional work intended for a popular audience. In this way, popular 
                                                          
8
“The Harmony of the Worlds”. Cosmos: A Personal Voyage. Narr. Carl Sagan. 12 Oct. 1980. Television Series. 
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fiction is made into a didactic and philosophical exercise, thereby fulfilling the dual functions of 
delighting and informing the reader. 
 Years later, Borges would provide a prologue for Charles Hinton’s Scientific Romances, a 
collection of Hinton’s science-fiction works from the late 1800s which were among the first to 
deal with themes involving upper-dimensionality. Like Borges’ treatment of this theme in “La 
cuarta dimensión,” here he sets the stage for Hinton’s “What is the Fourth Dimension?” by once 
again laying bare the provisional and subjective foundations of mathematics. 
We tend to forget that the elements of geometry that are learned in elementary 
school pertain to abstract concepts and correspond to nothing in so-called reality. 
These concepts are the point, which occupies no space; the line, which, no matter 
how long, consists of an infinite number of lines, one on top of the other; and 
volume, made from an infinite number of planes like an infinite deck of cards. 
(ibid. 509) 
  
Borges goes on to cite a 17
th
-century innovation: “the hypervolume formed by an infinite number 
of volumes, and limited by volumes, not by planes.” He also mentions a number of other four-
dimensional, geometrical monsters: “hypercubes, hyperprisms, hyperpyramids, hypercones, 
truncated hypercones, hyperspheres, etc.” (ibid. 509) These structures would, of course, be 
desperately beyond the preparation of the average reader of fiction, but we might presume that 
Borges mentions them not to inform, but to overwhelm. The human mind’s aforementioned 
inability to conceive of the fourth dimension is insuperable, but in generating a sensation of 
anxiety and confusion by way of a rather Baroque list of four-dimensional shapes, Borges is able 
to cause a similar effect in the reader. That he goes on to mention the possibility of “universes of 
two, four, five, six dimensions, and so infinitely until one has exhausted all of the natural 
numbers” only reinforces this confusion, along with our own hypothesis. (ibid. 510)   
A full review of Borges’ scientific output could go on for many more pages, but in the 
interest of moving our study forward we must now turn to the next chapter. While it is not 
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necessary to re-state all that has been said in the previous pages before we move forward, certain 
themes will bear emphasizing. We have shown that Borges and Calvino both received significant 
educations in scientific and mathematical subject matter, with Calvino as the curious and dutiful 
son of scientists and Borges openly indulging a voracious appetite for scientific readings. Both 
Calvino and Borges prolifically produced non-fiction works in which varied elements of science 
are presented cleanly and clearly for a wide audience – a practice that lies parallel with Calvino’s 
stated plan for an interdisciplinary and didactic form of fiction, which was outlined in Six Memos 
for the Next Millennium. Both authors recognized and analyzed the subjective and arbitrary 
foundations of fiction and science, and drew comparisons between these (and other) disciplines 
in order to promote epistemological parity and encourage an interdisciplinary approach to 
writing. Reflecting on what we have established here will propel us toward the next chapter, in 
which we will review the scientific discoveries and concepts that most affected the creative 
output of Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges, before finally moving into a detailed analysis of 




































Part 1, Chapter 1 - The Legacy of Scientific Philosophy 
 
 Before we can effectively discuss any aspect of the role of scientific processes in the 
genesis of fiction, there must first be laid considerable groundwork. While we will eventually 
encounter the most important scientific discoveries of the last century, we must first achieve a 
solid philosophical basis upon which to begin our discussion. Commencing with an overview of 
the deductive logic of Karl Popper, we will then move through Thomas Kuhn’s socio-scientific 
concept of paradigm shifts and, finally, into the anarchic creativity of Paul Feyerabend – each of 
whom represents a significant milestone in the development of the philosophy of science. 
 
Karl Popper 
 In 1935, Austrian philosopher Karl Popper published his first edition of The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery. Intended to offer a fresh approach to scientific methodology, Popper’s 
bombshell work was met with both harsh criticism and congratulatory ovation. His argument was 
simple, yet staggering in its complexity: universal statements, the cornerstone of the traditional, 
inductive method of science, created logical contradictions in that they could not be conclusively 
verified simply through observation and subsequent singular statements. (Popper 4) If one 
considers the example, “I saw three white swans = all swans are white,” the logical fallacy is 
made readily apparent – one cannot possibly speak about all swans without having seen all 
swans. Unfortunately, much of humanity’s scientific knowledge had been based on this 
seemingly functional but ultimately flawed methodology, and Popper’s aim was to convince his 
contemporaries to abandon the principle of induction. His arguments that inductive logic was 
superfluous, self-congratulating, rife with inconsistencies and caught in the useless spiral of an 
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“infinite regress” were met, in turn, with venomous reproach. (ibid. 5) Hans Reichenbach, a 
Positivist and staunch supporter of inductive logic, said of Popper’s criticisms:  
This principle determines the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate it from 
science would mean nothing less than to deprive science of the power to decide 
the truth or falsity of its theories. Without it, clearly, science would no longer 
have the right to distinguish its theories from the fanciful and arbitrary creations 
of the poet’s mind.” (ibid. 4-5)   
 
Popper, indeed, had begun to highlight a larger problem at the core of all human epistemological 
enterprises: that what had been assumed to be knowable might remain forever outside of 
humanity’s grasp. 
Popper’s introduction of the “deductive method” of logic suddenly permitted a variable 
range of credibility for each individual theory. By beginning with a hypothesis and testing its 
falsifiability, scientists could plumb the limits of what might be verified and conclusively known, 
rather than trustingly accept that which was assumed to be true based on a limited number of 
personal observations. Popper hoped also to remove what he referred to as “psychologism” from 
the scientific enterprise, with the goal of preventing emotion and egotistical pride from 
muddying the potentially “pure” waters of science. (ibid. 7) He is clear in his intentions: 
In rejecting the method of induction, it may be said, I deprive empirical science of 
what appears to be its most important characteristic; and this means that I remove 
the barriers which separate science from metaphysical speculation. My reply to 
this objection is that my main reason for rejecting inductive logic is precisely that 
it does not provide a suitable distinguishing mark of the empirical, non-
metaphysical, character of a theoretical system. (ibid. 11)  
 
Popper’s main assault against inductivism was based on his observation that, despite the 
Positivists’ apparent desire to eliminate metaphysics from “pure” science, they nevertheless had 
constant recourse to universal and untenably illogical statements. In doing so, they flirted with 
the annihilation of natural science along with metaphysics. (ibid. 13)   
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 Popper obviously treads on dangerous ground – to call into question the logical basis of 
natural science requires strong conviction and a clear mind. In his own words, he establishes a 
new set of principles:  
My business, as I see it, is not to bring about the overthrow of metaphysics. It is, 
rather, to formulate a suitable characterization of empirical science, or to define 
the concepts ‘empirical science’ and ‘metaphysics’ in such a way that we shall be 
able to say of a given system of statements whether or not its closer study is the 
concern of empirical science… Thus anyone who envisages a system of 
absolutely certain, irrevocably true statements as the end and purpose of science 
will certainly reject the proposals I shall make here… I hope that my proposals 
may be acceptable to those who value not only logical rigour but also freedom 
from dogmatism; who seek practical applicability, but are even more attracted by 
the adventure of science, and by discoveries which again and again confront us 
with new and unexpected questions, challenging us to try out new and hitherto 
undreamed-of answers.  (ibid. 14-15) 
 
And so, in words that might just as well have been spoken in the name of literature or art, Popper 
reframes the goal of science – not as the pursuit of some eventual, ultimate Truth, but instead as 
an investigation of the limits of knowledge within the parameters of our senses and mental 
faculties. He would state later that “an assertion which owing to its logical form is not testable 
can at best operate, within science, as stimulus: it can suggest a problem.” (ibid. 81) Though 
some ideas within this new science might spring from a speculative, literary, or even 
“metaphysical” font, Popper vows to retain a firm footing in the rigors of methodical testing and 
empirical falsifiability. (ibid. 16-18)  
 Popper’s defense of his position is lengthy, intricate and well-argued. For the sake of this 
study, however, we need only turn to one of his most heartbreakingly earnest meditations on 
epistemology:  
The empirical basis of objective science has nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science 
does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it 
were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven 
down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; 
and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm 
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ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to 
carry the structure at least for the time being. (ibid. 94)  
 
Echoing the agile approach of Henri Poincaré, Popper acutely delineates the limits of human 
knowledge by sacrificing humanity’s golden, untouchable truths. Of them, he concludes that 
“our method of research is not to defend them, in order to prove how right we were. On the 
contrary, we try to overthrow them.” (ibid. 280)  
If we reflect again on the previous quotation of Reichenbach, we can be almost certain 
that he could not have expected science’s future to increasingly resemble those much-maligned 
“fanciful and arbitrary creations,” nor would he have foreseen to what extent the poet’s mind and 
the mind of the scientist might eventually merge into one holistic viewpoint (and perhaps never 
so much so as in the cases of Borges and Calvino). In turn, Popper’s rejection of universal 
statements exposed more than he might have even realized about the nature of knowledge – 
namely, that universal statements are logically inconsistent since one can never make them from 
within a system.  
 
Thomas Kuhn 
The limits of knowledge have come to be seen as the central hurdle of modern science, as 
we will note later when discussing the origins of quantum physics and the study of the anomalies 
of deep space. As mankind has been faced with an unending series of epistemological 
foundations, it has occasionally experienced the anguished pangs of paradigm shifts. Thomas 
Kuhn is credited with coining and defining the concept of the paradigm shift in 1962, in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn laid out crisis and conflict as the harbingers of new 
paradigms – as ineluctable steps in the scientific process, rather than as pitfalls or obstacles. 
Through the revision, criticism and eventual abandonment of obsolete ideas, mankind can 
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expand its threshold of knowledge and allow more current visions of the universe to take shape. 
What makes this concept a particularly compelling companion to an examination of the scientific 
aspects of the works of Borges and Calvino is Kuhn’s rejection of fixed and unmovable ideas. 
“Normal science is a highly determined activity,” he states, “but it need not be entirely 
determined by rules.” (Kuhn 42) As we outline the history of the philosophy of science, moving 
steadily through “incommensurable ways of seeing the world and practicing science in it,” (ibid 
4) more and more will its shape come to resemble that of an ideal form of literature whose goal 
is the drawing together of all disciplines. 
Kuhn initially lays out his argument by tracing the pattern of crests and troughs that 
defines the development of scientific ideas:  
Normal science repeatedly goes astray. And when it does – when, that is, the 
profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of 
scientific practice – then begin the extraordinary investigations that lead the 
profession at last to a new set of commitments… (ibid. 5-6)   
 
New ideas are formed by way of the recapitulation and re-evaluation of “prior fact” across 
numerous years and multiple minds (ibid. 6). In the same way as scientists whose shared 
paradigms permit a collaborative or antagonistic effort to bring forth innovation, Jorge Luis 
Borges and Italo Calvino can be seen as kindred researchers and inventors. Not all scientists – or 
writers, for that matter – are obliged to shift paradigms simultaneously, which makes it all the 
more significant that Borges and Calvino appear to have shared a common methodology in their 
descriptions of reality.    
 Kuhn does not leave Popper entirely behind in his approach to scientific methodology: 
“To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, 
and in fact never does, explain all facts with which it can be confronted.” (ibid. 17-18) Just as we 
found in Popper, here again is that absence of absolute fact; the best that mankind can hope for 
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are educated and informed guesses based on observation, experience, and, most crucially, 
falsification and skepticism. This is not say that there can be no accepted body of knowledge, or 
that everything need be presumed false – on the contrary, the working corpus of human 
knowledge grows stronger with every new conflict and each discarded theorem. Kuhn elaborates 
on such innovations:  
When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he need no longer, 
in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, starting from the first 
principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced. That can be left to 
the writer of textbooks. (19-20) 
 
By extension, can we not reason that the literary writer – the Borges or the Calvino of any given 
paradigm – embodies a fusion of the roles of textbook writer and scientific innovator? If every 
work of fiction necessarily generates a provisionally accepted view of the universe, surely its 
creator must straddle the divide between these disciplines. Further words by Thomas Kuhn 
bolster this assertion: “Today in the sciences, books are usually either texts or retrospective 
reflections upon one aspect or another in the scientific life.” (ibid. 20) It will be shown in later 
chapters of this study that Borges and Calvino were indisputably engaged in this very same 
pursuit, and found results similar to those of whom we would traditionally refer to as 
“scientists.” Additionally, and again in line with Kuhn’s observations, scientists no longer write 
books for the layman – instead, there must be a translation. (ibid. 21) Indeed, the gulf between 
the public and the specialists is vast. Without the momentum of the populace, though, no 
scientific idea can move from germ to paradigm. It is in precisely this location that Borges and 
Calvino (as “writer-scientists”) reside. Their recapitulations of and elaborations on established 
elements of the scientific paradigm have the functions of both educating a reading public and 
simultaneously modifying and manipulating the framework of the paradigm itself. Throughout 
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their oeuvres, Borges and Calvino generated new methodologies and willingly disposed of 
obsolete ideas, all in the name of descriptive efficacy.   
 Turning again to Kuhn’s words, we can move forward into a discussion of the often-
accidental nature of innovation:  
No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; 
indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists 
normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those 
invented by others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to the 
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies. 
(ibid. 24) 
 
Is this not – again – an analogue to the process and industry of literature? How many writers can 
be said to have established wholly new genres? Kuhn goes on to say that  
a part of normal theoretical work… consists simply in the use of existing theory to 
predict factual information of intrinsic value. The manufacture of astronomical 
ephemerides, the computation of lens characteristics, and the production of radio 
propagation curves are examples of problems of this sort. (ibid. 30) 
   
This is an equivalency to the nearly endless and predictable elaborations of genre that appear on 
bookstore shelves and online shopping carts – one need only glance at the flush of red, blue and 
silver swathing the familiar-sounding titles of paperbacks in the Romance aisle at an airport 
bookstore, or the repeated themes summarized in the front jackets of myriad best-sellers, to get a 
sense that innovation is not as easily found as one might think. This is not say that such examples 
of genre elaboration are not needed – on the contrary, they steadily swell the paradigm to a 
breaking point, enabling each aspect of “normal” research to eventually reach a dead-end, 
requiring a shift in perspective to provide resolution. Kuhn confirms this process, stating that 
“extraordinary problems are not to be had for the asking. They emerge only on special occasions 
prepared by the advance of normal research.” (ibid. 34) 
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 To render this argument more salient, we can take an example from Calvino’s Mr. 
Palomar to represent an illustration of the process through which “normal science” becomes 
more and more complex, reaches a paradox, and finally requires a paradigm shift to resolve its 
inconsistencies. Being a simple story of observational research at its core, Palomar’s journey 
begins with the protagonist “reading a wave” – he sits on the shore and watches the surf, 
gradually attempting to focus his gaze on individual waves, and then on the discrete parts of each 
wave. As he tries to delineate where exactly one wave ends and another begins, he is confounded 
by the interplay of other waves, people in the surf and the eventual understanding that in trying 
to see one wave he loses his focus on the others (which is in itself a version of Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle, to be covered in the next chapter). As this short tale comes to a close, 
Palomar loses his patience and walks off, “tense and nervous as when he came, and even more 
unsure about everything.” (Calvino 8). Palomar has encountered a difficult problem in the midst 
of what appeared to be a very elementary observational exercise. Kuhn explains that “even the 
project whose goal is paradigm articulation does not aim at the unexpected novelty.” (Kuhn 35) 
It is in precisely this way that normal science can stumble upon a paradigm-changing event.
9
    
 We have said much about the methodological properties of “normal science,” but what of 
its social aspects? Like literature, science also can affect the world in which it works, and in 
some ways the culture of this world is reflected in the science that it generates. Kuhn astutely 
notes that “a paradigm can…even insulate the community from those socially important 
                                                          
9
One concession that must be made in science’s defense is that, unlike science’s constant negotiation with the 
material world, writers are free, in most senses, to follow whimsy rather than fact, thereby facilitating wild 
experimentation with relative immunity to physical consequences. But then even this division, when we arrive at our 




problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the 
conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies.” (ibid. 37) He goes on: 
The scientist must, for example, be concerned to understand the world and to 
extend the precision and scope with which it has been ordered… And, if that 
scrutiny displays pockets of apparent disorder, then these must challenge him to a 
new refinement of his observational techniques or to a further articulation of his 
theories. (ibid. 42) 
 
One can posit that this same approach applies directly to the cases of Jorge Luis Borges and Italo 
Calvino. When considering intricate, mathematically-driven stories like “The Library of Babel” 
or “The Garden of Forking Paths,” it is not difficult to see Borges as a practitioner of such 
“extraordinary science,” initiating a movement through and past the tropes and structures of a 
former paradigm; just as easily could one consider Calvino a Borgesian “scientist” through his 
innovative fusion of scientific thought and literary innovation. Perhaps in this way, by modeling 
the techniques of science, literature succeeds in joining the scientific conversation already in 
progress. 
 Kuhn provides further evidence that writers and scientists are, ultimately, not so different;  
One is at liberty to suppose that somewhere along the way the scientist has 
intuitively abstracted the rules of the game for himself, but there is little reason to 
believe it. Though many scientists talk easily and well about the particular 
individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are 
little better than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its 
legitimate problems and methods. (ibid. 47) 
 
This idea – that scientists do not belong to an elite group but, rather, simply demonstrate an 
advanced knowledge of some highly particular aspect of a largely decentralized whole – throws 
open the gates to the realm of science and allows those who craft literature to enter freely, and 
with just as much claim to accuracy and authority as those who have perennially dwelt there. It 
would seem, also, that our granting both Borges and Calvino the titles of “literary scientists” 
cannot be met with anything but acceptance while keeping Kuhn’s words in mind. 
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 And what of the “revolutions” named in the title of Kuhn’s most famous work? What 
effects do they have on the world around us? We are told that, on an immediate level, they are 
mundane. “There is no geographical transplantation; outside the laboratory everyday affairs 
usually continue as before. Nevertheless, paradigm changes so cause scientists to see the world 
of their research-engagement differently.” (ibid. 111) These subtle effects of internal revolutions 
mimic those of literary innovations – while they may not visibly affect the outside world, they do 
reshape the world-view of those who are privy to their occurrences. Additionally, after the dust 
has cleared and a new discovery has taken hold of those within the paradigm, the writing begins 
anew; textbooks are revised and generated; articles and arguments are penned and published 
(ibid. 144). The foundation of all of science’s pursuits rests firmly on literary bedrock, then: that 
of the written word. 
 The latter portion of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions emits even more 
exemplary ideas that support our argument that the writing of Borges and Calvino can be 
ascribed equally to the dimensions of science and literature. We are asked whether we can “very 
much depend upon a definition of science,” and whether such a definition can “tell a man 
whether he is a scientist or not.” (ibid. 160) Kuhn also insists that “science is any field in which 
progress is marked,” which would allow any number of human endeavors to be potentially 
considered “sciences.” In a final stroke of open-minded clarity, Kuhn confesses in his postscript 
to what the reader has implicitly understood all along: 
To the extent that the book portrays scientific development as a succession of 
tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks, its theses are 
undoubtedly of wide applicability. But they should be, for they are borrowed from 
other fields. Historians of literature, of music, of the arts, of political 
development, and of many other human activities have long described their 





 Paul Feyerabend, an Austrian philosopher and physicist, will serve as the final character 
in this brief overview of relatively recent scientific philosophy, and rightly so, as his “anything 
goes” approach to framing scientific progress and epistemic validity will deliver us to the very 
doorstep of the fictive literary act as embodied in Calvino and Borges. His controversial Against 
Method (1975) was an attempt to illustrate that all great scientific discoveries do not stem from a 
rigid, dogmatic reading of methodological rules, but rather occur only when the established order 
has been suspended, broken or bent to the will of the scientist.  Not intended as an assault on the 
work of scientists, Feyerabend’s work was rather meant to be a harsh light shone on the 
hegemony of intellectual ideology. In his words: “Single-mindedness in pursuit of any goal, 
including truth and understanding, yields great rewards. But single vision is folly if it makes you 
think you see THE truth, the one and only truth. So, ‘anything goes.’” (Feyerabend XIII) Even 
the precious position that science has held in society as a bastion of empirical fact is called into 
question in Feyerabend’s thesis – instead, he proposes an equalization of all disciplines and 
fields, so that none might wield too much influence on the public and no potentially fruitful 
hypothesis might be ignored or cast aside due to aesthetic or personal prejudice.  
Some of the most important formal properties of a theory are found by contrast, 
and not by analysis. A scientist… must adopt a pluralistic methodology… Experts 
and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth-freaks and liars – they are all 
invited to participate in the contest and to make their contribution to the 
enrichment of our culture. (ibid. 13) 
   
As we will see in chapters to come, this approach mirrors the encyclopedic and broadly inclusive 
styles of both Borges and Calvino and epitomizes the ideal, multifaceted “literature’ that Calvino 
optimistically envisioned for the future. 
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 But where are the rules in Feyerabend? How is anything to be considered “proven” if 
truth itself is no longer a stable foundation upon which to judge theories? The author’s 
admittedly idealist and Marxist approach to the business of science does not leave us with many 
concrete answers. At turns playful and arrogant, sober and humanistic, Feyerabend did not set 
out to rewrite or replace the rules of science. (ibid. 16) Instead, he strove to supply modern 
thinkers with a larger toolkit with which to craft their ideas. His seems to be very much a 
philosophical battle, which, in the end, is probably not such a bad thing for a philosopher. His 
feelings on pluralist methodology are clearly stated: 
There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of improving our 
knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for 
improving every single theory. Nor is political interference rejected. It may be 
needed to overcome the chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to the 
status quo… A scientist who is interested in maximal empirical content, and who 
wants to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible, will adopt a 
pluralistic methodology, he will compare theories with other theories rather than 
with ‘experience’, ‘data’ or ‘facts’, and he will try to improve rather than discard 
the views that appear to lose in the competition. For the alternatives, which he 
needs to keep the contest going, may be taken from the past as well. As a matter 
of fact, they may be taken from wherever one is able to find them – from ancient 
myths and modern prejudices; from the lucubrations of experts and from the 
fantasies of cranks… The separation between the history of a science, its 
philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation 
between science and non-science. (ibid. 27) 
 
There is not much to add to such a passionate exhortation of the need for creativity and 
imagination in the hard sciences, except to acknowledge that, at this point, Feyerabend has 
eliminated many of the divisions between the realms of fact and fiction – myth can become 
reality, and a raving lunatic can be a “scientist,” even if only in name. Surely not all of this is 
meant to be taken quite so literally, but somewhere therein we find the same spirit of 
interdisciplinary ingenuity and curious, freeform experimentation that has allowed the greatest 
successes of both Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges to come into existence. 
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 This is not to say that Paul Feyerabend’s legacy is all starry-eyed idealism – quite the 
contrary. Throughout Against Method, Feyerabend rails against Karl Popper’s standards for 
falsifiability and reason, largely for their “inhuman” and rigid characteristics. Referring to 
Popper’s project as “specialized, formalistic and elitist, and devoid of the concern for human 
happiness,” (ibid. 27) Feyerabend criticizes his erstwhile colleague for limiting the freedom of 
the scientist to choose ideas at will and as needed according to the terms of his own process and 
his own imagination. He noted that “such a procedure may satisfy the school philosopher, who 
looks at life through spectacles of his own technical problems and recognizes hatred, love, 
happiness, only to the extent to which they occur in these problems. But,” he continues, “if we 
consider human interests and above all, the question of human freedom…then we are proceeding 
in the worst possible fashion.” (ibid. 156) In his own defense (had he still drawn breath) Popper 
might have argued that Feyerabend’s approach quite obstinately made no attempt to pose 
counter-arguments against competing theories just as it nevertheless embraced other theories 
without testing their limits of falsifiability, thereby leaving the door open to shaky science and a 
total lack of rigor and accountability. (ibid. 153) Popper earnestly attempted to make the best of a 
scientific and human condition in which nothing is truly knowable, as he himself would have 
freely admitted. Nevertheless, Feyerabend’s well-intentioned spirit is the closest kin to Calvino’s 
humanist enterprise and, at certain moments, of Borges’ touching and delicately intimate 
humanity. 
 In any case, if one suspends for a moment their judgment of the practical aspects of 
Feyerabend’s program and instead allows him the indulgence of illustration, he does succeed in 
expressing the nuanced basis of his fledgling system. For example, in a brief summarization of 
the history of science Feyerabend recalls that both Aristotle and Ptolemy agreed that the Earth 
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was a stationary object in the ether, and that all other bodies revolved in relation to it. This 
position was in direct opposition to that of their allegedly quirky but esteemed predecessor, 
Pythagoras, who had held that it was in fact the Earth that moved in relation to other celestial 
bodies. Much later, Nicolas Copernicus exhumed this dead Pythagorean model in order to 
support and prove his own heliocentric celestial model. By rejecting the perennially accepted fact 
that the Earth was a stationary object and by reconnecting with a previously discarded theory, 
Feyerabend posits, Copernicus reached into the past in order to carry science into the future. 
(ibid. 29) Feyerabend makes similar arguments in favor of a pluralistic methodology, drawing 
examples from Chinese and Western medicine (ibid. 31) as well as the arts (ibid. 32). It is 
precisely this unrestrained and inclusive spirit that Feyerabend sought to express in Against 
Method. 
 Knowing what we do about Feyerabend after this brief and necessarily incomplete   
introduction, one might be left with the impression that, as he opines, science is much more 
“sloppy” or “irrational” than what its methodological visage might suggest  (ibid. 160). True or 
not, these two terms are perhaps unnecessarily negative. In our further discussions of scientific 
concepts and the literature of Calvino and Borges, we will instead prefer to demonstrate the 








Part 1, Chapter 2 – Foundational Physics 
 
 
Approaching the Modern Age 
 In an essay entitled “The Book of Nature in Galileo,” written in 1985 and later published 
in English in a collection of works entitled Why Read the Classics?, Italo Calvino cites what he 
considers to be Galileo Galilei’s most potent maxim: “Nature is written in a mathematical 
language.” (Calvino 83) The link between these two concepts, Calvino explains, lies in the 
divergent notions of world and alphabet; “alphabet” is to be understood as a combinatory system 
of minimal semiotic elements that carry no meaning of their own, but instead are defined 
relationally and provisionally within a “world.” The “Book of Nature,” according to Galileo, was 
written in a new alphabet that differed substantially from those already established by humanity. 
This new system of signs, once understood and decoded, would ideally reconcile the reality of an 
ever-changing Earth with what were considered to be, for Galileo and some of his 
contemporaries, the immutable and constant heavens. (ibid. 88) The key to the universe, it 
seemed, was within reach of those who were patient and intelligent enough to grasp it. 
 This concept is not the only one that Calvino gleaned from Galileo. During a television 
interview in 1968, Calvino discussed his position that Galileo had perhaps been Italy’s greatest 
writer of prose. A prime consideration behind this opinion was the observation that the legendary 
astronomer had harnessed scientific language “not as a neutral utensil, but with literary 
awareness, with a continuous commitment that [was] expressive, imaginative and even lyrical.” 
(Uses of Literature 31) Galileo – an observational scientist and theorist first – regarded the world 
and universe in an “ideal” way (ibid. 32) that was nourished by literary culture. He had 
succeeded, in Calvino’s estimation, in merging the often divisive disciplines of science and 
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literature, creating all at once a literary tradition that both stimulated the imagination and 
cultivated concrete knowledge in the reader. Calvino, in his own writing, found “nourishment in 
Galileo, in his precision of language, his scientific-poetic imagination, his posing of 
conjectures.” (ibid. 32) Roger Newton, a scientist and scholar to whom we will have recourse at 
several moments in our study, echoes these same notions and develops them further. 
In his mathematical discussions he distinguishes between finite, infinitesimally 
small, and infinitely large quantities, without flinching from paradoxes that arise 
and appear unresolvable. On the subject of infinite quantities, for example, he 
points out that such concepts as “less than,” “greater than,” and “equal to” are not 
necessarily applicable, which he exemplifies by showing that the infinite set of 
natural numbers can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set consisting 
of their squares. These are problems with a definitely modern flavor that would 
preoccupy mathematicians in the nineteenth century. (Newton 83-4)   
 
 Again, in 1985 – just prior to his untimely death – Italo Calvino presented further 
observations on Galileo in the notes for a lecture entitled “Quickness.” “For [Galileo], good 
thinking means quickness, agility in reasoning, economy in argument, but also the use of 
imaginative examples.” (Six Memos 43) It should not strike us as strange, then, that Calvino 
went on to praise another major literary influence in this same essay, and for precisely these 
same qualities. “What I particularly wish to stress is how [Jorge Luis] Borges achieves his 
approaches to the infinite without the least congestion, in the most crystalline, sober and airy 
style. In the same way, his synthetic, sidelong manner of narration brings with it a language that 
is everywhere concrete and precise…” (ibid. 50-51) In another essay entitled “Multiplicity,” 
Calvino restates his praise for Borges. “I love his work because every one of his pieces contains 
a model of the universe or of an attribute of the universe (infinity, the innumerable, time eternal 
or present or cyclic); because they are texts contained in only a few pages, with an exemplary 
economy of expression…” (ibid. 119) Calvino’s affinities for both Borges and Galileo seem, in 
fact, to be based on largely the same criteria. In apparent support of this comparison, Galileo 
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shows up in Borges’ writing as well. A brief non-fiction piece entitled “On the Cult of Books” 
cites Galileo’s aforementioned “natural alphabet” as an analogue to Francis Bacon’s postulation 
of a divine “abecedarium naturae.”
10
      
 To simply state that Galileo’s influence on literature was far-reaching would be barely 
sufficient; Calvino confidently asserted that Galileo – in the same way as Italy’s crown jewel, 
Dante Alighieri – had “tried to construct an image of the universe by means of the written word,” 
thereby initiating a “deep-rooted vocation in Italian literature.” (Uses of Lit. 32) In speaking 
about his own writing, Calvino did not miss a chance to render thanks unto Galileo: “From time 
to time I get the feeling that the road I am taking is leading me back to the true but forgotten 
source of the Italian tradition.” (ibid. 33) The unique character of Calvino’s literary production, 
seated astride both the creative exercises of literature and the intellectual rigor of science, can be 
traced along a direct line back to the infamous Pisan astronomer.    
 Though beloved by Calvino and Borges, Galileo was not the only pre-modern thinker to 
attempt to construct an image of the universe as it truly was. In later years, the scientific world 
would be shaken by the erratic and fragmentary musings of Blaise Pascal, a French philosopher, 
polymath and engineer. While harboring an undeniably Christian and theist perspective on the 
nature of the universe, Pascal also initiated a courageous and early departure from the perception 
that the universe was closed, solid and eventually knowable, effectively overturning centuries of 
scientific and philosophical teleology. The editor and translator of a collection of Pascal’s 
Pensées, A.J. Krailsheimer, explains that Pascal was focused on the image of Christ as the 
redeemer of man’s wretchedness, but also toiled to weaken the faith that could be held in 
reason’s power; “The pattern, not only of the Pensées, but of all Pascal’s religious writing, is the 
stark contrast between man in his state of fallen nature and in a state of grace.” (Pensées XXI) 
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This perspective places Pascal at a midpoint between man’s perennial trust in the universe’s 
ultimate coherence (by way of a supernatural being) and the implicit agnosticism of modern 
science. Pascal himself lamented that “only reason can persuade reason of its own inadequacy,” 
(ibid. XXIV) and in doing so he vocalized the same struggle that would be later undertaken by 
more modern thinkers, including Kurt Gӧdel, Erwin Schrӧdinger and Henri Poincaré. That 
something stands in the way of our full understanding of the universe – be it an omnipotent God 
or a yawning, incomprehensible infinity – is a tremendously forward-thinking concept for any 
human being, let alone a devoutly religious man of the seventeenth century.     
 The Pensées themselves are a collection of Pascal’s philosophical fragments and 
thoughts, originally arranged numerically on lengths of string according to theme and 
demonstrating his intellectual and emotional struggles. They are widely varied in subject matter 
and tone, though many inevitably return to a chorus pondering the weakness of reason and its 
uselessness as a foundation for thought, like fragment number 188: “Reason’s last step is the 
recognition that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it.” (ibid. 56) Others 
focus on the parameters of infinity and man’s hopelessness within such immensity, including 
number 199: “Nature is an infinite sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference 
nowhere… What is a man in the infinite? …A nothing compared to the infinite, a whole 
compared to nothing, a middle point between all and nothing, infinitely remote from an 
understanding of the extremes.” (ibid. 60-61)   
 Despite having predated modern science by at least two centuries, Blaise Pascal 
unwittingly prefigured several current scientific conjectures. Number 199 of his Pensées, by far 
the richest fragment for our own purposes, cleaves rather closely to what will be seen in our later 
discussion of Georg Cantor’s transfinite set theory.  
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Thus we see that all the sciences are infinite in the range of their researches, for 
who can doubt that mathematics, for instance, has an infinity of infinities of 
propositions to expound? They are infinite also in the multiplicity and subtlety of 
their principles, for anyone can see that those which are supposed to be ultimate 
do not stand by themselves, but depend on others, which depend on others again, 
and thus never allow of any finality… In the perspective of these infinites, all 
infinites are equal and I see no reason to settle our imagination on one rather than 
another. (ibid. 62-64)     
 
Cantor’s so-called “continuum hypothesis,” intended to establish a hierarchy of theoretical “sets” 
of infinities, was never proven. Two hundred years prior, Blaise Pascal had unknowingly defined 
the terms of Cantor’s paradox by demonstrating the impossibility of differentiating between 
separate or unique infinites. Pascal had tapped into the spirit of a mathematical quandary from 
the distant future; perhaps fittingly, he also foreshadowed Kurt Gӧdel’s famous rebuttal of 
Cantor’s theory, embodied fully in what has come to be known as Gӧdel’s “Incompleteness 
Theorem”: “If man studied himself, he would see how incapable he is of going further. How 
could a part possibly know the whole?” (ibid. 64) As we will see in coming chapters, this simple 
statement channels the truest sense of what would become Gӧdel’s bogglingly intricate logical 
exercise. 
 Pascal’s thoughts are not all mired in negativity, though. At times he reaches into other 
dimensions and realities, igniting a spark would eventually become a conflagration in Hugh 
Everett III’s “Many-World’s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” in 1957; “I want to show 
[man] a new abyss,” said Pascal. “I want to depict to him not only the visible universe, but all the 
conceivable immensity of nature enclosed in this miniature atom. Let him see there is an infinity 
of universes, each with its firmament, its planets, its earth, in the same proportions as in the 
visible world…” (ibid. 61) Pascal can also be seen reaching for the void in a description of 
something akin to a black hole and, in an abstract sense, Borges’ legendary “Aleph”; “Do you 
believe that it is impossible for God to be infinite and indivisible? –Yes– Very well, I will show 
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you something infinite and indivisible: it is a point moving everywhere at an infinite speed. For it 
is one and the same everywhere and wholly present in every place.” (ibid. 126) In a practically 
Thoreauvian moment, Pascal merges the concept of the infinite physicality of God with the 
physics of the darkest, densest and most mysterious places of the universe. Borges, in his own 
readings, had encountered Pascal and summarized him in this way: 
In that dejected century, the absolute space that inspired the hexameters of 
Lucretius, the absolute space that had been a liberation for Bruno was a labyrinth 
and an abyss for Pascal. He hated the universe and yearned to adore God, but God 
was less real to him than the hated universe. He lamented that the firmament did 
not speak; he compared our lives to the shipwrecked on a desert island. He felt the 
incessant weight of the physical world; he felt confusion, fear, and solitude; and 
he expressed it in other words: “Nature is an infinite sphere, the center of which is 
everywhere, the circumference nowhere.” That is the text of the Brunschvieg 
edition, but the critical edition of Tourneur (Paris, 1941), which reproduces the 
cancellations and hesitations in the manuscript, reveals that Pascal started to write 
the word effroyable: “a frightful sphere, the center of which is everywhere, and 
the circumference nowhere.” (SNF 353) 
This deep reading proves Borges’ familiarity with Pascal’s philosophical system and 
psychological struggles, and, in highlighting Pascal’s writing process, demonstrates Borges’ 
keen critical eye. 
 In our own study, of course, all of Pascal’s magnificent rhetoric would be for naught if it 
did not lead us back to the interdisciplinary spirit of Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges. In 
number 512 of the Pensées, Pascal presents a binding tie – the hopeful vision of the 
mathematician fused with the creative thinker: “All mathematicians would therefore be intuitive 
if they had good sight, because they do not draw false conclusions from principles that they 
know. And intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could adapt their sight to the 
unfamiliar principles of mathematics.” (ibid. 182) Just as Calvino would later appeal for the 
cultivation of an ideal thinker versed in both science and literature, echoing as well the hope of 
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C.P. Snow and the spirit of the erudite and endlessly curious Borges, so did Pascal recognize the 
importance of drawing intellectual inspiration from a plethora of sources and fields of study.       
In the interest of delving deeper into these varied fields of study, it will be beneficial for 
us to allow a brief historical introduction to the tenets of thermodynamics, with a specific focus 
on the aforementioned concept of entropy that lies at its core. According to Columbia University 
physicist Brian Greene, author of The Fabric of the Cosmos, “the notion of entropy was first 
developed during the industrial revolution by scientists concerned with the operation of furnaces 
and steam engines, who helped develop the field of thermodynamics.” (Greene 151) 
Thermodynamics, in turn, is the branch of physical science that deals with heat and its 
relationship to energy transfer – Roger G. Newton provides an extremely concise and effective 
description: “[Thermodynamics] dealt with the behavior of heat, its conduction through objects, 
and its transfer from one body to another, as well as its relation to other phenomena such as 
pressure and volume changes of gases, rather than with its fundamental nature.” (Newton 144) 
The boundaries of thermodynamics can be expressed in a set of four laws, although Newton goes 
on to delineate their relative importance:  
The rest of thermodynamics lays down detailed rules governing how the flow of 
heat through or into a body depends on the properties of the material making it up, 
the behavior of fluids when their temperature, pressure or volume changes, and 
the way the state of a substance changes, from a gas to a liquid or a solid or vice 
versa, as its temperature or pressure changes. However, the formulation of the 
first and second laws is the most important achievement of thermodynamics. 
(ibid. 152)   
This second law will also be of the most use to us in our own study of literature and science. This 
law is specifically concerned with entropy, which is succinctly (and perhaps simplistically) 
defined as being a measure of the amount of disorder in a physical system.  
According to the second law of thermodynamics, “there is a natural evolution toward 
greater disorder, since disorder can be achieved in so many more ways than order. In the 
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language of entropy, this is the statement that physical systems tend to evolve toward states of 
higher entropy.” (Fabric 154-155) Michio Kaku, another renowned physicist and a CUNY 
faculty member, adds another crucial detail to the interpretation of thermodynamics’ second law: 
“any process creates a net increase in the amount of disorder (entropy) in the universe.” 
(Hyperspace 304) In parallel terms: absolutely any action taken in the universe creates an 
increase in entropy, be it a supernova or a sneeze. While a statement of this kind appears to leave 
scarcely any room for exceptions, there is a possibility for the unlikely to occur. 
…It is important to remember that we are dealing with probabilities and statistics, 
not deterministic predictions of the behavior of individual systems. In the course 
of the development of a system consisting of many particles, such as a gas, the 
entropy varies and fluctuates, sometimes wildly. The states called equilibrium are 
by far the most probable because there are so many of them, all practically 
indistinguishable from one another. The entropy in these states is maximal. Any 
individual state far from equilibrium is very improbable – it has low entropy – 
because there are very few states like it or almost like it. Such states are always 
set up by external intervention; they almost never arise spontaneously in an 
isolated system. (Newton 185)  
“Almost never,” while certainly on the far edge of the odds, is in no way an utter prohibition – 
this notion brings us once again to a locus shared by both science and fiction: just as carefully 
controlled scientific experiments have the capacity to bring such improbable low-entropy states 
into existence, so do works of imaginative, narrative writing.      
The increase of entropy, then – the statistically probable movement from a low-to-high 
entropy state – seems to echo the multiplication of elements and the increasing tension and 
confusion that we find in many narratives by both Borges and Calvino – Borges’ “The Lottery in 
Babylon” and scenes involving Calvino’s tortured Mr. Palomar come to mind most readily. 
Much of the writing found in these two authors’ oeuvres might be grouped under the heading of 
(to coin a term) entropic writing; in other words, writing that tends toward increasing states of 
disorder and lacks a subsequent reversal of this increase in disorder.  
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Stephen Hawking, the English physicist and author of the legendary work of popular 
science A Brief History of Time, provides more clarity on the probabilistic and volatile nature of 
thermodynamics’ dominant rule. “The second law of thermodynamics has a rather different 
status than that of other laws of science, such as Newton’s law of gravity, for example, because it 
does not hold always, just in the vast majority of cases.” (Hawking 107) Brian Greene clarifies 
this admittedly obtuse point: “For things with many constituents, going from lower to higher 
entropy – from order to disorder – is easy, so it happens all the time. Going from higher to lower 
entropy – from disorder to order – is harder, so it happens rarely, at best.” (Elegant Universe 
158) Spilled milk does not independently flow back into the glass; gases released from a tank do 
not regroup and return to their original container; in short, the complex does not routinely 
become the simple. Though statistically this can occur, the more numerous the constituents in a 
system the less probable it becomes. However unlikely, Roger Newton reinforces the possibility 
of such a reversal of entropy: 
…A system in a state of low entropy will, as Poincaré decreed, eventually return 
to an almost identical state of equally low entropy, but “eventually” here means 
that the waiting period for the recurrence to happen in an inevitable fluctuation is 
many times longer than the age of the universe. This is not a wild guess but can be 
actually calculated. (Newton 186) 
Again, in the same way that the probability and characteristics of such a state can be calculated 
through scientific experimentation, so does the fictive process allow us to bring into existence 
and witness – through whatever mental exercise – varying states of disorder.    
In Newton’s estimation, the second law of thermodynamics “introduced an entirely new 
notion into physics... It contained an arrow of time, defined by the inexorable and irreversible 
increase in entropy. The concept of time’s irreversible flow, popular and influential in 
philosophy and literature, had finally found its way into physics.” (Newton 153) Here, the point 
of dialogue between literature and science is made exceptionally clear. The notion that, over 
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time, elements (whether real or fictional) become increasingly disordered on a relational level 
sits in perfect alignment with the complex and interlaced weave of elements in the works of Italo 
Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges; just as human experience can only be lived along an increasingly 
disordered “arrow of time,” so only can it be represented. As Hawking tells us, “just like a 
computer, we must remember things in the order in which entropy increases.” (Hawking 151) 
Beginning typically with a tight, compact image, theme or nucleus and gradually spiraling out 
into often universal or epic scopes, the fictions given to us by these two writers reflect the same 
macroscopic dispersal of energy that has been playing itself out on a grand scale across our 
randomized cosmos since the occurrence of the Big Bang.  
 As we established in the preceding chapter, Borges and Calvino were not strangers to 
such advanced scientific and mathematical concepts. In an article published in Corriere della 
sera on January 23, 1976, Calvino serenely provided readers with an accessible explanation of 
the primary laws of thermodynamics.  
L’irreversibilità del tempo ha due aspetti. L’uno si manifesta in tutti quei 
processi… che implicano un passaggio da stati più semplici e uniformi a stati più 
complessi e differenziati… L’altro aspetto è quello dello sciogliersi della zolletta 
di zucchero nel caffè, del volatilizzarsi del profumo fuori del flacone aperto, del 
degradarsi dell’energia in calore: qui la <<freccia del tempo>> segna la direzione 
opposta: quella della crescita del disordine, dell’entropia, della dissoluzione 




Borges, as was briefly shown in the preceding chapter, demonstrated a confident familiarity with 
the concept of entropy in several works – in the cases of “Raymond Llull’s Thinking Machine” 
and “The Doctrine of Cycles,” he even mentions the concept by name. “Entropic writing” would 
therefore appear to be a particularly apt description, based on both the subject matter chosen by 
both authors as well as their own personal knowledge. 
                                                          
11




Henri Poincaré, through his work in mathematics and physics, was a primary architect in 
a field of research that would eventually come to be known as chaos theory (a discipline that will 
be analyzed in detail during the final chapter of this study). He excelled in all branches of science 
and philosophy and was widely regarded as a brilliant and inventive thinker. A man of letters, he 
also served as director of l’Académie Francaise and President of l’Académie des Sciences, and is 
even said to have had an influence on both Albert Einstein and Pablo Picasso.
12
 Poincaré 
outlined his own clearly-defined methodology of thought in Science and Method, a 1908 treatise 
on the philosophy of science. Through anecdotes and self-analysis, he demonstrated that when he 
found himself unable to overcome a particular mathematical quandary, his subconscious mind 
would continue to process combinations of elements while he engaged in other activities. 
Eventually, and at a completely arbitrary time, the correct answer would suddenly come to him 
as if in a flash, and he would rush off to verify it.
13
 In environs ranging from a seaside stroll to 
attending a geological conference, while serving in the military, and even during fitful attempts 
to sleep after having drunk too much coffee, Poincaré received dispatches from his subconscious, 
which appeared to have been working on problems even as he remained mentally idle. He 
eventually came to form the opinion that the mind, nourished by periods of rigorous study, will 
then bear its best fruit when left to silently process combination after combination of elements in 
the background. Italo Calvino appears to have shared Poincaré’s understanding of the mind’s 
internal combinatorial processes, as we can see in his 1985 essay “Visibility”; 
The poet’s mind, and at a few decisive moments the mind of the scientist, works 
according to a process of association of images that is the quickest way to link 
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and to choose between the infinite forms of the possible and the impossible. The 
imagination is a kind of electronic machine that takes account of all possible 
combinations and chooses the ones that are appropriate to a particular purpose, or 
are simply the most interesting, pleasing, or amusing. (Six Memos 91) 
Indeed, how can the mind know which combinations are the best? Poincaré departs from 
Calvino’s more playful adjectives to define the desired arrangements of elements as those that 
are “useful”: 
What, in fact, is mathematical discovery? It does not consist in making new 
combinations with mathematical entities that are already known. That can be done 
by anyone, and the combinations that could be so formed would be infinite in 
number, and the greater part of them would be absolutely devoid of interest. 
Discovery consists precisely in not constructing useless combinations but in 
constructing those that are useful, which are an infinitely small minority. (Method 
50-51) 
Soon after, Poincaré attempts to resolve the potential psychologism that he has created by 
acknowledging the role of personal choice in scientific enterprise: 
It may appear surprising that sensibility should be introduced in connexion with 
mathematical demonstrations, which, it would seem, can only interest the 
intellect. But not if we bear in mind the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the 
harmony of numbers and forms of geometric elegance. (ibid. 59)  
 
Poincaré is not shy on this point; on several other occasions he presented a sentiment akin to the 
idea that “any fact can be generalized in an infinite number of ways, and it is a question of 
choice.” (Science and Hypothesis 146) The best scientist, then, is the one who can tease out from 
all of the useless combinations the one that is simplest, most elegant and most useful, and then 
prove it using a rigorous process of numeric or quantitative verification.  
Though not immediately apparent, this aesthetic turn highlights the first point of contact 
between Poincaré’s scientific approach and the provisional procedures of literary creation. In an 
aforementioned work from 1902 entitled Science and Hypothesis, Poincaré confidently posits an 
unpopular truth regarding the foundations of scientific knowledge, and in fact of all knowledge. 
68 
 
Whence are the first principles of geometry derived? Are they imposed on us by 
logic? Lobatchewsky, by inventing non-Euclidean geometries, has shown that this 
is not the case. Is space revealed to us by our senses? No: for the space revealed to 
us by our senses is absolutely different from the space of geometry. Is geometry 
derived from experience? Careful discussion will give the answer – no! We 
therefore conclude that the principles of geometry are only conventions. (ibid. 
XXV)  
Conventions, then, and not absolute, universal truths, are the wages of all human scientific 
endeavors, and in this admission the line between art and science, between poetry and geometry, 
between fiction and fact is all but annihiliated. The worlds invented by Calvino in his 
Cosmicomics and the magnificent society shown to us by Borges in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” 
are grown from the same seed as Einstein’s relativity and the accepted laws of thermodynamics, 
a position that is only reinforced by Poincaré’s next elaboration: 
Every conclusion presumes premises. These premises are either self-evident and 
need no demonstration, or can be established only if based on other propositions; 
and, as we cannot go back in this way to infinity, every deductive science… must 
rest upon a certain number of indemonstrable axioms. (ibid. 35)    
The a priori roots that anchor the whole of science do not sprout from some absolute source – 
they come from man, in the same way as all literature, all music and all art. The inventive 
scientist, then, is as much an artist as he is an engineer, and he must rely on his imagination just 
as much as he does his logical faculties. Calvino would attest to this notion in the very same 
essay that was cited previously: “…The imagination, while following channels other than those 
of scientific knowledge, can coexist with the latter and even assist it, indeed be a phase the 
scientist needs in order to formulate his hypothesis.” (Six Memos 88) One need only reflect on 
the magnificent insights that were the products of Poincaré’s seaside strolls and daydreams to 
find evidence of this connection between the imaginary and the rational.  
 This topic, scandalous to many in the realm of quantitative science, should not be seen as 
an affront to the validity of the incredible discoveries that scientific enterprise has yielded. On 
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the contrary, it is actually a means to elevate literature to the same level and, perhaps, to allow a 
more porous flow between the two disciplines, fostering further inspiration. Creative freedom is 
indeed the hallmark of both fields, and to this very point Poincaré spoke on a number of 
occasions. Regarding the interplay between the subconscious and the conscious mind, he said 
that: “The rules of these calculations are strict and complicated; they demand discipline, 
attention, will and consequently consciousness. In the subliminal ego, on the contrary, there 
reigns what I would call liberty…” (Method 63) Careful enough not to invalidate his entire 
enterprise, however, Poincaré had also previously cautioned against taking this concept of liberty 
too far. “Some people have been struck by this characteristic of free convention which may be 
recognized in certain fundamental principles of the sciences. Some have set no limits to their 
generalizations, and at the same time they have forgotten that there is a difference between 
liberty and the purely arbitrary.” (Hypothesis XXIII) There is, then, the requirement in science to 
at least temporarily agree to the established principles, even if they are understood to represent 
not absolute truths but rather the current limits of human understanding. 
Our choice among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts, but it 
remains free, and is only limited by the necessity of avoiding every 
contradiction… What, then, are we to think of the question: Is Euclidean 
geometry true? It has no meaning. We might as well ask if the metric system is 
true, and if the old weights and measures are false. One geometry cannot be more 
true than another; it can only be more convenient. (ibid. 50)  
Effective literature carries the same requirements of consistency and measure, and also expects, 
in the reader as much as in the writer, a mutual acceptance of the parameters – the conventions – 
of the exercise. There is no getting around it – “Principles are conventions and definitions in 
disguise.” (ibid. 138)  
 In keeping with the idea of an “effective” literature, we might also dwell a moment on the 
reciprocal concept of “effective” science. Like the discarded drafts that precede a completed 
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work of fiction (or a completed dissertation, for that matter), a scientific principle need not be 
ironclad and flawless in order to be of use to the business of inquiry. Instead, according to 
Poincaré, the role of the principle is to be disproved in the service of progress.  
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. 
Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after another; 
he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will 
in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in 
vain… His scepticism is superficial; he does not take into account the object of 
scientific theories and the part they play, or he would understand that the ruins 
may still be good for something. (ibid. 160)   
“Effective” science, then, is often wrong; or rather, it suffers an artifice only so long as it is 
fruitful before abandoning it in favor of yet another artifice. What can be known through science 
is always clipped by this upper limit, about which Kurt Gӧdel opined and against which Georg 
Cantor raged. Poincaré, for his own part, seems to have reconciled with this insurmountable 
obstacle: 
I quite see that it might be said: We do not know, and yet we must act… We must 
therefore make up our minds without knowing. This must be often done whatever 
may happen, and we must follow the rules although we may have but little 
confidence in them. What I know is, not that such a thing is true, but that the best 
course for me is to act as if it were true. (ibid. 187)    
Here we are apparently told to accept fiction and to live within it, not necessarily in denial of its 
shaky foundation but rather in the interest of creating an even better fiction that mimics the 
external universe even more, or as much a fiction possibly could. The aspirational worlds 
generated in fiction, the countless “invisible cities” that exist in the potentiality of creative 
thought, can only be occupied in this way, and so we have reached – yet again – the broad 
intersection of science and literature. Fiction is fiction, whether it stirs our emotions or lifts a 
rocket into space.  
 Through the inspired work of other literary researchers – in this particular case, William 
Goldbloom Bloch – we can be sure that Jorge Luis Borges was aware of Poincaré’s conjectures. 
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Having made several “end leaf notations” on his own copy of Science and Method in 1939, 
Borges was presumably drawn to Poincaré by way of Cantor – of whom, it has been stated, 
Poincaré was a detractor of the first order. (Bloch 144-45) Poincaré is not explicitly named in 
any of Borges’ published works; however in his 1931 essay “The Postulation of Reality” Borges 
delineates a narrative approach that is in some respects identical to the process of critical 
selection outlined by Poincaré in Science and Method.  
I would recommend this hypothesis: imprecision is tolerable or plausible in 
literature because we almost always tend toward it in reality. The conceptual 
simplification of complex states is often an instantaneous operation. The very fact 
of perceiving, of paying attention, is selective; all attention, all focusing of our 
consciousness, involves a deliberate omission of what is not interesting. (SNF 61) 
The “imprecision” that one finds in literature by way of authorial choice is analogous to the 
scientist’s approval of one formula and rejection of another, and both hearken back to an earlier 
citation in which Poincaré invokes aesthetic beauty, harmony and elegance as parameters for 
such selections. (Method 59) Whether Borges had read Poincaré by as early as 1931 or not – and 
of this we cannot be absolutely sure – the similarity between these two sentiments is undeniable. 
Curiously, Borges shares another moment of direct contact with Poincaré in a fanciful metaphor 
found in Science and Hypothesis: “I may be permitted to compare science to a library which 
must go on increasing indefinitely; the librarian has limited funds for his purchases, and he must, 
therefore, strain every nerve not to waste them.” (Poincaré 144) Again, the faculty of selection is 
stressed, and again we see a fragment of an image that Borges would come to develop – 
notoriously, in “The Library of Babel” – except in Poincaré’s case this flight of imagination 
comes with an understandably pragmatic budgetary encumbrance. 
 In a subsequent portion of “The Postulation of Reality” Borges, while attempting to 
“demolish the arguments of [Benedetto] Croce,” describes three methods of narration that also 
demonstrate his overarching scientific bent.  
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The classic postulation of reality can take three forms, which are quite diversely 
accessible. The easiest consists of a general notification of the important facts… 
The second consists of imagining a more complex reality than the one declared to 
the reader and describing its derivations and results… The third method, the most 
difficult and effective of them all, makes use of the invention of circumstances. 
(SNF 62-63) 
By offering a precise, logical definition of what amounts to a creative and intuitive process, 
Borges is working very much in the vein of Poincaré’s own approach to scientific methodology, 
and it is no small coincidence that the three narrative approaches outlined above can be seen to 
correspond with “observation,” “hypothesizing” and “experimentation” – all crucial steps in the 
traditionally accepted scientific method.   
 There is, as well, a thread to be found in Calvino’s oeuvre that will lead us back to the 
spirit of Poincaré. Taken from an interview with Calvino in 1968, the following statements 
express the author’s view on the conventional nature of science: 
I recently read an article by Roland Barthes called “Literature versus Science.” 
Barthes tends to think of literature as the awareness that language has of being 
language, of having a density of its own, and its own independent existence. For 
literature, language is never transparent, and is never merely an instrument to 
convey a “meaning” or a “fact” or a “thought” or a “truth”; that is, it cannot mean 
anything but itself. Whereas, on the other hand, the idea of language given by 
science is that of a neutral utensil that is used to say something else, to mean 
something foreign to it. This different concept of language is what distinguishes 
science from literature. Proceeding along these lines, Barthes gets to the point of 
maintaining that literature is more scientific than science, because literature 
knows that language is never naïve, and knows that in writing one cannot say 
anything extraneous to writing, or express any truth that is not a truth having to do 
with the art of writing… But can the science of today really be defined by such 
trust in an absolute code of references, or is it not in itself by this time a continual 
questioning of its own linguistic conventions? In his polemic against science 
Barthes appears to envisage a kind of science far more compact and sure of itself 
than it really is. (Uses of Literature 28-29)    
Roughly sixty-five years after Poincaré had expressed these same doubts and explanations, we 
can see Calvino demonstrating a similar understanding of science’s provisional foundations. That 
which is said within science can only be true of science, in the same way that literature can make 
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no claim to demonstrate some absolute or universal truth. The mitigating factors – author, 
perception, method – are shared between the two disciplines, and both are understood to be 
founded on convention. “The scientist should no more banish [unverifiable hypotheses] than a 
poet banishes metaphor,” Poincaré informs his reader, “but he ought to know what they are 
worth.” (Hypothesis 164) There is a scientific function extant in creative literature – or at the 
very least in imaginative, creative thought – which is itself the driving force behind both 
literature and science. 
 In exploring this shared experience across divergent disciplines, we might briefly 
reconsider what has been previously discussed regarding Calvino’s ideal education – 
specifically, his desire for a return to interdisciplinarity and dialogue – and how this might relate 
to Poincaré’s own distribution of intellectual labor. 
It is well that there should be logicians and that there should be intuitionists. Who 
would venture to say whether he would prefer that Weierstrass had never written 
or that there had never been a Riemann? And so we must resign ourselves to the 
diversity of minds, or rather we must be glad of it. (Method 120)   
 
These two opposed strains of intellectual are not, then, in as much conflict as one might imagine; 
rather, they can be seen – and here we will borrow a metaphor from Guy Raffa – “not so much as 
two sides of the same coin as a fusion of two metals into a beautiful and useful new alloy”;
14
 in 
other words, as a set of inviolable mechanisms that contribute equally to human knowledge’s 
sum total. In his bluntly-titled essay “Filosofia e letteratura,” published in 1967, we find that 
Calvino shares Poincaré’s sentiment: 
Science is faced with problems not too dissimilar from those of literature. It 
makes patterns of the world that are immediately called in question, it swings 
between the inductive and the deductive methods, and it must always be on its 
guard lest it mistake its own linguistic conventions for objective laws. We will not 
have a culture equal to the challenge until we compare against one another the 
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basic problematic of science, philosophy and literature, in order to call them all 
into question. (Uses of Literature 45-46)  
In addition to recognizing the need for science and literature to interact, Calvino goes as far as 
mentioning again what Poincaré had taken great care to make apparent – that linguistic 
conventions are the sole bases of human knowledge.  
Further to Poincaré’s creative methodology, which alternates periods of rigorous study 
with periods of idleness or distraction, Calvino makes mention of a similar process in his lecture 
entitled “Visibility”: “The imagination, while following channels other than those of scientific 
knowledge, can coexist with the latter and even assist it, indeed be a phase the scientist needs in 
order to formulate his hypothesis.” (Six Memos 88) The relationship between the subliminal and 
the conscious has already been well established in our study of Poincaré, and while it cannot be 
shown that Calvino necessarily learned this process directly from Poincaré, it is difficult to 
ignore the similarity.  
In the same set of lectures written by Calvino for an intended address at Harvard 
University, let us also take note of the shared appreciation of economical expression and brevity 
across all three of the authors upon which we have set our lens. In a lecture entitled “Quickness,” 
we witness a collision of the sentiments of Poincaré, Calvino and Borges. Calvino declares that 
“writing prose should not be any different from writing poetry. In both cases it is a question of 
looking for the unique expression, one that is concise, concentrated and memorable.” (ibid. 49) 
On the very next page he lavishes praise on Jorge Luis Borges as a master of the short form. 
“What I particularly wish to stress is how Borges achieves his approaches to the infinite without 
the least congestion, in the most crystalline, sober and airy style.” (ibid. 50) We need only place 
these statements alongside one made by Poincaré to witness the moment of contact. “…Economy 
of thought, that economy of effort which… is the constant tendency of science, is a source of 
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beauty as well as a practical advantage.” (Method 23) Lauded by three masters of form and 
expression, the virtue of expressive economy captures the full breadth of the themes we have 
explored in relation to Poincaré. From the shared duties of the scientist and the writer of fiction 
in judiciously selecting only the most harmonious combinations of elements, to the mass 
acceptance of the shared provisional foundations that prop up the endeavors of both science and 
literature, and especially in tempering the role of the imagination through a constant focus on 
form and structure, the parallels are apparent and abundant. The universe, inscrutable in its 
fullness, can only be represented through language, either scientific or literary, or ideally through 
a fusion of both. If only the arrogant builders of Perinthia, imagined by Calvino in Invisible 
Cities, had known as much;  
Following the astronomers’ calculations precisely, Perinthia was constructed; 
various peoples came to populate it; the first generation born in Perinthia began to 
grow within its walls; and these citizens reached the age to marry and have 
children. In Perinthia’s streets and square today you encounter cripples, dwarfs, 
hunchbacks, obese men, bearded women. But the worse cannot be seen; guttural 
howls are heard from cellars and lofts, where families hide children with three 
heads or with six legs. Perinthia’s astronomers are faced with a difficult choice. 
Either they must admit that all their calculations were wrong and their figures are 
unable to describe the heavens, or else they must reveal that the order of the gods 
is reflected exactly in the city of monsters. (Calvino 144-45) 
 
 
Einstein and Relativity 
 The Special Theory of Relativity is arguably the most well-known scientific theory in the 
history of humanity, despite the fact that rather few are actually versed in its delicate nuances. 
The brainchild of Albert Einstein – a Swiss patent clerk and notorious daydreamer – this theory 
of space-time ushered a new era of science and philosophy into being. Its foundation, however, is 
not dissimilar to the creative impulse found at the base of any short story, dramatic novel or 
comedic play; “According to Einstein’s own recollection, the intellectual origin of the special 
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theory of relativity went back to his youth, a time when he tried to imagine what it would be like 
to ride along on a wave of light.” (Newton 157) Einstein’s imagination – and not his 
mathematical rigor or methodological steadfastness – acted as the original catalyst for this 
incredible idea. That a creative whim or flight of boyhood fancy would come to be the 
foundation for our most salient basis for understanding the universe around us is in perfect 
alignment with the stated purpose of our study of Calvino and Borges. 
 The most basic terms of the Special Theory of Relativity have been distilled by myriad 
scientific historians and philosophers. Roger Newton, always of great employ in our research, 
gives a serviceable breakdown: 
If two observers in motion relative to one another see their clocks running at the 
same rates and their yardsticks to be of equal length, they cannot see the same 
light signal move at the same speed… If you are moving with respect to me, I see 
your clock going slow and your yardsticks contracted, and symmetry demands 
that you see my clock going slow and my yardsticks contracted too. The reason 
why this had never been noticed before and is still difficult to notice is that these 
effects are minute unless our relative speed is close to the speed of light. There is 
no universal space in which the world moves along a universal time, as [Sir Isaac] 
Newton had taken for granted. The standards of measurement for both space and 
time have to be separately established for each observer. (Newton 158) 
Relativity, then, is the mathematical proof for the idea that there is no “absolute yardstick”; any 
claim to universality is therefore shattered, since the speed of light is fixed and limited. The 
transmission of information by way of light waves cannot be faster than the maximum speed of 
light itself;
15
 because of the yawning vastness of the universe, events occurring very far apart 
will not appear to happen simultaneously to any particular observer, even if in actuality they 
occurred at the same instant. This renders futile, then, any attempt at objective measurement 
based on fixed values.  
                                                          
15
“The theory also implied some important specific predictions, namely that no material body and no information 
can be transported faster than light and that mass and energy are equivalent, or convertible into one another, as 
expressed in the famous formula      , in which c is the speed of light.” (Newton 159) 
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 There is more to this theory than simple speed limits, however – Stephen Hawking’s 
explication of relativity includes the crucial equivalency between speed and mass: 
The fundamental postulate of the theory of relativity, as it was called, was that the 
laws of science should be the same for all freely moving observers, no matter 
what their speed… All observers should measure the same speed of light, no 
matter how fast they are moving. This simple idea has some remarkable 
consequences. Perhaps the best known are the equivalence of mass and energy, 
summed up in Einstein’s famous equation        (Where E is energy, m is 
mass and c is the speed of light), and the law that nothing may travel faster than 
the speed of light… As an object approaches the speed of light, its mass rises ever 
more quickly, so it takes more and more energy to speed it up further. It can in 
fact never reach the speed of light, because by then its mass would have become 
infinite, and by the equivalence of mass and energy, it would have taken an 
infinite amount of energy to get it there. For this reason, any normal object is 
forever confined by the theory of relativity to move at speeds slower than the 
speed of light. Only light, or other waves that have no intrinsic mass, can move at 
the speed of light. (Hawking 20-21) 
Objects with mass that are moving at the speed of light attain infinite mass, which is an obvious 
impossibility. Spaceships, people, and even atoms are subject to this cosmic speed limit, and 
cannot be propelled to the speed of light without violating the limits of relativity.
16
 Light waves, 
on the other hand, have no intrinsic mass and are immune to this cumbersome burden. It would 
not be difficult, for our purposes, to coyly extend this proviso from light waves to fiction, which 
also exists without mass and can only be evaluated, relatively, by a subjective observer. The 
lightest and least mass-laden examples of fiction would hew more closely to this rule; given 
Calvino’s ideal of “lightness” and the fact that, to him, Borges represented the zenith of this 
attribute, we can make the assumption that Borges and Calvino, in their writing, have managed 
to routinely unburden the world of its mass, allowing everyday objects and beings to transgress 
the limits dictated by relativity. Without an obligation to remain shackled to the bodily universe, 
Borges and Calvino’s characters and settings are able to become potential, hypothetical and 
                                                          
16
The ubiquitous “FTL” ("faster-than-light") starship drives of science fiction are apparently very much trapped 
within the realm of fiction. - MR 
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wave-borne, just as Einstein wished to in that youthful daydream that moved him to create the 
special theory of relativity. 
 Aside from permitting such pleasing visual experiments, there is an even deeper 
philosophical significance to the theory of relativity – a notion that generates equal measures of 
wonder and anxiety; “Einstein’s gravitational theory represented the culmination of all of 
deterministic physics, and the problem that the twenty-first century inherited was to make this 
theory come to terms with the probabilistic revolution in physics that pervaded the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.” (Newton 166) Newton goes on to define the problem further: “When 
Einstein, shortly after developing the theory, began to apply it to cosmology, he found that his 
equations had no solutions that described a static, closed universe of fixed dimensions, with 
relatively slowly moving stars in it, as the cosmos was thought to be at that time.” (ibid. 169) 
The image of the universe as a closed system of knowable laws was suddenly incompatible with 
the mathematics of Einstein’s theory. Aside from overturning science’s presupposition of a 
causal and, more importantly, meaningful universe, this innovation also had the effect of 
trickling down into and muddying other fields of objective knowledge. If the hope of a firmly 
deterministic conclusion to the human scientific exercise was now gone, and the grand narrative 
of science had been reduced to a series of irresolvable conundrums relating to the reliability of 
subjective observers, then science itself would have to be reinvented in a new image.  
 While the consequences of Einsteinian relativity lend themselves readily to the study of 
literature and philosophy, not all scientists would agree to the legitimacy of such a comparison. 
Richard Feynman, an American physicist who made the fundamentals of relativity accessible to 
the masses by way of numerous popular science lectures and books, took issue with the 
malleability with which philosophers and “armchair-physicists” handled this theory. 
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When this idea descended upon the world, it caused a great stir among 
philosophers, particularly the “cocktail-party philosophers,” who say “Oh, it is 
very simple: Einstein’s theory says all is relative!” In fact, a surprisingly large 
number of philosophers, not only those found at cocktail parties (but rather than 
embarrass them, we shall just call them “cocktail-party philosophers”), will say, 
“That all is relative is a consequence of Einstein, and it has profound influences 
on our ideas.” In addition, they say, “It has been demonstrated in physics that 
phenomena depend on your frame of reference.” We hear that a great deal, but it 
is difficult to find out what it means. (Feynman 73) 
 
Feynman mocks those who wield only a thematic or generalized understanding of the special 
theory of relativity, both for the vagueness of their explanations as well as for their gall in 
bandying about a concept that they have not studied deeply. There is a distinct tone of disdain in 
his words, with a defensive position that seems to imply that, in order for “cocktail-party 
philosophers” to hold their simplistic positions (unburdened by empirical proof, we should note), 
physicists and mathematicians have had to do all of the hard work. Our earlier discussion of C.P. 
Snow’s desire to merge the humanistic and scientific fields – to say nothing of Calvino’s own 
hope for an inclusive body of human knowledge – is met with palpable opposition in Feynman, 
who seems to resist the mobility of these implications of relativity outside of the borders of hard 
science. Feynman later deepens his argument: 
One of the consequences of relativity was the development of a philosophy which 
said, “You can only define what you can measure! Since it is self-evident that one 
cannot measure a velocity without seeing what he is measuring it relative to, 
therefore it is clear that there is no meaning to absolute velocity. The physicists 
should have realized that they can only talk about what they can measure.” 
(Feynman 75) 
 
While Feynman appears to redress the physicists for their short-sightedness in this passage, he 
also implicitly limits the jurisdiction of the philosopher; if only that which can be measured can 
be known, only those who perform such measurements carry the prestige of dictating what is 
known. Experiment, and not thought, according to Feynman, is the basis of knowledge. 
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 Regardless of Feynman’s take on the cultural function of relativity, it has become an 
extremely popular concept in literature and art and is a defining aspect of the modern cultural 
paradigm. Feynman’s own words on the consequences of relativity, despite his seemingly 
defensive position, betray its function in affecting the basis of what can be known across all 
disciplines.  
What, then, are the philosophic influences of the theory of relativity? If we limit 
ourselves to influences in the sense of what kind of new ideas and suggestions are 
to be made to the physicist by the principle of relativity, we could describe some 
of them as follows. The first discovery is, essentially, that even those ideas which 
have been held for a very long time and which have been very accurately verified 
might be wrong. It was a shocking discovery, of course, that Newton’s laws are 
wrong, after all the years in which they seemed to be accurate. Of course it is 
clear, not that the experiments were wrong, but that they were done over only a 
limited range of velocities, so small that the relativistic effects would not have 
been evident. But nevertheless, we now have a much more humble point of view 
of our physical laws – everything can be wrong! (Feynman 76-77) 
 
While the physical effects of relativity can only be proven through scientific experimentation, 
this need not place a limit on what its implications might mean to other human activities; a 
statement like “everything can be wrong” does not appear to lend itself to any particular 
discipline, we might argue. In fact, in further support of our thesis, we can look to one final 
passage taken from Feynman’s lectures on relativity, this time focusing on man’s inability to 
even define the concept of “now”: 
When we look at the star Alpha Centauri, we see it as it was four years ago; we 
might wonder what it is like “now”. “Now” means at the same time from our 
special coordinate system. We can only see Alpha Centauri by the light that has 
come from our past, up to four years ago, but we do not know what it is doing 
“now”; it will take four years before what it is doing “now” can affect us. Alpha 
Centauri “now” is an idea or concept of our mind; it is not something that is really 
definable physically at the moment, because we have to wait to observe it; we 
cannot even define it right “now”… There are fortune-tellers, or people who tell 
us they can know the future, and there are many wonderful stories about the man 
who suddenly discovers he has knowledge about the affective future. Well, there 
are lots of paradoxes produced by that because if we know something is going to 
happen, then we can make sure we will avoid it by doing the right thing at the 
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right time, and so on. But actually there is no fortune-teller who can even tell us 
the present! There is no one who can tell us what is really happening right now, at 
any reasonable distance, because that is unobservable. (Feynman 101)         
 
Clearly offensive to all historical conceptions of time, space and the coherence of the 
universe, these words by Feynman do as much to validate fiction as they do to call into question 
the meaning of absolute truth. While scientists – burdened by requisite verification and 
evidentiary proof – cannot speak on “what is really happening right now,” creators of fictional 
works can step in and generate any number of potential “nows,” all equally valid and invalid. 
Their purpose is not to tell what really is, but what could be in the absence of experimental proof. 
As a number of philosophers and scientists that we have already studied have noted, this fictive 
process can also lead to innovations in experimental science – taking an imaginative and 
unrestrained approach to problem-solving can introduce fresh perspectives and better angles, 
from which “good” scientists (if we recall Henri Poincaré’s words) can select the most 
constructive and proceed with further verification.  
 After Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity, it was thought that much could still be 
known; even if the whole of human knowledge had ceased to be absolutely linear and coherent, 
definite facts could still be located relationally or relatively, so long as the process of 
measurement could be carried out rigorously and with precision. It is not a surprise, then, that 
what would eventually come out of Germany and Austria’s scientific communities would once 
again redefine the human scientific enterprise. David Lindley summarizes this development 
rather cleverly in his intimate portrait of this period: “Relativity doesn’t deny that there are 
absolute facts; that’s what the uncertainty principle does.” (Lindley 213)  
 
Quantum Physics  
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 The basis of quantum physics, and its namesake, is an essential unitary measurement of 
waves known as a quantum. Max Planck, widely touted as the father of quantum physics, 
performed a series of experiments relating to waveforms and initiated an unprecedented period 
of scientific creativity and frenzied experimentation. Physicist Stephen Hawking recounts that 
…the German scientist Max Planck suggested in 1900 that light, X rays, and other 
waves could not be emitted at an arbitrary rate, but only in certain packets that he 
called quanta. Moreover, each quantum had a certain amount of energy that was 
greater the higher the frequency of the waves, so at a high enough frequency the 
emission of a single quantum would require more energy than was available. 
(Hawking 56) 
In order to resolve this paradox, Planck began to employ wildly creative thinking, going so far as 
to incorporate seemingly-unrelated equations and matrices from diverse fields of mathematics 
into his calculations. In a stroke of gently-coaxed luck, one set of parameters seemed to actually 
work for his purposes. 
In 1900, without any underlying rational justification other than strictly 
mathematical purposes, he applied [Ludwig] Boltzmann’s probabilistic reasoning 
to calculate the entropy of the energy distribution in a black body… Planck’s new 
radiation law turned out to agree well with experimental data. This would not be 
the last time in this field that imaginative scientists generated productive new 
theoretical ideas that appeared totally unjustified… Scientifically, Max Planck 
embodied the reluctant but willing transition of the old guard from classical 
physics to an entirely new probabilistic paradigm in which iron-clad laws changed 
to statistical regularities. To admit the possibility, even if rare, of a violation of 
the second law of thermodynamics by a fluctuation was a wrenching thought for 
him, and he only grudgingly accepted atoms, which, after all, were ultimately 
responsible for the statistical nature of thermodynamics.  (Newton 212-23) 
 
In light of this, we should recall Paul Feyerabend’s position that unfettered and imaginative rule-
breaking in science can sometimes lead to major advances in knowledge, precisely when it 
coincides with the adoption of a pluralistic methodology and an openness to new forms of 
understanding. In Planck’s case, in fact (as it appears from the citation above), he indulged his 
creative impulse grudgingly, with an unwillingness to accept – like Albert Einstein – that there 
could be room for probability in the “hard” sciences. 
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 Before moving too far into a discussion of probability, however, we will need to better 
define the parameters of quantum physics. Michio Kaku gives a concise primer of its main 
concerns: 
…In quantum theory light was to be chopped up into tiny pieces. These packets of 
light were named photons, and they behave very much like point particles. When 
two electrons bump into each other, they repel each other not because of the 
curvature of space [itself a consequence of relativity], but because they exchange 
a packet of energy, the photon. The energy of these photons is measured in units 
of something called Planck’s constant (         erg sec). The almost 
infinitesimal size of Planck’s constant means that quantum theory gives tiny 
corrections to Newton’s Laws. These are called quantum corrections, and can be 
neglected when describing our familiar, macroscopic world. That is why we can, 
for the most part, forget about quantum theory when describing everyday 
phenomena. However, when dealing with the microscopic subatomic world, these 
quantum corrections begin to dominate any physical process, accounting for the 
bizarre, counterintuitive properties of subatomic particles. (Hyperspace 113-14) 
The implications of these “quantum corrections” are even farther-reaching than those introduced 
by relativity. That the world we see and exist within every day might, at a microscopic level, be 
completely rooted in uncertainty and probabilistic randomness is nothing short of horrifying – if 
things do not happen because of causality or consequence, what can be known or expected in the 
course of a human life? There is no longer a separation between fiction and reality in quantum 
physics – both are exempt, at a certain level, from direct cause, and neither is governed by an 
immutable set of rules. It seems that Dr. Kaku may have also grappled with this thought: “If 
quantum theory violates our common sense, it is only because nature does not seem to care much 
about our common sense.” (ibid. 115) Brian Greene shares similar musings on these 
implications: 
What business does probability have in the formulation of fundamental physics? 
We are accustomed to probability showing up in horse races, in coin tosses, and at 
the roulette table, but in these cases it merely reflects our incomplete 
knowledge… Quantum mechanics, on the contrary, injects the concept of 
probability into the universe at a far deeper level… In practice this means that if a 
particular experiment involving an electron is repeated over and over again in an 
absolutely identical manner, the same answer for, say, the measured position of an 
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electron will not be found over and over again… Exact outcomes of experiments 
cannot be predicted; the best we can do is predict the probability that any given 
outcome may occur. (Elegant Universe 105-107) 
 
The distinction made by Greene is crucial – the probabilistic inconsistencies generated in 
quantum physics are not necessarily the results of incomplete human knowledge. Rather, it 
insinuates that some atomic and particulate behaviors simply do not operate according to fixed 
rules or, better said, that nature’s laws allow for the preeminence of randomness in such cases. 
The thesis of our current study only gains strength in light of such discoveries, as the border 
between science and fiction continues to blur and smudge. 
    A final step forward in our present discussion of quantum physics – and a fitting end to 
this chapter – can be found in the Austrian physicist Werner Heisenberg’s struggle with 
procuring accurate measurements of subatomic particles, the failure of which culminated in the 
formation of his so-called Uncertainty Principle. Stephen Hawking provides a synopsis of 
Heisenberg’s dilemma: 
In order to predict the future position and velocity of a particle, one has to be able 
to measure its present position and velocity accurately. The obvious way to do 
this is to shine light on the particle. Some of the waves of light will be scattered 
by the particle and this will indicate its position. However, one will not be able to 
determine the position of the particle more accurately than the distance between 
the wave crests of light, so one needs to use light of a short wavelength in order to 
measure the position of the particle precisely. Now, by Planck’s quantum 
hypothesis, one cannot use an arbitrarily small amount of light; one has to use at 
least one quantum. This quantum will disturb the particle and change its velocity 
in a way that cannot be predicted… In other words, the more accurately you try to 
measure the position of the particle, the less accurately you can measure its speed, 
and vice versa. (Hawking 56-57) 
 
Since there can be no smaller quantity of light than the quantum (according to Planck), and since 
any amount of light used to measure one or more quanta will physically affect the particles being 
measured, this obviously translates into a net inability to obtain accurate information about all 
aspects of a particle or, by extension, any one thing in toto. In the same way that focusing a lens 
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on an object blurs everything else within the frame, Heisenberg’s observations uncovered a blind 
spot in the scientific enterprise. Roger Newton’s more-detailed description of Heisenberg’s 
experimentation is also useful in explaining this point: 
Published in 1927, it came to be known as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (or, 
more correctly translated, indeterminacy principle; he regarded it as a 
fundamental statement of indeterminacy at the submicroscopic level). Suppose an 
experiment is set up to determine the position of a particle with an accuracy A 
and, at the same time, its momentum with an accuracy B; then the two error limits 
A and B cannot both be made arbitrarily small… In other words, if you want to 
know the position of a particle extremely accurately, making A very small, then 
you cannot at the same time demand to know its momentum extremely accurately; 
the best you can achieve is B = h/A. Heisenberg’s conclusion from this surprising 
principle was that quantum mechanics could not be deterministic: in order to 
predict the future behavior of a particle, both its initial position and its initial 
momentum had to be known, but the indeterminacy principle prevented you from 
knowing both precisely. In fact, even to speak of a particle’s motion made little 
sense, since this would presuppose an exact simultaneous knowledge of both its 
place in space and its velocity, and such knowledge could not be obtained. 
(Newton 232-33) 
 
Clearly stated: the more an observer tries to obtain information about a subatomic particle’s 
position in space, the less there is that can be known about its speed, and vice versa. There would 
always be, as Heisenberg put it, “an ‘inexactness’ (Ungenaugkeit) in the conclusions.”
17
 While 
obviously posing an unfortunate burden for the empirical side of science, this indeterminacy can 
also have a more significant and nefarious impact in the development of scientific systems. 
David Lindley explains:  
Heisenberg’s uncertainty nailed down the inescapability of the discord between 
one possible measurement and another. An observer can choose to measure this, 
that or the other, but has to put up with resulting incommensurabilities. And that 
uncertainty feeds into the future development of the system. (Lindley 154) 
 
If the development of scientific systems can be summarized, therefore, as not much more than 
the exponential stacking of uncertainties over time, then the expected result should actually be a 
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David Lindley. Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science. New York: 
Anchor Books, 2008. p. 147. 
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spiraling movement away from certainty, in which what is thought to be verifiably known rests 
upon ever-shakier ground. There is little space that remaining for a convincing argument on the 
superiority of science over fiction – almost nothing separates them at this point, with the 
exception of science’s burden of experimental proof. Even then, though, Heisenberg’s principle 
calls into question what the eyes can claim to see and what mathematical proofs can claim to 
substantiate. We are already, albeit unwillingly, in the fictional realm of Borges and Calvino.    
 Many scientists and theorists have weighed in on the deep-reaching consequences of 
Heisenberg’s discovery. Echoing an earlier statement by Feynman, Stephen Hawking draws out 
a now-familiar point: 
The uncertainty principle had profound implications for the way in which we 
view the world. Even after more than seventy years they have not been fully 
appreciated by many philosophers, and are still the subject of much controversy. 
The uncertainty principle signaled an end to Laplace’s dream of a theory of 
science, a model of the universe that would be completely deterministic: one 
certainly cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the 
present state of the universe precisely! (Hawking 57) 
 
Roger Newton, as well, speaks in fiery words of the dilemma that assails science post-
Heisenberg: 
The now generally accepted physical interpretation of the probabilistic laws 
postulated for quantum mechanics emerged in 1926 out of long discussions in 
Copenhagen… The Copenhagen interpretation is based on a renunciation of all 
assumptions of the reality of entities and processes not observable or measurable: 
nothing is real until it is measured. If Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle 
prevents us from precisely measuring them at the same time, simultaneous 
position and momentum of a particle are meaningless concepts, and hence so is a 
particle’s motion. (Newton 242) 
 
We should dwell for a moment on the weight of this statement – potentially, the very motion of 
subatomic particles is a “meaningless concept,” since it cannot be measured reliably. Where can 
science possibly go from here? With such a gargantuan burden of verifiable proof as the standard 
for scientific success, theorization had no choice but to take the place of experimentation, at least 
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in certain branches of physics and mathematics. “Probability thus came to be located right at the 
heart of quantum mechanics,” Newton explains, “a characteristic strengthened by Heisenberg’s 
indeterminacy principle, which made statistics into an intrinsic feature of every measurement 
process.”  (ibid. 236) 
 
Cultural Function of Uncertainty 
 In 2008, David Lindley commented on the nature of the towering monolith that the 
Uncertainty Principle had come to embody; “Heisenberg’s paradoxically precise uncertainty 
principle has ascended to a remarkable level of intellectual celebrity.” (Lindley 210) In the same 
year, the American television channel AMC launched a new dramatic series entitled Breaking 
Bad, which told the story of a high-school chemistry teacher-cum-methamphetamine cook and 
kingpin named Walter White. The program was exceptionally well-received, and would 
eventually come to be regarded as one of the finest shows in the history of television. This was 
surely due in part to the brilliant inclusion of a clandestine alias of White’s during the show’s 
later seasons, in which he is known in the underworld simply as “Heisenberg”. Perhaps no 
better-known pop-cultural reference to the Uncertainty Principle exists than this devious alter-
ego, which re-introduced Heisenberg’s name – and, hopefully, his scientific legacy – to a wide 
and generally non-scientific audience. 
 With Walter White performing some of his most morally questionable acts under the 
mask of “Heisenberg,” the symbolism leads to an (admittedly obvious) meditation on moral 
relativism, in which the real Heisenberg’s principle, as we have already established, has moved 
out of the realm of physics and into the speculative world of the philosophy of “good” and “bad.” 
Indeterminacy does not only exist between the momentum and position of electrons – rather, it 
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can be found as well in human behavior, where our actions are driven by complex and conflicted 
motivations. “Good,” “bad,” “momentum” and “position” appear to have become 
interchangeable terms in the present day. David Lindley can offer more insight into this 
situation: 
Literary deconstructionists have also made a fetish out of the uncertainty 
principle. They insist that a text has no absolute or intrinsic meaning but acquires 
meaning only through the act of being read – and therefore can acquire different 
meanings depending on who is doing the reading. Just as, in quantum 
measurements, results come about through an interaction between observer and 
thing observed, so too, we are invited to think, does the meaning of some piece of 
literature arise through interaction between reader and text (authors having 
evidently vanished from this equation)…Whether physicists like it or not, 
Heisenberg’s principle has spread far and wide and caused cultural derangement. 
This has nothing to do with whether quantum mechanical uncertainty has some 
genuine meaning in various far-flung regions of intellectual study. It has to do 
with the way Heisenberg has become a touchstone, a badge of authority, for a 
certain class of ideas and speculations. (ibid. 211-212) 
 
This “class of ideas” is precisely what was harnessed in Breaking Bad, and in any number of 
other books, programs and films that philosophically consider our loss of absolute markers. 
Borges and Calvino are part of this grand exercise to wrangle statistical uncertainty into a 
reliable set of predictable beliefs or systems. Again, Lindley is a step ahead of us: 
What fascinates, evidently, is the semblance of a connection, an underlying 
commonality, between scientific and other forms of knowledge… It tells us that 
scientific knowledge, like our general, informal understanding of the everyday 
world we inhabit, can be both rational and accidental, purposeful and contingent. 
Scientific truth is powerful, but not all-powerful. (ibid. 214-216) 
 
Science, it would seem, cannot claim to be Heisenberg’s sole heir.  
 We might note, as we did in Feynman’s words, the critical tone toward the appropriation 
of the Uncertainty Principle by mass culture, or at the very least the mournful lamentation that all 
might be lost. There is a tendency by scientists and mathematicians to claim exclusive rights to 
what Heisenberg’s ideas represent, with all employment of these concepts by artists dismissed as 
misguided or outside of the original spirit of indeterminacy. However, Lindley reveals all that we 
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need to know in order to proceed with our own study without fear of misusing Heisenberg’s 
intellectual property. In recounting the story of Heisenberg’s first meeting with Danish physicist 
Niels Bohr – his friend and colleague in quantum theory – Lindley crafts an image that is as 
steeped in fiction as it is in fact. 
He wanted to know, Heisenberg told Bohr, what quantum theory meant. Beyond 
the ingenious calculations and fitting of complex spectral lines to peculiar systems 
of quantum numbers and rules, what, he wanted to know, was the underlying 
conception, the true physics of it all? Bohr did not insist on the need for detailed 
classical models that could be translated systematically into quantum terms. 
Rather, he told Heisenberg, the point of models was to capture as much as one 
could hope to say about atoms, given the inadequacies of the ideas with which 
physicists were fumbling along. “When it comes to atoms,” Bohr concluded 
enigmatically, “language can be used only as in poetry. The poet, too, is not 
nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creating images and establishing 
mental connections.” (ibid. 86)     
 
The fathers of quantum theory – including Heisenberg himself, who established indeterminacy as 
a scientific concept – approached the language of theorization as necessarily poetic and fictive; 
what could be said, after all, about a theory for which there was no visible proof? Bohr 
specifically would seem to share a special kinship with Jorge Luis Borges and Italo Calvino: 
“Bohr was not like other physicists. Unmathematical, he moved forward on a spiderweb of 
concepts, principles and riddles that, to the typical physicist, looked something like philosophy.” 
(ibid. 200-201) We need not rest too long upon this description of Uncertainty’s originators – 
perhaps it is safest to assume that for each staunch Feynman there is a poetic Bohr, and that our 
own interpretation of the Uncertainty Principle will be completely in line with its necessarily 
ambiguous message. 
Before moving into the next section of our study, in which we will finally begin our deep 
analyses of the works of Borges and Calvino, we might best close this chapter by turning to 
Calvino’s perennially-neurotic subject, Mr. Palomar, and his own struggles with verifiability, 
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ambiguity and indeterminacy. Palomar is a complex figure, simultaneously eliciting both pathos 
and frustration. He attempts to regard the universe as a scientist, but remains, inescapably, a 
human animal, at every turn immobilized when his desire to understand scrapes against the 
ceiling of human cognition and reason – as always, Heisenberg’s principle in motion. 
For an illustration of this hopelessly-comical cycle, we will focus on the second section 
of Mr. Palomar, specifically on a triptych entitled “Mr. Palomar in the Garden,” which finds its 
conclusion in a section entitled “The Infinite Lawn.” Mr. Palomar gazes at the lawn surrounding 
his home, regarding it first as a “uniform green expanse” and then, upon closer inspection, as 
actually being riddled with weeds of various species. He begins to cull his lawn, a symbolic act 
that may reflect man’s desire to rein the wild universe into a closed system of predictable laws 
and processes. But, inevitably: “When you start pulling up one weed, you immediately see 
another appear a bit farther on, and another, and still another.” (Calvino 30) The astute reader 
will recognize this scene as another possible recapitulation of the infamous paradox of Zeno of 
Alea, an evergreen trope in Borges’ fictions as well. Palomar attempts to resolve this quandary:  
To be sure, pulling up a weed here and there solves nothing. This is how it should 
be done, he thinks – take a square section of the lawn, one meter by one meter, 
and eliminate even the slightest presence of anything but clover, darnel or 
dichondra. Then move on to another square. No, perhaps not: remain perhaps with 
the sample square. Count how many blades of grass there are, what species, how 
thick, how distributed. On the basis of this calculation you would arrive at a 
statistical knowledge of the lawn, which, once established… (ibid. 31) 
 
Here, as with all systems of scientific inquiry based on indeterminacy, Palomar’s approach 
begins to spiral and grow exponentially. One never knows, he finds, at which point to stop 
counting blades of grass, or when a tiny sprout should be counted fully as a true “blade” of grass. 
“Mr. Palomar has already moved to another train of thought: is ‘the lawn’ what we see, or do we 
see one grass plus one grass plus one grass…? What we call ‘seeing the lawn’ is only an effect of 
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our coarse and slapdash senses.” (ibid. 33) There can be no system here, at least not for the 





































Part 2, Chapter 1: Transfinites and Infinites 
 
Georg Cantor 
 In this chapter we will begin a close analysis of the scientific themes and imagery present 
in the short fictions of Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges. We will first focus on various 
representations of infinity, beginning in the early 1800s and extending into the present day. 
Following a brief historical contextualization of Georg Cantor, the brilliant and troubled inventor 
of transfinite set theory (a constant source of inspiration for Borges), we will then jump to 
astrophysical concepts first introduced by Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking, and later still to 
the recapitulation of such concepts by modern-day physicists Michio Kaku and Brian Greene, 
while constantly maintaining a steady focus on what role such ideas might have played in 
numerous specific works by Borges and Calvino. As we progress in later chapters into more 
current scientific material, our close readings will intensify, until finally culminating and 
concluding in a discussion of science as fiction.    
As the creator of transfinite set theory, Austrian mathematician Georg Ferdinand Ludwig 
Philipp Cantor revolutionized the logical study of continuity and the infinite. Having departed 
from the foundation laid by his scholarly forebears, he freely deviated from the established 
methodology and, often relying on scarcely more than his imagination and instinct, was at least 
mostly successful in establishing a new theory of numbers that would, for the first time, allow for 
the provisional representation of infinity as a usable mathematical value. Cantor’s specialized 
point sets, which resolve “discontinuities in domains of definition” (Dauben 6) (read: problems 
of representing the infinite or the [mathematically] irrational in patterns of numbers), came about 
not by following the customary logical thread of contemporary mathematics, but rather through a 
release from the constraints of traditional rules. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the spirit 
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of this exercise is one and the same of that of liberal scientific philosophers like Paul 
Feyerabend, as well as those of experimental writers of fiction such as Jorge Luis Borges and 
Italo Calvino. 
 Cantor began his project from a vantage point that had already been posed by several 
titans of number theory and mathematics. By 1829, the German mathematician Gustav Dirichlet 
had established and begun to tease out the tightly knotted mass of the so-called “discontinuity 
problem,” a difficulty in mathematically representing infinite values; his work was continued by 
Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann. (ibid. 9) Riemann was able to narrow the focus onto the 
representation of discontinuous (again, “infinite”) functions and develop a brilliant but limited 
system which allowed for the incorporation of isolated infinities within specific formulas. 
According to Joseph Dauben, a Cantor biographer and historian, this meant that Riemann had 
“focused only on the sum function” (ibid. 13) – or, more clearly, that the methodology of 
reaching a sum became irrelevant so long as, in the end, the correct sum was attained. Just as 
Paul Feyerabend would implore of his eventual contemporaries, Riemann innovated by spackling 
shut the peepholes in the wall of mathematics that stubbornly suggested the endless, 
unapproachable abyss that lay behind. Necessarily, these provisional solutions only proved 
useful for very specific functions, cases and conditions, but they worked better than any idea had 
worked before. His master stroke, the introduction of the “auxiliary function” – denoted F(x) – 
brought about a total shift in perspective as the first systematic treatment of discontinuous 
functions, and would come to inspire yet another generation of revolutionary mathematicians. 
(ibid. 15-18)  
 In the late 1800’s, German mathematician Hermann Hankel, drawing from Riemann’s 
discoveries and working concurrently with him, succeeded in multiplying arithmetical 
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singularities (basically zero-value variables) by transplanting them into other algebraic functions. 
Simply stated, this allowed a potentially infinite number of singularities to be found within any 
finite interval – for example, the space between 0.1 and 1.0. The magnitude of this innovation 
might be easily overlooked, so better to pose it in sharper terms: for the first time in history, a 
mathematician was able to actually contain and resolve a singularity inside of a rational set of 
values – in essence, to hold a “condensation of infinities” in the palm of his hand. (ibid. 24) The 
philosophical implications of this were – and are – understandably staggering; incidentally, 




Infinity is not only represented in Hankel’s functions, it is also used and manipulated. In 
1870, in his doctoral thesis defended at Tübingen University, he posited that, in the same way 
that problems of division had required the introduction into the mathematical lexicon of rational 
numbers – not to mention similar issues with quadratic problems requiring the subsequent 
invention of irrational and complex numbers – so was a novel number system needed here to 
resolve the limitations of representing the discontinuous and the infinite. The existing 
mathematical language, to put it bluntly, wasn’t cutting it. Hankel’s justification, cited from his 
Universitätsprogramm, is strangely moving: 
Actual proof of the existence of functions of the most illegitimate kind… has been 
necessary to show beyond a doubt that the legitimacy of functions does not come 
to us arbitrarily dictated from some mysterious, inflexible necessity which lies in 
the “Nature of Things” as one often hears, but is rather a wise, convenient and 
conventional limitation which we impose on ourselves. (ibid. 26) 
 
Here, though, the notion of the singularity has just barely been touched. Through the efforts of 
Dirichlet, Riemann and Hankel, the stage had been set for the emotionally troubled and 
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Jorge Luis Borges. Jorge Luis Borges: Selected Non-Fictions. (Andrew Hurley, ed.) New York: Penguin Books, 
1999. pp. 43-47.  
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mystically-minded Georg Cantor to overthrow the very concept of “real numbers” and introduce 
transfinite set theory to a shocked world of mathematicians, logicians and eventually writers of 
fiction. 
Georg Cantor’s first scandalous gesture was in his re-elaboration and expansion of 
Riemann’s F(x) function, through which, we may recall, he managed to squeeze a theoretical 
infinity of unique points into a given space by permitting numerous exceptions to traditional 
methods of representation. (ibid. 34) These exceptions fomented an immediate backlash among 
his colleagues and superiors – they were uneasy with his apparent eagerness to abandon the 
established methodology in order to make his functions valid. In 1871, Cantor took a cue from 
Hermann Hankel and began to merge singularities into his work as well, hoping to extend the 
usefulness of his functions past finite numbers and exceptional points. (ibid. 36) Here, though, a 
monolithic problem arose: with multiple layers of tangled singularities to work with, Cantor 
found himself at a disadvantage when using the traditional number system of mathematics, as it 
did not lend itself readily to the work that he was attempting to do. Like the indiscrete, 
continuous sections of Palomar’s “infinite lawn” that we have seen in Calvino’s Mr. Palomar,
19
  
it was impossible to tell at which point one singularity ended and another began, or to designate 
the order in which they were situated. In order to move forward, he decided – rather impetuously 
– to build his own number system from the ground up, in which there would be no 
presupposition of the existence of irrational numbers (ibid. 37); simply stated, his number system 
would allow the irrational to remain rational from the very start. As Dauben notes, “Cantor had 
devised a scheme whereby it was possible to identify with precision and rigor complicated 
                                                          
19
“A lawn does not have boundaries; there is a border where the grass stops growing, but still a few scattered blades 
sprout farther on, then a thick green clod, then a sparser stretch: are they still part of the lawn, or not? Elsewhere the 
underbrush enters the lawn: you cannot tell what is lawn and what is bush. But even when there is nothing but grass, 
you never know at what point you can stop counting: between one little plant and the next there is always a tiny 
sprouting leaf that barely emerges from the earth…” (Calvino 31-32)  
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configurations of points distributed in certain specified ways on the geometric continuum.” (ibid. 
40) 
 As all of this theorizing was necessarily arbitrary, Cantor contented himself by 
establishing point sets that simply represented “neighborhoods” of points rather than individual 
points – this technically allowed statistical precision without having to resolve the impossible 
issue of locating each potential singularity. He simply named a point set P’ when it contained an 
individual point P. If the points within P’ were theoretically infinite, a higher order set of P” 
could be generated to contain it. This ordering of sets, like an endlessly dense Matryoshka doll, 
could potentially go on forever (      ), but like each individual doll the structural properties of 
these point sets could be neatly identified. Cantor had found a way for mathematicians to wield 
infinity.  
 As years passed for Cantor, he worked feverishly to legitimize these theories to his peers 
and the mathematical world at large. Wracked by self-doubt and anxiety and prone to nervous 
breakdowns and violent outbursts, he delusionally characterized his creation of transfinite sets as 
being “divinely inspired,” (ibid. 285-291) which no doubt increased the pressure that he felt to 
complete his work, and presumably also magnified the caustic skepticism that others harbored 
toward his strange ideas. These dialectically-generated numbers were, for him, non-arbitrary and 
undeniably real. (ibid. 82) For his colleagues, though, his use of the infinite as a “completed” 
idea was not only mathematically inconsistent but potentially dangerous. 
 Cantor responded to this criticism with a redefinition of the rules of transfinite set theory, 
foremost of which was his proclamation that it was simply incorrect to assume that infinities 
demonstrated the same arithmetical characteristics as finite numbers – they were necessarily 
different, of a completely separate order of existence, and could not be productively compared to 
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finite numbers. In fact, being infinite, these numbers should absolutely not be thought of as 
exhibiting finite properties at all. This argument, of course, was airtight within the parameters of 
Cantor’s own system, but those still living in the world of traditional mathematics were 
nonetheless inflamed and befuddled. Cantor had shattered the old concept of the infinite as an 
“untouchable” concept, (ibid. 124) and had even introduced a vague but notable distinction 
between actual and potential infinities. He appealed to his contemporaries with the same fire that 
would be seen in the likes of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, extolling the “freedom of 
mathematics to accept the creation and application of new ideas solely on the grounds of 
intellectual consistency.” (ibid. 132) By putting imagination and creativity first, Cantor claimed 
that set theory’s “application to physical phenomena of the external world was of considerable 
but subsidiary importance,” (ibid. 133) a claim with which both Borges and Calvino, as writers 
of fiction and lovers of imaginative experimentation, would probably agree.   
 Cantor’s introduction of the Hebrew symbol   – pronounced “aleph” – into his equations 
was perhaps his final major innovation in legitimizing transfinite set theory, and its mystical, 
Kabbalistic undertones imbued that which he already considered to be a “divine” concept with 
even more arcane weight and depth. Meant to represent the first transfinite cardinal number 
(which, in turn, would represent the power of the set of all finite cardinals),   cannot be a finite 
number, as it is larger than all finites. (ibid. 181) Essentially, the aleph is a symbolic 
representation of an infinite unity, or a singularity – a figurative black hole. Cantor was able to 
establish this unity through his statements         and            ; the   exhibits 
characteristics that are unique to infinities, as is shown by its obliteration of the value of 1 in the 
first example and its resistance to being multiplied in the second.  
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 This was to be Cantor’s big moment – the apotheosis of transfinite set theory as a 
coherent and transcendent mathematical system. Sadly, although perhaps not unexpectedly, his 
further proofs were disappointingly incomplete. One major stumbling block became his inability 
to prove the comparability and sequential order of alephs. (ibid. 195) The entire enterprise 
seemed anticlimactic if one transfinite cardinal could not be distinguished from another, or if 
they could not be put into some sort of hierarchical order. An even more damning flaw was the 
horrifying logic of the “set of all sets” (ibid. 242) – if a transfinite “master” set could 
theoretically contain all other transfinite sets but not itself, it must itself belong to yet another 
higher-order set. However, since this set also had to be a member of the master set, the inevitable 
conclusion was an irresolvable paradox: either a lower-order set contained a higher-order set, or 
a set contained itself. Italo Calvino would later come to dub this, “the paradox of an infinite 
whole that contains all other infinite wholes,” as “the undecidable”;
20
 the inexorable vortex of 
infinity had begun to pull transfinite set theory down into an endless regress. Like Calvino’s 
Palomar in the “Invasion of Starlings,” who, when confronted with the task of delineating the 
borders of a constantly shifting and churning flock of birds, falls under the spell of “a vertigo that 
[gripped] him at the pit of the stomach” (Calvino 63); Palomar, like Cantor, is overwhelmed by 
the smudged and disobedient borders of the limitless.  
None of Cantor’s conclusions satisfied anyone, least of all himself. The French 
mathematician Henri Poincaré famously took up arms against Cantor’s proofs, calling transfinite 
numbers a “disease” of which mathematics could eventually and hopefully be cured. He went on 
to accuse Cantor of employing “contradictory and meaningless concepts” that would cause 
mathematics to become a “complex system of tautologies.” (Dauben 266) Other mathematicians 
railed against what they saw as Cantor’s introduction of psychologism into mathematics. Cantor 
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Italo Calvino. Six Memos for the Next Millennium. New York: Vintage Books, 1993. p. 97. 
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was heartbroken at his own inability to defend his theory against such attacks, despite having 
virtually scraped against the ceiling of what was knowable to mankind. He believed deeply in his 
theory, and did not see the paradoxes in his system as being anything other than totally coherent 
manifestations of the Absolute, or “the virtual word of God.” (ibid. 248) Dauben explains that:  
The set of all transfinite numbers, like the absolute itself, could be acknowledged 
but it could never be completely understood… The mystical-religious 
implications were all a part of Cantor’s conceptualization of the infinite… He 
always regarded the absolutely infinite succession of transfinite numbers as a 
thoroughly appropriate symbol for the absolute. (ibid. 245) 
 
 The sharpest details of Cantor’s set theory remain unproven today; the lacunae found 
therein do not lend themselves willingly to proofs, although many have tried. In a study of 
literature as science (and vice-versa), however, this lack of proof need not be overly 
disconcerting – as Borges and Calvino have shown us, the potentiality of an idea can be worth 
much more than its scientific viability.  
To begin a study of Borges’ employment of ideas from Cantorian set theory, it will be 
appropriate to first introduce a short piece that demonstrates Borges’ awareness of the subject: 
his 1940 book review of Mathematics and the Imagination by Edward Kasner and James 
Newman. Always wry, Borges tells the reader that “its four hundred pages lucidly record the 
immediate and accessible charms of mathematics, those which even a mere man of letters can 
understand, or imagine he understands,” including even “the rudiments of the theory of 
transfinite numbers.” (CNF 249) Here, Borges is winking at us – he is much more familiar with 
this concept than he lets on. Four years earlier, in 1936, he had published an essay entitled “The 
Doctrine of Cycles,” which harnessed Cantorian methodology to present a possible refutation of 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s doctrine of the “Eternal Return.” Briefly summarized, it posited that 
Nietzsche had been credited with presenting the idea that, in a universe in which there exist a 
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finite number of atoms coupled with infinite time, all possible permutations of the universe must 
eventually come into being. Over an infinite time period, all variations and combinations will 
necessarily repeat themselves (even down to our own births and deaths!), the universe having 
exhausted all possible novel forms and interactions. This should, theoretically, continue ad 
infinitum. Borges readily admits to his self-doubt in presenting a refutation to this idea. After 
latching onto a quote by Nietszche from Thus Spake Zarathustra – “I never denied that the 
vicissitudes of matter were copious; I said only that they were not infinite” (ibid. 116) – Borges 
is obliged “to fall back on Georg Cantor and his heroic theory of sets.” 
“Cantor destroys the foundation of Nietszche’s hypothesis,” Borges tells us. “He asserts 
the perfect unity of the number of points in the universe, and even in one meter of the universe, 
or a fraction of that meter.” (ibid. 116) An infinitude of derivable points in finite space, to 
Borges, is the equivalent of an infinity of matter. He demonstrates this using a tableau from set 
theory in which the sets of all even or odd numbers are shown to be just as infinite as the set of 
all numbers. Borges’ grasp on Cantor’s ideas is evident here, with this infinite series of all 
numbers being broken down into equally infinite (but structurally diverse and distinct) subsets. 
Borges provides several other examples of the infinity of physical points in the universe, and 
concludes the section by stating that “if the universe consists of an infinite number of terms, it is 
rigorously capable of an infinite number of combinations – and the need for a Recurrence is done 
away with. There remains its mere possibility, which can be calculated as zero.” (ibid. 117) 
While potentially his most explicit discussion of Cantorian set theory, this refutation of 
Nietszche was not necessarily Borges’ first. An aforementioned essay published in 1929 (when 
Borges was thirty years old) entitled “The Perpetual Race of Achilles and the Tortoise” 
recapitulated the ancient riddle of the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea, which details a race 
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between Achilles and a tortoise, and in which the tortoise has graciously been given a ten-meter 
head-start by the tenfold-faster Achilles. Demonstrating comparative gains in space, the race 
continues without end as the space between the two contestants approaches (but does not ever 
reach) zero. With each subsequent subdivision of space, Achilles edges ever closer without ever 
overtaking the tortoise, due to the increasingly smaller spatial subdivisions that continually splay 
out before them. Zeno’s conundrum, to Borges, is a potentially harrowing thought experiment 
involving the same infinite divisibility of space that would come to be seen explicitly in the 
“Doctrine of Cycles.” 
Borges vivisects Zeno’s paradox in the following way: “We can divide ten units by ten, 
and the quotient again by ten, as many times as we want, and [the] subdivisions of the time in 
which it all occurs. But an unlimited number of subdivisions can occur within what is limited.” 
(ibid. 44) Borges also invokes another notable name in scientific philosophy, Henri Bergson, 
who famously championed the idea of the non-discrete nature of time, and the inability of 
science and mathematics to adapt to its continuous and non-segmented nature – specifically, 
Borges argues that Achilles’ movements across time could not be segmented in the same way as 
the space that he crossed, and as such Zeno’s paradox was simply inapt.
21
 To reinforce this point, 
Borges employs the aforementioned tableaux delineating the infinite subsets of even and odd 
numbers contained within the group of all numbers in order to illustrate, once again, that “the 
part… is no less copious than the whole.” (ibid. 46) Borges finally grants us a diplomatic 
conclusion: “Zeno is incontestable, unless we admit the ideality of space and time. If we accept 
idealism, if we accept the concrete growth of the perceived, then we shall elude the mise an 
abîme of the paradox.” (ibid. 47)  
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Curiously, much of this essay is identical to the text of “The Doctrine of Cycles,” with 
the notable absence of any mention of Georg Cantor, transfinites or even set theory. This would 
suggest that Borges recycled segments of this essay once he had later found suitable 
mathematical inspiration in Cantor, a supposition that lends credence to his (and our) assertion 
that scientific concepts can indeed inform and drive the creative forces of literature. 
There is no better emblem of the concept of Cantor’s aleph in Borges’ oeuvre than what 
can be found in the eponymous tale “The Aleph.” So enchanted must Borges have been by the 
mathematical, spiritual and occult potential of this aspect of the infinite that he seems to have 
made it the focal point of what many consider to be his greatest work of short fiction, written 
some twenty years after his exposition on Zeno’s paradox. “The Aleph” details the Borgesian 
narrator’s loss of the object of his longstanding affection, the overwhelmingly beautiful – and 
recently deceased – Beatriz Viterbo. Over the course of several years following her death, the 
narrator, uninvited, returns to her home every April 30
th
 to attend a memorial dinner, gradually 
becoming familiar with her first cousin, the decadent poet and arrogant blowhard Carlos Daneri 
– as Borges describes him, “authoritarian, though also ineffectual.” (ibid. 275) Daneri’s poetic 
mission is to “versify the entire planet,” (ibid. 277) through a pompous and labyrinthine long-
form work entitled “The Earth,” which was, according to the narrator, “a poem that seemed to 
draw out to infinity the possibilities of cacophony and chaos.” (ibid. 280) As the narrator spends 
increasingly insufferable evenings in Daneri’s company, it is eventually revealed that the 
inspiration for Daneri’s poem – and the font of his arcane and esoteric imagery – is an “Aleph,” 
found “in one corner of the cellar.” (ibid. 280) An Aleph, our narrator explains, “is one of the 
points in space that contain all points”; more specifically, it is “the place where, without 
admixture or confusion, all the places of the world, seen from every angle, coexist.” (ibid. 281) 
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One need simply lie down in complete darkness on the cellar’s tile floor, focus one’s eyes on the 
space below the nineteenth step of the stairway, and wait. Borges’ narrator obliges, but also 
assumes, of course, that Daneri has lost his mind, and fears that he has unwittingly become the 
prisoner of a madman in that obscure cantina. Amazingly enough, within moments, the narrator 
encounters precisely the same stupefying phenomenon that was described by Daneri. 
Of particular interest at this point in our analysis is the language that Borges employs in 
discussing his narrator’s crisis of description – much as Georg Cantor’s transfinite numbers 
failed to provide solace from the insuperable problem of representing the infinite, so does 
Borges’ narrator struggle to find a similar technique to “show” us the Aleph in this story.  
I come now to the ineffable center of my tale; it is here that a writer’s 
hopelessness begins. Every language is an alphabet of symbols the employment of 
which assumes a past shared by its interlocutors. How can one transmit to others 
the infinite Aleph, which my timorous memory can scarcely contain? …And 
besides, the central problem – the enumeration, even partial enumeration, of 
infinity – is irresolvable. (ibid. 282) 
 
This citation presents a serviceable-but-tenuous link to Cantor’s theories, but thankfully Borges 
provides an even more explicit connection in the postscript to “The Aleph.” 
‘Aleph,’ as we all know, is the name of the first letter of the alphabet of the sacred 
language. Its application to the disk of my tale would not appear to be accidental. 
In the Kabbala, that letter signifies the En Soph, the pure and unlimited godhead; 
it has also been said that its shape is that of a man pointing to the sky and the 
earth, to indicate that the lower world is a map and mirror of the higher. For the 
Mengenlehre, the aleph is the symbol of the transfinite numbers, in which the 
whole is not greater than any of its parts. (ibid. 285) 
  
This directly-stated parallel with Georg Cantor is perfectly in line with what we already know of 
Borges’ interest in and awareness of Cantor and transfinite set theory.  We can see echoed in 
Borges’ attempt to ascribe discrete physical features to an object that suggests the discontinuous 
the very same approach that Cantor employed in his toil to qualify and sketch transfinite sets, 
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which are also figures or images that are meant to somehow contain the totality of existence 
within finite space. 
Borges’ postscript to “The Aleph” leaves his reader spiraling in exactly the same 
feedback loop that plagued Cantor’s final proofs of transfinite set theory – namely, the difficulty 
of establishing the comparability and sequentiality of distinct transfinite alephs, along with the 
final paradox of the set of all sets, which cannot contain itself, and therefore cannot possibly be 
the final set in the transfinite hierarchy despite containing all other sets. Our narrator says: 
I would like to know: Did Carlos Argentino [Daneri] choose that name, or did he 
read it, applied to another point at which all points converge, in one of the 
innumerable texts revealed to him by the Aleph in his house? Incredible as it may 
seem, I believe that there is (or was) another Aleph; I believe that the Aleph of 
Calle Garay was a false Aleph.” (ibid. 285)  
 
Borges then names several other legendary artifacts that, throughout history, have been suspected 
of possessing the ability to reflect or display infinity to those who regarded them. In citing these 
other possible Alephs, all of which display the characteristics of a “final” Aleph or “set of all 
sets,” Borges gives us an exact mapping of the upper echelons of Cantor’s transfinite structure. 
These number sets/ infinity proxies all refer to one another (by way of referring to infinity) but 
cannot necessarily be hierarchically ordered – there is no way for us to tell which is the “real” 
final Aleph and which are simply the “false” ones that point toward the master set. This is 
precisely the conundrum that stumped Cantor, re-elaborated in the form of creative fiction. 
“Does that Aleph exist…?” asks our narrator. This is unfortunately not a rhetorical question. We 
can safely assume that Borges is content to end his study with this replication of Cantor’s 
problematic continuum hypothesis. In any event, we still do not possess a solution to this 
paradox, despite the best efforts of Cantor and Borges, and almost one-hundred additional years 
of mathematical advancement. 
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      In keeping with the theme of Borges’ portrayal of objects that tend toward or represent 
infinity, we will now focus on “The Zahir,” another story in the collection entitled The Aleph. In 
this tale we are told that, currently, the Zahir is a “common twenty-centavo coin into which a 
razor or letter opener has scratched the letters N T and the number 2.” (ibid. 243) At various 
moments in history, the narrator informs us, the same Zahir has nevertheless also existed as a 
tiger, a blind man, an astrolabe, a compass, a vein in the marble of a pillar and, poetically, the 
bottom of a certain well. We are told that this coin-Zahir has come into the possession of Borges’ 
narrator following the death of a beloved Argentine film and magazine star, Teodelina Villar. We 
should note immediately the similarities between this premise and that of “The Aleph” – clearly 
Borges is presenting us with another variation on a theme, only this time it is a movable 
singularity rather than the fixed maw of Carlo Daneri’s enchanting, subterranean Aleph. 
Following Villar’s wake, the narrator is unknowingly given the Zahir as part of his change for 
the purchase of a caña de naranja, or brandy and orange juice, at a café, presumably as he 
attempts to console himself over the loss of the woman that he had so adored from afar. 
Seemingly magnifying the implied potentiality of the Zahir’s infinitude, three men in the café are 
playing truco during Borges’ transaction. Truco, as Andrew Hurley explains in the notes to 
Borges’ Collected Fictions, is “a card game indigenous, apparently, to Argentina. Borges,” he 
continues, “was fascinated by this game… Truco’s nature, for JLB, is that combination of fate 
and chance that seems to rule over human life as well as over games: an infinitude of 
possibilities within a limited number of cards…” (ibid. 541) Truco not only involves complex 
rules and intricate strategies, but is also heavily reliant on deception, confusion and feigned 
misunderstanding.
22
 That the Zahir be transmitted to Borges’ unreliable narrator (a potentially 
beguiling artifice in and of himself) while this symbolic representation of maddening infinity 
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plays out in the background is nearly perfect in its effect, and again illustrates Borges’ acute 
contextual awareness. 
 The actual experience of beholding the Zahir is where the reader will note a sharp 
deviation from the formula of “The Aleph.” Rather than representing an actually infinite visible 
experience that occurs extra-corporeally, the Zahir seems to instead suggest a potential infinity 
(we will surely recall Cantor’s “potential infinities” at this point), which then triggers a semiotic 
avalanche – A refers to B, B to C and so on, in quick succession and with overwhelming 
simultaneity. Our narrator describes his first such experience: 
I looked at it for an instant, then walked outside into the street, perhaps with the 
beginnings of a fever. The thought struck me that there is no coin that is not the 
symbol of all the coins that shine endlessly down throughout history and fable… 
Possessed, without a trace of sleepiness, almost happy, I reflected that there is 
nothing less material than money, since any coin (a twenty-centavo piece, for 
instance) is, in truth, a panoply of all possible futures… (I had no suspicion at the 
time that these “thoughts” were an artifice against the Zahir and a first 
manifestation of its demonic influence.)… The next day I decided I’d been drunk. 
(ibid. 245-6) 
Our narrator is assailed by the palpable, tangible existence of all coins when confronted with the 
Zahir. In order to escape the vertigo that this induces, he “loses” the coin in a randomly selected 
café far from his home, as payment for another brandy.   
 Time passes, but the narrator is unable to purge himself of the memory of his encounter 
with the Zahir. “It was futile to tell myself that that abominable nickel disk was no different from 
the infinite other identical, inoffensive disks that pass from hand to hand every day.” (ibid. 246) 
He passes sleepless nights until he encounters, miraculously, a book on the phenomenon of the 
Zahir, “Urkunden zur Geschichte der Zahirsage (Breslau, 1899).” He learns that zahir, in Arabic, 
“means visible, manifest, evident; in that sense, it is one of the ninety-nine names of God.” (ibid. 
246) Again, we find ourselves in an apt position to return, briefly, to Georg Cantor’s Alephs – 
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functionally identical to the zahir, they are the visual or “physical” manifestation not of the 
infinite itself, but of the suggestion of the infinite. One Aleph, in its unprovable sequentiality or 
cardinality, necessarily evokes all others; none of these, however, is larger or smaller than any 
other, regardless of whether it is denoted   ,    or even   . This same equivalence is shared 
between the tiger-Zahir, the blind-man-Zahir and the marble-vein-Zahir, as well as all others; 
like Cantor’s Alephs, they are all mere arrows pointing to the one Absolute infinity – Cantors’ 
God – which cannot be represented, perceived or even imagined. Borges’ Aleph, on the other 
hand, seems to be an attempted representation of the Absolute itself, which of course must fail 
due to the limitations of human language and understanding.  
In the end, the narrator of “The Zahir” is unable to forget his harrowing encounter with 
the abyss. We are told, in fact, that others in town have also beheld the Zahir, and it has led to 
their incarceration in a home for the mentally disturbed. (ibid. 248) Borges’ speaker resigns 
himself to what seems to be his only possible future – the anonymous plenitude of the Zahir.  
Time, which softens recollections, only makes the memory of the Zahir all the 
sharper. First I could see the face of it, then the reverse; now I can see both sides 
at once… It is as though the vision were itself spherical, with the Zahir rampant in 
the center… Anything that is not the Zahir comes to me as though through a filter, 
and from a distance. (ibid. 248) 
He concludes with a statement that is utterly evocative of our previous interpretation of Cantor’s 
Absolute: “Perhaps behind the coin is God.” (ibid. 249) God is not the coin itself, then, after all – 
like all other transfinites, the coin simply refers to Him, infinitely. 
 Borges attempts another permutation of the transfinite in “The Writing of the God,” the 
story of a Mayan priest who has been imprisoned by the Spanish in a deep, lightless well. He 
shares this prison with a jaguar, and is separated from the beast by a very tall dividing wall with 
a metal grate at the bottom. Most of the time they dwell in complete darkness, but once a day 
they are given food and water, and Tzinacán, the priest, can briefly make out the jaguar’s 
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features in the fleeting daylight. To pass the time until his inevitable execution, Tzinacán 
attempts to remember all that he has seen and known in his entire life. This exercise leads him to 
recall the legend of a “secret text” written by the god Qaholom in an unknown place, which 
would provide the power not only to free Tzinacán from his prison but also to bring on the end of 
days. 
Tzinacán languishes until he recalls that one of the names for Qaholom is tigre – the 
Spanish word for the jaguar. (ibid. 251) At this thought, Tzinacán is “filled with holiness” – the 
text must be written on the flesh of the jaguar, he decides. From this point on, Borges’ narration 
becomes that of Tzinacán’s struggle with the essentially transfinite nature of deciphering a god’s 
language.  
What sort of sentence, I asked myself, would be constructed by an absolute mind? 
I reflected that even in the languages of humans there is no proposition that does 
not imply the entire universe… I reflected that in the language of a god every 
word would speak that infinite concatenation of events, and not implicitly but 
explicitly, and not linearly but instantaneously… A god, I reflected, must speak 
but a single word, and in that word there must be absolute plenitude. No word 
uttered by a god could be less than the universe, or briefer than the sum of time. 
(ibid. 252) 
 
Soon after this observation, Tzinacán experiences a dream in which his portion of the well is 
gradually filled by multiplying grains of sand. Mid-dream, he realizes that he is dreaming and 
hears a voice say, “You have wakened not out of sleep, but into a prior dream, and that dream 
lies within another, and so on, to infinity, which is the number of grains of sand. The path you 
are to take is endless…” (ibid. 252) Borges, here, manages to posit the same idea swathed in two 
layers of imagery: the infinitely-many denote the One, and the One is infinite. 
 Perhaps nowhere else in his oeuvre does Borges enjoy such free usage of the term 
“infinite” – it appears four times in just two pages, not including the synonyms “endless” and 
“absolute.” His overarching goal in “The Writing of the God” appears to be that of delineating 
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the gulf between the human and the divine/absolute (he seems to deliberately make no distinction 
between these terms), as well as exploring the idea of exterior infinity as a mirror of, or source 
for, the interior, finite multiplicity of the mortal world. As Tzinacán, either ecstatic or delusional, 
finally receives the omniscient vision that provides him with Qaholom’s secret phrase (fourteen 
words, “apparently random”), his cares for the world dissolve and he, “lying in darkness,” simply 
allows the days to forget him. (ibid. 254) Tzinacán, it would seem, has achieved what Cantor 
could not, and has transcended the fetters of the rational. In an essentially Buddhist turn, he has 
joined the irrational, the discontinuous… or, for lack of a better word, the infinite. 
 Before turning our attention to several appearances of the transfinite in Calvino’s works, 
we must light upon one additional Borges novella – “The Book of Sand,” published in 1975, a 
full twenty-six years after the stories in The Aleph. This story speaks of a book of infinite pages, 
offered for sale by a traveling bible salesman who, in turn, first encountered it in India; it is 
bartered for and purchased by our curious narrator for the price of one rare bible and the entire 
sum of his pension. While this particular story is uncharacteristically short on plot, in typical 
Borgesian fashion the attributes of this “infinite” book are extremely dense and warrant attentive 
study. 
 The narrator’s initial perusal of the book yields the following description:  
The characters were unfamiliar to me… At the upper corner of each page were 
Arabic numerals. I was struck by an odd fact: the even-numbered page would 
carry the number 40,514, let us say, while the odd-numbered page that followed it 
would be 999. I turned the page; the next page bore an eight-digit number. (ibid. 
481)  
 
The book, as a set that contains infinite numbered units, represents yet another example of a 
Cantorian transfinite set. As such, it also contains the same continuum fallacy with which Cantor 
struggled so desperately. The book salesman provides more details: “The number of pages in this 
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book is literally infinite. No page is the first page; no page is the last. I don’t know why they’re 
numbered in this arbitrary way, but perhaps it’s to give one to understand the terms of an infinite 
series can be numbered any way whatever.” (ibid. 482) Borges’ deep familiarity with Cantor is 
demonstrated through this quotation, and his astonished narrator’s befuddlement could even be 
seen as a lighthearted caricature of the effort – and madness – required in contemplating 
Cantorian set theory.  
The narrator examines the book; he chooses a page, then closes the book and attempts to 
find the same page again. He is unable – the pages multiply under his fingertips. He is likewise 
unsuccessful in reaching the first and last pages of the book, as, somehow, ever more pages of 
unfamiliar script seem to spontaneously generate before he can reach the binding. “I went to bed 
but could not sleep… I took out the impossible book and turned its pages… there was a number 
in the corner of [a] page – I don’t remember now what it was – raised to the ninth power. ” (ibid. 
483) Pages continue to multiply and confound. Finally, an exhausted, harried and terrified 
narrator, wracked by a growing obsession with the book and haunted by tortured dreams, decides 
to (as with the Zahir) “lose” the book in the National Library, choosing a shelf upon which to 
abandon it at random and never again entering the library or even walking along the same street 
where it is found. 
 “The Book of Sand” presents a number of challenges for the reader and the 
mathematician alike. For the reader, the ability to visualize an infinite book – really intending 
“visualize,” not only “imagine” – is a colossal effort, as no person has ever seen anything like it, 
nor have they seen infinity. For the mathematician, the problems are more concrete; aside from 
the aforementioned crisis of transfinite continuity, there is also the matter of the physical size of 
an infinite book. Our first assumption might be that an infinite book should be infinitely large, 
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and therefore should take up all of the space in the universe, but luckily Borges gives us a 
different parameter to work with. It can be held in the hands, and though it does have an 
“unusual heft,” (ibid. 481) it apparently does not weigh an infinite amount. William Goldbloom 
Bloch, one of few scholars to write on the mathematics of Jorge Luis Borges, hypothesizes quite 
astutely that, in order for an infinite number of pages to fit within a book that has, more or less, 
the same physical characteristics of other books, the infinite pages within it must be “infinitely 
thin.” (Bloch 51). A book full of infinite, infinitely thin pages, Bloch tells us, must then be 
visualized as being infinitely thin itself – having “measure 0,” or zero thickness, in other words. 
Bloch’s complex mathematical interpretation highlights Borges’ departure from the laws of 
physical reality – whether this is due to a misunderstanding or miscalculation, or simply to the 
great author’s desire to exercise poetic license, is unfortunately not for us to say.   
Borges may have considered this possibility, though, judging by the aborted introduction 
that he provides for this novella: “The line consists of an infinite number of points; the plane, of 
an infinite number of lines; the volume, of an infinite number of planes; the hypervolume, of an 
infinite number of volumes… No – this, more geometrico, is decidedly not the best way to begin 
my tale.” (CF 480) Considering that the infinite book may very well be summarized as a volume 
consisting of an infinite number of flat planes, we may be inclined, then, to take these statements 
as examples of typically understated Borgesian irony. In this further recapitulation of Zeno’s 
paradox Borges has shown us another Aleph, another specular manifestation of infinity, and 





Kurt Gӧdel, the Austrian-American logician whose so-called “Incompleteness Theorem” 
called into question the internal consistency of all logical and mathematical systems, was, as we 
have noted, part of the army of scientists and thinkers who reacted to Georg Cantor’s theories 
with understandable doubt and confusion. But unlike Cantor’s more venomous opponents, Gӧdel 
responded not with ad hominem attacks on Cantor’s tendency toward psychologism and 
metaphysics, but instead with an assault on the very foundation of all knowledge, simultaneously 
undermining Cantor’s suppositions and those of all other mathematicians. 
 In the wake of Cantor’s novel number system and the concurrent advent of new 
approaches to arithmetic, the mathematical arena was coming to be recognized as being much 
more abstract and formal than had been traditionally supposed; in a sense, math was becoming 
more like the arts, including literature. (Hofstadter 10) A new creative freedom was in the air – 
perhaps embodying the same eventual spirit of Paul Feyerabend, if not yet of the same 
magnitude. This intensified formalization of math emancipated thinkers’ minds from the 
restrictions of customary interpretations of functional expressions – there were new algebras, 
new geometries, and broader uses for both. But this freedom brought with it a commensurate 
cost: how could we show the consistency of postulates that are not true of the “space of ordinary 
existence”? (ibid. 14) Mathematicians circumvented this problem by converting each postulate 
into a true statement or theorem about the model with which they were working, thereby creating 
a tiered system of axioms that reflected the accepted truths of a specific system.  
 It is in precisely this area that Kurt Gӧdel focused his incisive critique; this axiomatic 
specularity did not solve the problem of internal inconsistency, he stated, but instead simply 
shifted any given problem to another domain, where it nevertheless remained logically 
incomplete. (ibid. 17-19) His argument hinged on the possibility that, “even if all observed facts 
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are in agreement with the axioms… a hitherto unobserved fact may contradict them and so 
destroy their title to universality. Inductive considerations,” he continued, “can show no more 
than that the axioms are plausible or probably true.” This supposition is readily extended from 
the specific (the Principia Mathematica, in Gӧdel’s original case) to all logical systems. Here, 
then, is Gӧdel’s great achievement – laying bare the endless referential drift that is necessarily a 
part of all finite, human systems. That all proofs derived from axiomatic systems are beholden to 
the assumed consistency of yet another system (and so on, un-ironically ad infinitum) does not 
provide any “absolute” proof of anything – indeed, the most elegantly conceived human system 
can only ever be provisional at best. (ibid. 19-20) Our inability to see behind the tapestry of 
finitude prevents us from ever conclusively verifying the solidness of anything that we create as 
human beings. 
At this point, Gӧdel’s connection to Cantor is clear enough – the latter’s struggle to 
uncover a hidden, universal transfinite code was valiant and ingenious but ultimately futile. 
What, if any, were the effects of this idea on Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges? What might 
they have gleaned from a statement such as “the vast continent of arithmetical truth cannot be 
brought into systematic order by laying down once and for all a fixed set of axioms and rules of 
inference?” (ibid. 104) We have been investigating this connection through the insights of 
Douglas Hofstadter, by way of citations taken from his iconic work entitled Gӧdel, Escher, 
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. In this study, Hofstadter attempts to define the shared universal 
ideas that science, art and music struggle to express. By focusing on the “art” category, we may 
find a connecting thread to Calvino and Borges in the following position: “There is a conflict 
between the finite and the infinite, and hence a strong sense of paradox. Intuition senses that 
there is something mathematical involved here.” (ibid. 15) Gӧdel’s “Incompleteness Theorem,” 
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embodied in this vague notion but also defined by its inability to be fully expressed, is once 
again reflected in Calvino’s Palomar, who cannot ever completely isolate his subject of study; in 
several Borgesian narrators who grapple with Alephs, Zahirs, and infinite books; and even in 
Calvino’s nonexistent knight, Agilulf, himself a representation of spiraling infinity. These 
characters fail to gain the wholeness or insight that they seek against the unstoppable current of 
infinite time and infinite space, and necessarily so; “Gӧdel says that no sufficiently powerful 
formal system can be perfect, in the sense of reproducing every single true statement as a 
theorem… The fact that truth transcends theoremhood, in any given formal system, is called the 
‘incompleteness of that theorem.” (ibid. 86) The incompleteness of understanding that plagues 
the narratives of Calvino and Borges is assuredly an extension of this same idea: 
I think it can have suggestive value to translate Gӧdel’s Theorem into other 
domains, provided one specifies in advance that the translations are metaphorical 
and are not intended to be taken literally… The other metaphorical analogue to 
Gӧdel’s Theorem which I find provocative suggests that ultimately, we cannot 
understand our own minds/brains… All the limitative Theorems of 
metamathematics and the theory of computation suggest that once the ability to 
represent your own structure has reached a certain critical point, that is the kiss of 
death. It guarantees that you can never represent yourself totally. (ibid. 696-7) 
 
Palomar, in a section entitled “Model of Models,” reaches this “kiss of death.” He is unable to 
create a system that mimics the gargantuan scope and endless fluidity of reality.  
In Mr. Palomar’s life there was a period when his rule was this: first, to construct 
in his mind a model, the most perfect, logical, geometrical model possible; 
second, to see if the model was suited to the practical situations observed in 
experience; third, to make the corrections necessary for model and reality to 
coincide… Mr. Palomar’s rule had gradually been changing: now he needed a 
great variety of models, whose elements would be combined in order to arrive at 
that one would best fit reality, a reality that, for its own part, was always made up 
of many different realities, in time and space. (Calvino 108-110) 
 
One can practically trace the entire human exercise of scientific inquiry in this short 
passage – from early attempts to create a static cosmological model all the way to the vertiginous 
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implications of special relativity and quantum physics. Like Cantor, Palomar is maddened by 
reality’s resistance to his imposition of structure; like Heisenberg, he is befuddled when, in 
grasping one variable, another slips through his fingers; and like current scientists such as Brian 
Greene, Michio Kaku and Stephen Hawking, Palomar finally resigns himself to the idea that “the 
model of models… must serve to achieve transparent models, diaphanous, fine as cobwebs, or 
perhaps even to dissolve models, or indeed to dissolve itself.” (ibid. 111) 
 
Black Holes 
So far in this section we have dwelt largely on mathematical singularities; now, we will 
move into a discussion of the physical singularities known as “black holes.” The concept should 
not be new to anyone, as black holes have held a terrifying and titillating place in Western 
popular culture for quite some time.
23
 At its most basic level, a black hole is a region of space 
whose density is so immense – usually the result of the implosion of a huge, dying star – as to 
approach infinity. This extreme compression causes spacetime to warp into a cone-shaped 
structure that peaks, at its center, in a pin-point of infinite density: a singularity. The singularity’s 
characteristics are still mostly unknown; other than its density, not much can be audited about its 
more intimate properties since light particles, which communicate information to us, cannot 
escape its inexorable pull. Studies on black hole radiation and X-rays have yielded novel details 
about the physical qualities of black holes, but there appears to be a cosmic curtain that remains 
closed on their deepest structures. Nonetheless, the implications are unsettling – Brian Greene, in 
The Hidden Dimension, tells us that: 
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A singularity is any physical setting, real or hypothetical, that is so extreme (huge 
mass, small size, enormous spacetime curvature, punctures or rips in spacetime 
fabric) that quantum mechanics and general relativity go haywire, generating 
results akin to the error message displayed on a calculator when you divide any 
number by zero. (Greene 111) 
 
Even earlier, in his 2000 bestseller The Elegant Universe, Greene presented what is perhaps the 
strangest aspect of a black hole singularity: 
A straightforward application of general relativity, going all the way back to 
[Karl] Schwarzschild in 1916, shows that the enormous mass and energy crushed 
together at the black hole’s center causes the fabric of spacetime to suffer a 
devastating rift, to be radically warped into a state of infinite curvature – to be 
punctured by a spacetime singularity… Time itself comes to an end at the heart of 
a black hole. (Greene Elegant 343-4) 
It is not difficult, then, to intuit why the concept of the black hole/singularity has captivated the 
imaginations of authors, directors and the general public – its mere existence seems to violate the 
rules of everyday existence, allowing the impossible to somehow become possible. In recent 
years, theoretical discussions have migrated to the possibility of mankind eventually creating 
artificial black holes, which would allow us to not only observe more closely the properties of 
singularities but also to potentially affect time and space in new and useful (or destructive) ways. 
Whether or not this will ultimately become possible is very much up for debate, although small 
successes have been seen recently at the Large Hadron Collider operated by CERN in 
Switzerland. Brian Greene defines the parameters of this possibility in The Fabric of the 
Cosmos: 
Although we normally think of black holes as gargantuan structures out in deep 
space, it’s been known since the early days of general relativity that if you 
crammed enough matter together in the palm of your hand, you’d create a tiny 
black hole. This doesn’t happen because no one’s grip – and no mechanical 
device – is even remotely strong enough to exert a sufficient compression force. 
Instead, the only accepted mechanism for black hole production involves the 
gravitational pull of an enormously massive star’s overcoming the outward 
pressure normally exerted by the star’s nuclear fusion processes, causing the star 
to collapse in on itself. But if gravity’s intrinsic strength on small scales is far 
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greater than previously thought, tiny black holes could be produced with 
significantly less compression force than previously believed. (Fabric 403) 
 
 To the literary mind, these wondrous possibilities need not be mired in the argument of 
hypothesis versus reality – as with all other ideas, fiction finds itself to be uniquely unfettered 
and, perhaps, most capable of all disciplines to take up the business of contemplating black holes 
with the aim of advancing knowledge. Greene states this very same idea: 
Extraordinary emblems of math’s ability to illuminate the dark corners of the 
cosmos, black holes have become the cynosures of modern physics. Besides 
serving as a boon for observational astronomy, black holes have also been a fertile 
source of inspiration for theoretical research by providing a mathematical 
playground in which physicists can push ideas to their limits, conducting pen-and-
paper explorations of one of nature’s most extreme environments. (Hidden 276) 
 
These “pen-and-paper explorations,” we might posit, are in no way distinct from the activities of 
other creative thinkers of the ilk of Calvino and Borges; “The Aleph” and Cosmicomics, in 
particular, are indeed “playgrounds” for the physical and philosophical consequences of 
singularities of various forms. Greene is not the only physicist with such a broad understanding 
of the interdisciplinary epistemology involved in the contemplation of black holes; Matthieu 
Ricard, a former scientist who left his profession to become a Buddhist monk, states in a 
dialogue with the physicist Trinh Xuan Thuan that  
In the vicinity of a “black hole,” one second can stretch to eternity. As in 
Buddhism, relativity teaches us that the idea of a past already gone and a future 
still to come is mere illusion, given that my future can be someone else’s past and 
a third person’s present – it all depends on our relative motions. Time does not 
pass, it is simply there. (Ricard 277)      
    
Deriving his stance from a more Eastern perspective than that of Greene, Ricard bridges the 
perceived gap between science and philosophy by offering a meditation on the concept of the 
singularity that succeeds in tying together not only all people, but all times and places. 
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 What is most crucial to our study is confirmation that both Calvino and Borges had an 
awareness of black holes and the phenomenon of singularities. Domenico Scarpa, a Calvino 
scholar, provides some admittedly anecdotal evidence of the former: 
Calvino e [Primo] Levi erano entrambi lettori della rivista di alta divulgazione piú 
diffusa a livello mondiale, <<Scientific American>>, e della sua edizione italiana 
<<Le Scienze>>. In quest’ultima apparvero tra il 1972 e il 1974 due importanti 
articoli, firmati rispettivamente da Roger Penrose e da Kip S. Thorne, i quali 
riferivano a loro volta sugli esperimenti e le riflessioni dello scienziato che in 
questo settore [i.e. black holes] si sarebbe conquistato fama mondiale negli anni 
successivi: Stephen Hawking. (Scarpa 297) 
 
While highly probable, this citation does not prove conclusively that Calvino had an 
understanding or awareness of black holes. Fortunately, more primary evidence can be found in 
several of Calvino’s articles published in the Corriere della sera, and in particular one 
installment of “Mr. Palomar’s Observatory” from 1975 (cited by Mario Porro in “Images and 
Scientific Knowledge in Calvino”). 
In one of the pieces of the column entitled ‘Mr. Palomar’s Observatory’, in the 
Corriere della sera, Calvino admits that he is a collector of cosmological models: 
they fulfill his sensitivity ‘alle suggestioni delle immagini plastiche’, a sensitivity 
that is generally more powerful than philosophical implications. In September 
1975, Mr. Palomar had tried to provide an explanation of how he understands 
black holes, those ‘innimaginabili oggetti celesti’. In response, he received a 
series of polite critical observations from the astronomer Margherita Hack, to 
whom he responded in the same column in October… On this occasion Calvino 
clarifies his position saying that figurative thought functions according to an 
elementary or primitive logic, based on the mechanism of analogy, which can be 
broken down into very simple oppositions: inside and outside, full and empty, 
light and dark, high and low, and so on. ‘E puó accadere alle volte che queste 
strade incrocino quelle della scienza di oggi, o le accompagnino per un tratto’. 
(Porro 62) 
 
In addition to explicitly confirming Calvino’s interest in and knowledge of black holes, this 
quote also provides an additional excursus on what he saw to be the primacy of analogy in the 
generative processes of both science and literature. By linking both disciplines at their common 
root, Calvino makes a clear statement about the shared mental and philosophical processes of 
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fiction and physics. In both cases, abstract logic can assist in conceptualizing ideas that seem 
“unimaginable,” and one might therefore justly seek to employ such creative thought patterns in 
forming an understanding of physical phenomena. 
 Borges, in turn, indirectly demonstrated an awareness of the phenomenon of black holes 
through several of his book reviews and stories – by analyzing works like “The Book of Sand,” 
“The Aleph” and “The Library of Babel,” we can be certain of his fluency in the defining 
characteristics of singularities. In Borges, though, singularities can pop up in the most unlikely of 
places. Aside from the examples of Cantorian infinity that we have already identified in Borges, 
a different example comes in the form of a small, intensely heavy metal cone, a tiny totem of an 
almighty being that exists only within the made-up universe of a provocative story entitled 
“Tlӧn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” Borges relates its attributes: 
In his delirium, several coins had slipped from his wide gaucho belt, as had a 
gleaming metal cone a die’s width in diameter. A little boy tried to pick the cone-
shaped object up, but in vain; a full-grown man could hardly do it. I held it for a 
few minutes in the palm of my hand; I recall that its weight was unbearable, and 
that even after someone took it from me, the sensation of terrible heaviness 
endured. I also recall the neat circle it engraved in my flesh. That evidence of a 
very small yet extremely heavy object left an unpleasant aftertaste of fear and 
revulsion… Those small, incredibly heavy cones (made of a metal not of this 
world) are an image of the deity in certain Tlӧnian religions. (CF 80)    
 
“Tlӧn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is, first of all, the tale of a tale. It explores the power of fiction and 
the potential for the “false” to come to replace the “true” – or, better still, it explores an occasion 
upon which true and false reach an existential parity. In this story, the reader comes to know that 
a shadowy group of intellectuals has invented a world known as “Tlӧn” by way of a series of 
obscure encyclopedia entries. Borges’ narrator, in attempting to verify the reality of such a place, 
is drawn into an ever-developing description of the elements of this other universe. Strangely 
enough, the fictitious Tlӧnians (as they are called) deny the reality of their own world, which not 
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only complicates Borges’ research but also challenges the reader to align themselves with either 
Borges’ relative “reality” or Tlӧn’s fiction. The uncharacteristically lengthy story ends with the 
statement that, as Tlӧn receives increasing attention from researchers, it may come to replace our 
own world. The aforementioned metal disk – which is never given a name – represents, then, not 
only an otherworldly substance of extreme weight and density, but also a manifestation of the 
terror and confusion that an infinite plurality of realities can produce in whoever regards it. Its 
placement as a quasi-religious artifact within a story that is intended to complicate the very 
nature of reality is not accidental – Borges seems to urge the reader, through this image, to 
envision something that tends toward a black hole: heavy enough to warp time and space, dense 
enough to serve as a gateway to another universe, and so difficult to conceive of as to generate 
nothing short of abject fear and hopelessness in humanity, as the Earth itself is pulled into its 
annihilating spiral. 
 “Tlӧn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” does not represent the only appearance of black-hole 
imagery in Borges’ cycle, however. In “The Disk,” a Norse woodcutter encounters a man who 
possesses a coin – the “disk of Odin” – that has only one side. Its allure compels the woodcutter 
to murder the coin’s owner, causing the coin to hurtle and land with its visible side facing down, 
never to be found again. While extremely short, this particular story generates a high density of 
implications relating to infinitude and singularity. Floyd Merrell has commented on this tale, 
stating that “this coin is a metaphor for infinity, and as such the coin can have no reverse side, 
for since infinity according to one particular view is incompletable, the reverse side must 
therefore be invisible.” (Merrell 7) Less compelling, but ultimately valid, is Guillermo Boido’s 
estimation that “Borges arranca el círculo euclideano del plano, lo lanza a un espacio 
tridimensional, lo materializa y lo convierte en el disco de Odin, que tiene un solo lado.” (Boido 
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52) Between these two critiques of Borges’ single-sided disk we can locate a hybridized view 
that classifies a disk that exists in three-dimensional space while simultaneously violating the 
rules of Euclidean geometry as a physical singularity. If it exists in three-dimensional space, it 
must have more than one side – it cannot have fewer than two sides or fewer than three 
dimensions. Yet it does; and its impossible existence so inflames the passions of the woodcutter 
that he murders a stranger in order to possess it. This moment of contact with the perplexing, 
maddening nature of infinity echoes the images we have already seen, as well as those to come.    
 There exists a physical limit, however, to the aspects of a black hole that can actually be 
seen or measured – since light is trapped by its pull, the same light cannot reach us to convey 
information about what lies beyond the event horizon. Indirect methods can be used to 
triangulate certain properties of black holes, but the singularity at the center of the black hole 
cannot typically be witnessed. There is only one possible version of a singularity that would 
potentially allow the observer to peer into its abyss, and we will be utilizing this theoretical 
possibility in order to advance our discussion on the usage of such images in the fictions of 
Borges and Calvino. This phenomenon is called a “naked singularity,” and Floyd Merrell has 
handily linked this concept to what is witnessed by the narrator of Borges’ infamous story “The 
Aleph”: 
The Aleph, I believe… enjoys a contemporary counterpart in the concept of a 
space-time singularity, especially the so-called “naked” singularity… Ordinary 
singularities are the product of “black holes,” whose gravitational force is of such 
magnitude that light is trapped within them. There are also special types of 
singularities, “naked” singularities, which are theoretically formed in the absence 
of black holes… In general, the difference between a black hole and a naked 
singularity – “unclothed” with a black hole – is that light can escape one but not 
the other… In the collapse of a star to a naked singularity, light rays are 
convoluted around the singularity, which is a charged, rotating hole unlike the 
nonrotating black hole, and after spiraling around it for a period of time, the rays 
can finally escape to the outer region, and hence theoretically they now become 




The possibility of witnessing a naked singularity is infinitesimal, of course, even by 
astronomical standards. John D. Barrow, author of The Infinite Book, a popular primer on 
infinity, reinforces this caveat:  
Are naked singularities real? Roger Penrose proposed that there “exists a principle 
of ‘cosmic censorship’ in Nature, so that all singularities, or physical infinities, 
where the laws of Nature break down, are hidden from the outside by horizon 
surfaces. Their consequences are trammeled up by the extreme curvature to space 
and time that accompany the formation of very high density regions. They are 
quarantined by the horizon. There have been many attempts to prove that this 
hypothesis of cosmic censorship is always true: that naked singularities never 
occur in Nature, they are all hidden by horizons. So far, it has not been possible to 
prove that it is universally true, but all the plausible situations that appear to 
threaten it have turned out to fail. It continues to be suspected that it will turn out 
to be true, but with certain caveats. (Barrow 107-8) 
 
Stephen Hawking, too, has commented on the likelihood of naked singularities, stating that they 
“would offer great possibilities for travel in space and time, but unfortunately it seems that these 
solutions may all be highly unstable.” (Hawking 91) 
But, once again, fiction allows us the opportunity to grasp, rotate and inspect such images 
despite the current technological and scientific limitations of humanity. Being able to observe a 
singularity involves seeing not only the singularity itself, but a full manifestation of infinity – 
Merrell explains that such an experience could “afford [the observer] an extraordinarily dramatic 
moment, for the singularity is exposed to and exposes the entire universe.” (ibid. 147) Other 
clues link “The Aleph” with a naked singularity as well; Merrell notes quite perspicaciously that 
“in an instant an infinite quantity of light arrives [from a naked singularity]. Significantly, 
Borges tells us that ‘all stars, all lamps, all sources of light’ were in the Aleph, and that the light 
emanating from it was of ‘unbearable brilliance’ when he saw it in that single ‘gigantic instant.’ 
(ibid. 148) The epigraph from Hamlet with which Borges begins “The Aleph” is also a sign of 
his complicity in the metaphor of a singularity: “O God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and 
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count myself King of infinite space.” (CF 274) It should also be noted that Merrell is far from 
being the only scholar who has pegged “The Aleph” as a representation of a singularity – Héctor 
Vecetich, for one, states in “Espacio y tiempo en Borges” that “En ‘El Aleph’… Borges sugiere 
una posible visión de una singularidad.” (Vucetich 64)  
There are numerous examples of singularities in Calvino’s fictions, as well. In fact, an 
echo of an Aleph can even be found in the description of a city called “Zoe” in Invisible Cities: 
“In every point of this city you can, in turn, sleep, make tools, cook, accumulate gold, disrobe, 
reign, sell, question oracles… if existence in all its moments is all of itself, Zoe is the place of 
indivisible existence.” (Calvino 34) The city of Zoe can therefore be regarded as an experiential 
singularity in the same way that the Aleph seems to represent all points of the universe in full 
simultaneity (as Borges himself clarifies in “The Aleph”) and not in succession. (CF 283) 
Another work by Calvino entitled Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore…, with its dialogic 
multiplicity and schizophrenic approach to narrative, has also drawn comparisons to a 
singularity, with Mario Porro stating in “Networks and Knots: The Discrete and the Continuous 
in Literature – Italo Calvino and Carlo Emilio Gadda” that “space itself in Se una notte is 
‘sovraccarico, denso,’ so that ‘le linee tendono a contorcersi, a diventare sinuose come il fumo 
del braciere.’” (Porro 264) 
We can advance our discussion of the appearances of possible singularities in Calvino’s 
works with an abstract sighting taken from The Castle of Crossed Destinies; specifically, within 
a story that is based on a section of Ludovico Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso. “The Tale of Astolpho 
on the Moon” – named analogously to its precursor – is a re-telling of this infamous chapter of 
the Furioso, but with the added frame of having been spontaneously generated from random 
selections of tarot cards (as is every other tale in this particular book). The narrative recounts 
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Astolpho’s task of retrieving the impassioned crusader Orlando’s sense from the surface of the 
moon, from a storeroom of vials that contain all untold stories and unlived histories. 
‘You must ascend to heaven, Astolpho’ (the angelic Arcanum of The Last 
Judgement indicated a superhuman ascension) ‘up to the pale fields of the Moon, 
where an endless storeroom preserves in phials placed in rows’ (as in the Cups 
card) ‘the stories that men do not live, the thoughts that knock once at the 
threshold of awareness and vanish forever, the particles of the possible discarded 
in the game of combinations, the solutions that could be reached but are never 
reached…’ (Calvino 37) 
 
The more immediate similarities to Borges’ “Library of Babel” and “Garden of Forking Paths” 
are, of course, obvious; a storeroom, plane or dimension containing all possible historical 
outcomes is in line with what will be discussed in the next chapter of this study in a relation of 
the consequences of quantum physics. However, it is the last paragraph of Calvino’s tale that 
will demonstrate why this particular image suggests the existence of a black hole. 
On the white fields of the Moon, Astolpho encounters the poet, intent on 
interpolating into his warp the rhymes of the octaves, the threads of his plots, his 
reasons and his unreasons. If he inhabits the very center of the Moon – or is 
inhabited by it, as by his deepest nucleus – he will tell us whether it is true that the 
Moon contains the universal rhyme-list of words and things, if it is the world full 
of sense, the opposite of the senseless Earth. ‘No, the Moon is a desert.’ This was 
the poet’s reply, to judge by the last card put down on the table: the bald 
circumference of the Ace of Coins. ‘From this arid sphere every discourse and 
every poem sets forth; and every journey through forests, battles, treasures, 
banquets, bedchambers, brings us back here, to the center of an empty horizon.’ 
(ibid. 38-9) 
 
The poet, existing in the center of a dense sphere much like the singularity of a black hole, 
attempts to “warp” all things into his area; we should recall at this point that the physical 
function of a space-time-warping black hole is the exactly the same. In fact, the density of the 
center of this sphere is so great that the poet and the moon have seemingly fused into a single 
entity, along with all other “discourses” and “poems,” e.g. all possible narratives and objects. 
The infinitely dense singularity within a black hole – as well as Borges’ Aleph – flattens time 
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and space and allows all things to occupy the same point in space. How fitting, as well, that 
Calvino chose to seal this paragraph with the word “horizon” (orizzonte in the Italian version), 
since it explicitly defines the event horizon, i.e. the area of a black hole that begins to tend 
toward emptiness and past which no light can escape. The evocation of the “bald circumference 
of the Ace of Coins” might also cause us to recall Borges’ own disk of Odin, which represents 
infinity in a rather similar monetary image. Nevertheless, whether he intended to or not, Calvino 
seems to have set a singularity at the center of this story, which is itself framed within an 
increasingly elaborate game of entropic combination. 
Calvino’s Cosmicomics, on the other hand, contains a more explicit depiction of a 
singularity; “All at One Point” lightheartedly analyzes the experience of existence prior to the 
Big Bang, when all things (and, indeed, all space) occupied a single, infinitesimally tiny point. 
Domenico Scarpa, in “Calvino, Levi e la scoperta dei buchi neri,” states that “Calvino prova a 
immaginare l’universo un attimo prima del Big Bang, quando tutta la materia è concentrata in un 
luogo privo di dimensioni e di tempo.” (Scarpa 302) Alan Lightman, a physicist writing in the 
scientific journal Nature, agrees that “it seems that Calvino is attempting to fathom how much of 
a reality can be created without familiar geography of time and space. He plays with science the 
way a found-object artist throws together bolts of silvered glass, odd metal brackets, bits of 
coloured paper.” (Lightman 329) “All at One Point” begins with a recapitulation of Edwin 
Hubble’s discovery of the continual expansion of the universe and the consequent understanding 
that all matter must necessarily have converged at one point prior to the beginning of such an 
expansion. What follows this historical citation is unexpectedly lighthearted: a community of 
beings, all with curiously Italian temperaments and speech patterns, cramped and living together 
in the center-point of a singularity that is described in much the same way as one would describe 
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a tenement building. These beings engage in petty squabbles, struggle and cope with the 
immense lack of space and diversity of disparate opinions, and lament that there is not enough 
room for the matronly Mrs. Ph(i)N   – the common object of their boyhood lust – to make all of 
them a batch of homemade pasta. Narrative aside, however, this story makes clear the fact that 
Calvino had a strong facility with the physical characteristics of singularities, which was 
assuredly nurtured by his extensive readings in science and his natural academic curiosity. 
T zero, which Calvino published soon after Cosmicomics, provides an extremely succinct 
image of a black hole, and perhaps one that is more accurate than others in its relative brevity. 
“The Origin of the Birds” narrates Qfwfq’s struggle to accept the reality of the spontaneous 
evolution of birds from reptiles, as well as the collision of the Earth with another land mass – a 
cataclysm that yields, for a moment, what Kerstin Pilz calls “a glimpse of the desired holistic 
universe. It is a cosmic vision that can only last a split second.” (Mapping Complexity 48) 
Calvino’s narration reads: 
The two worlds, having touched, bounced apart again, then were rejoined, then 
separated once more. In one of these clashes I found myself flung to the other 
side, while the empty abyss yawned again and separated from my world. I looked 
around: I didn’t recognize anything. Trees, crystals, animals, grasses – everything 
was different. Not only did birds inhabit the branches, but so did fish (after a 
manner of speaking) with spiders’ legs or (you might say) worms with feathers. 
Now it’s not that I want to describe to you the forms of life over there; imagine 
them any way you can, more or less strange, it doesn’t matter. What matters is 
that around me there were displayed all the forms the world could have taken in 
its transformations but instead hadn’t taken, for some casual reason or for some 
basic incompatibility: the rejected forms, unusable, lost. (Calvino 19) 
     
After a lengthy examination of this new, foreign world, Calvino’s narrator, finding himself 
engaged in a moment of amorous ecstasy with the Queen of the Birds, reaches the 
aforementioned “holistic,” cosmic vision; 
For a fraction of a second between the loss of everything I knew before and the 
gain of everything I would know afterward, I managed to embrace in a single 
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thought the world of things as they were and of things as they could have been, 
and I realized that a single system included all. (ibid. 26)   
 
Putting the sexual imagery aside for the moment, we might also regard this description of a 
fleeting communion with the infinite as analogous to what has very recently been observed in the 
Large Hadron Collider at CERN; if black holes or singularities represent points of infinite 
density in the universe, and if these infinitely dense points hold the potential to contain within 
them (according to our understanding of infinity) the totality of all space and perspectives, then 
what Qfwfq experiences following the collision of objects in “The Origin of the Birds” can be 
easily compared to the microscopic, infinitesimally short-lived black holes created through the 
forced collision of subatomic particles at CERN. Though they only exist for a fraction of a 
nanosecond, these singularity events hold the capacity, perhaps, to lay bare the underlying, 
infinite structure of the universe. That Calvino’s playful fiction even approaches comparison to 
such an advanced scientific concept – and then, more than 50 years ago – is nothing short of 
extraordinary.  
 A final thought on Calvino’s treatment of black holes comes once again from Domenico 
Scarpa, who comments on Calvino’s demonstrated awareness of supernovae and the surprisingly 
positive symbolism that he attributes to the consequences of their violent deaths: “Ecco che, dice 
Calvino, le stelle di neutroni con la loro implosione vengono a offrirci una nuova figura positiva, 
un emblema di ‘concentrazione massima delle proprie facoltà, contrazione come assorbimento di 
forza, focalizzazione e immedesimazione e compattezza interiore.’” (Scarpa 304) These qualities 
are all compatible with the literary concepts that Calvino would come to define as ideals in Six 
Memos for the Next Millennium – lightness, quickness and exactitude, specifically. There is an 
acuity to the singularity – a compact, precise efficiency of representation that can serve, in 
Calvino’s estimation, as an ideal model for the transmission of information. 
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 A final image to be discussed in this chapter is that of the wormhole, which is a radical 
warping of space-time made hypothetically possible through the existence of black holes. Brian 
Greene offers a detailed description of this phenomenon: 
A wormhole is a hypothetical tunnel through space. A more familiar kind of 
tunnel, such as one that’s been bored through the side of a mountain, provides a 
shortcut from one location to another. Wormholes serve a similar function, but 
they differ from conventional tunnels in one important respect. Whereas 
conventional tunnels provide a new route through existing space – the mountain 
and the space it occupies exist before a tunnel is constructed – a wormhole 
provides a tunnel from one point in space to another along a new, previously 
nonexistent tube of space. Were you to remove the tunnel through the mountain, 
the space it occupies would still exist. Were you to remove a wormhole, the space 
it occupied would vanish. (Fabric 461)  
      
Rather than acting as a conventional tunnel to allow the shortest distance between two points to 
be traversed, a wormhole instead pinches two points in space together, eliminating the space that 
divides them.
24
 This distinction is crucial to our visualization of wormholes, since it separates the 
concept of a universe of discrete points from that of a continuous universe that is both flexible 
and prone to warping. The scholar Mario Porro points out this distinction when discussing Marco 
Polo’s voyage in Calvino’s Invisible Cities in his article “Networks and Knots: The Discrete and 
the Continuous in Literature,” stating that “of Marco Polo’s itinerary [in Invisible Cities], 
punctuated by rest stops, we know only these breaks and not the path that leads from one place to 
another.” (Porro 258) Indeed, we readers are never shown the route of Polo’s traversals between 
the cities of the Khan’s dominion; each city represents a discrete point, and the continuum that 
surrounds them is never addressed. Could it be, then, that there simply is no space at all between 
them? Or, potentially, that the space between them is warped and pinched through some 
wormhole effect, eliminating the need to cross space in order to move from one to the next? 
                                                          
24
Stephen Hawking also touches on a similar description in A Brief History of Time:  “It might be that one could 
warp space-time so that there was a shortcut between A and B. One way of doing this would be to create a 
wormhole between A and B. As its name suggests, a wormhole is a thin tube of space-time which can connect two 
nearly flat regions far apart.” (Hawking 163)  
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There is, unfortunately, a lack of evidence in the text that Calvino deliberately intended to 
employ this particular technique in Invisible Cities. However, he provides a much more concrete 
example of a wormhole in “The Count of Monte Cristo,” which appears in T zero.   
 Itself a re-telling of the middle portion of Alexandre Dumas’ eponymous novel, 
Calvino’s “Count of Monte Cristo” has Edmond Dantés as its narrator, who details the frantic 
efforts of the Abbé Faria to tunnel his way out of their shared prison, the impenetrable Chateau 
d’If. Faria has been wholly unsuccessful in his attempts to escape, but he continues nonetheless, 
and the scrape of his digging tools against the castle’s stones is unrelenting. Strangely enough, 
Faria’s own experience of moving through his pointless tunnels seems to exactly mimic the 
expected effects of moving through a wormhole in space. Edmond describes it in this way: 
At times I hear scratching at the ceiling; a rain of plaster falls on me; a breach 
opens; Faria’s head appears, upside-down. Upside-down for me, not for him; he 
crawls out of his tunnel, he walks head down, while nothing about his person is 
ruffled, not his white hair, nor his beard green with mold, nor the tatters of 
sackcloth that cover his emaciated loins. He walks across the ceiling and the walls 
like a fly, he sinks his pick into a certain spot, a hole opens; he disappears. 
Sometimes he has hardly disappeared through one wall when he pops out again 
from the wall opposite: he hasn’t yet drawn his heel through the hole here when 
his beard is already appearing over there. He emerges again, more weary, skeletal, 
aged, as if years had passed since the last time I saw him. (Calvino 142) 
 
What is first noticed about this description is the relativistic approach to space and gravity – like 
the perspectives in an M.C. Escher drawing, Edmond and the Abbé seem to each exist 
concurrently in separate space-time paradigms; what is “up” for one is “down” for the other. 
Time seems to also pass at different rates, with Faria aging more rapidly (perhaps due to the 
effects of general relativity related to black-hole density). The more interesting detail in this 
citation, however, relates directly to the wormholes we have already discussed. Calvino’s 
narrator tells us that no space seems to separate the entrances and exits of the tunnels through 
which Faria travels – as soon as his head enters one hole, it exits the corresponding hole 
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simultaneously. This, of course, suggests that there is no space between the entrance and exit – if 
there were, there would be a lapse between when his head entered one end and exited the other. 
This means that the currently-accepted rules of theoretical physics are applicable here, and that 
the space that would normally need to be traversed is instead being bridged or “pinched” by way 
a warping of space-time. Of course, while technically acting as shortcuts, these wormholes never 
seem to yield an exit from imprisonment for the narrator or his companion. 
    We have shown that the concept of the wormhole exists within both theoretical physics 
and certain works of creative fiction; as a conclusion to this chapter, we will briefly reflect on the 
potential for their existence in physical reality. Stephen Hawking, perhaps the one human being 
best versed in such details, provides an analysis of this possibility in relation to time travel in A 
Brief History of Time: 
To do this, or to warp space-time in any other way so as to permit time travel, one 
can show that one needs a region of space-time with a negative curvature, like the 
surface of a saddle. Ordinary matter, which has a positive energy density, gives 
space-time a positive curvature, like the surface of a sphere. So what one needs, in 
order to warp space-time in a way that will allow travel into the past, is matter 
with negative energy density… We thus have experimental evidence both that 
space-time can be warped (from the bending of light during eclipses) and that it 
can be curved in the way necessary to allow time travel (from the Casimir effect). 
(Hawking 164-5) 
 
While this analysis relates specifically to wormholes in the function of time travel, the physics 
are the same – space-time can theoretically be bridged across areas of negative curvature, 
thereby allowing particles, information, and light (and eventually humans?) to move from one 
discrete point in space or time to another without having to cross any physical space at all. 
All of the disparate examples that have been provided in this chapter serve as signs that 
Borges and Calvino – both scientifically-minded, well-read writers of fiction and non-fiction 
alike – engaged in literary explorations of the infinite by using imagery and themes that have 
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strong analogues in the mathematics and astrophysics of their time. Among these, black holes, 
singularities, and infinite value sets are the foremost. In the coming chapter, we will move our 
discussion into increasingly stranger and more fecund imagery by focusing on the elements of 
quantum physics – from Erwin Schrӧdinger’s superposed states, to quantum entanglement, 
multiverses and time travel – that have found their way into the fictions of Italo Calvino and 















Part 2, Chapter 2 – Quantum Strangeness 
 
As we move deeper into our analysis of the scientific themes and imagery found in the 
fictions of Jorge Luis Borges and Italo Calvino, we must now confront what is arguably the most 
challenging theoretical material currently known to human science – quantum physics. By 
confronting several different theories and structures and drawing comparisons with specific 
works of fiction by Borges and Calvino, we will continue to trace a defined route through the 
interdisciplinary fictional exercises of these two authors while simultaneously demonstrating the 
creative roots of numerous scientific breakthroughs. By utilizing concepts such as superposition, 
quantum entanglement and multiverse theory in our close readings of fictional texts, we will find 
a number of compelling ways to relate Borges and Calvino’s creative output to the science of 
their epoch and ours. 
Just as literature has been perennially driven by aesthetic considerations, so, too, has 
science. As Roger Newton relates, 
Many scientists, Schrӧdinger and Einstein among them, were guided in their 
search for new insights by aesthetic considerations; beauty was an important 
criterion for them. This does not mean that they ignored experimental facts, but 
they were able to generate abstract mathematical ideas relying on their personal 
sense of beauty and to retain their faith in being right even when, among the 
always-present welter of initially confusing and unsorted experimental 
observations, some appeared to prove them wrong. (Newton 237) 
 
As was shown in our earlier discussion of the methodology-breaking tendencies of Paul 
Feyerabend, good science can be driven at each turn by both rigor and wild abandon – 
theorization is itself a fictive act, regardless of how its resultant conjectures come to be proven 
(according to a system of logic that, as we have seen, is also devoid of any “absolute” claim to 
verifiability). As we begin this chapter with Erwin Schrӧdinger’s concept of superposition, it is 
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crucial that we not lose sight of this unifying detail, which demonstrates the common root of 
science and literature. 
 As an introduction to quantum wave function – which will then lead us to an 
understanding of superposition – Roger Newton’s description will do:  
The state of a physical system, such as a collection of particles, determined in 
classical Newtonian mechanics by specifying all their positions and momenta, is 
determined in quantum mechanics by specifying its wave function. While the 
behavior of this wave function follows the Schrӧdinger equation in a deterministic 
manner – a given state now determines the state at a later time – knowing the 
wave function does not imply knowing all the physical attributes of a system 
precisely; for some of them the wave function implies only probabilities. The 
concept of causality is lost: we cannot trace every event back to an earlier event, 
or set of events, causing it… The Schrӧdinger equation has the property – 
technically speaking, it is linear and homogenous – that if f and g are two 
solutions of it, then so is f + g: this is called the superposition principle. (Newton 
242-43) 
 
To condense this admittedly heady discourse, we might simply rephrase thusly: quantum physics 
is based not on pure causality, but on waves of probability. Simply put, Schrӧdinger’s wave 
function defines the probability of a particular event occurring, but it is not until the wave 
“collapses” (e.g. the event occurs) that one can actually, precisely know whether it will. If f can 
occur or g can occur, quantum physics also allows that both f and g could occur, even if they are 
mutually exclusive. This paradox, strange as it seems, is one of the foundational concepts of 
modern theoretical physics. 
 Physicist Brian Greene, to whom we have turned at several points in our study, offers a 
measure of sympathy in The Hidden Reality: 
I understand full well if this explanation leaves you shaking your head. There’s no 
denying that quantum dogma sounds a lot like snake oil. I mean, along comes a 
theory that proposes a startling new picture of reality founded on waves of 
probability and then, in the very next breath, announces that the waves can’t be 




Likewise, Michio Kaku comments on the logical conditions that create superposition, which is 
essentially a theoretical image of reality composed of two superimposed or overlaid states, each 
of which carries a defined probability of occurring. 
Quantum theory also states that you never really know the state of the particle 
until you have made an observation. Before a measurement is made, the particle 
can be in one of a variety of states described by the Schrӧdinger wave function. 
Thus before an observation or measurement can be made, you can’t really know 
the state of the particle. In fact, the particle exists in a nether state, a sum of all 
possible states, until a measurement is made. (Hyperspace 260)  
 
The most common thought experiment associated with superposition (and with Schrӧdinger) is 





 in varying degrees of potency) has provided an excellent summation of this 
notoriously difficult conceptual exercise. 
Suppose we put a cat in an enclosed box containing a mechanism triggered by the 
possible radioactive decay of a nucleus that is capable of breaking a flask of 
cyanide gas. If the nucleus decays, the cat dies; if not, it remains alive. There is at 
the outset, in a rather metaphorical way of speaking, an overlapping 
“superposition” of two possible worlds: decayed nucleus and dead cat or intact 
nucleus and live cat. The question is, before we open the box at the designated 
time, is there a potential state, two “superposed” waves, entailing two 
nonactualized cats: live-dead? If so, then neither is “real” until we lift the lid of 
the box and take a peek (interact with) its “contents.” In such a case, and contrary 
to our better judgment, we are forced to conclude that we the spectators bring one 
of the two worlds into existence. (Merrell 157) 
 
                                                          
25
“This poor creature sat helplessly in an enclosed box, accompanied by a small radioactive sample and a Geiger 
counter hooked up to a hammer that will smash open a vial of poison. In the course of an hour, Schrӧdinger 
stipulated, there’s a 50 percent chance that the radioactive sample will trigger the Geiger counter and thereby kill the 
cat. The radioactive atoms themselves, at that moment, must be described quantum mechanically as being equal 
parts intact and decayed, since they combine both possibilities. But then, Schrӧdinger insisted, the cat that’s linked 
to the atom must be likewise described, in quantum language, as equal parts dead cat and live cat.” (Lindley 194-5) 
26
“According to quantum mechanics, we cannot predict with certainty when a single uranium nucleus will 
disintegrate. We only can calculate the probability of billions upon billions of nuclei disintegrating. Therefore, to 
describe a single uranium nucleus, quantum mechanics assumes that it is a mixture of two states – one where the 
uranium nucleus is inert, the other where it has decayed. The cat is described by a wave function that contains the 
possibilities that it is both dead and alive. In other words, we must assume statistically that the cat is a mixture of 
two states.” (Kaku Beyond Einstein 45)  
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Schrӧdinger’s much put-upon cat, then, has the remarkable quality of remaining, prior to 
verification, theoretically both alive and dead, simultaneously.  
While the creative implications of such a remarkable state are rather obvious, more can 
be said about what this means in terms of fiction and imagination. Schrӧdinger himself 
commented on the unreal quality of the image presented by superposition, just as Matthieu 
Ricard reminds us by stating that “it is better not to view a particle as a permanent entity, but 
rather as an instantaneous event. Sometimes these events link together to create the illusion of 
permanent entities.” (Ricard 85) An “illusion,” then, is the defining nature of the objects and 
occurrences that surround and envelop us in reality, according to Schrӧdinger – we, too, are part 
of this illusion. 
The bridge between our discussion and the realm of creative fiction can be established 
through Guillermo Boido: 
Podríamos pensar que al cabo del lapso de un segundo se han generado dos 
historias posibles: en una de ellas, el gato muere; en la otra, sobrevive. Con una 
argumentación similar, al cabo de dos segundos se habran generado tres historias 
posibles: la del gato que ha muerto al cabo de un segundo, la del gato que ha 
muerto al cabo de dos segundos y la del gato que sobrevive al cabo de dos 
segundos. Esta secuencia temporal, arborescente, de tiempos e historias paralelas, 
podría ser extendida indefinidamente. (Boido 51)  
 
We will eventually come to connect this type of idea with the images presented in Borges’ “The 
Garden of Forking Paths,” but first we will briefly return to “Tlӧn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” in order 
to light upon its extremely suggestive discussion of materialism and the nature of existence, 
which pertains directly to Schrӧdinger’s wave function. Borges’ narrator cites the words of a 
certain Tlӧnian heresiarch, who attempts to subvert the Tlӧnian dogma that whatever cannot be 
seen likewise cannot exist.  
On Tuesday, X is walking along a deserted road and loses nine copper coins. On 
Thursday, Y find fours coins in the road, their luster somewhat dimmed by 
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Wednesday’s rain. On Friday, Z discovers three coins in the road. Friday 
morning X finds two coins on the veranda of his house. 
From this story the heresiarch wished to deduce the reality – i.e., the continuity in 
time – of those nine recovered coins. (CF 75) 
 
While the connection of this anecdote to the wave function is not immediately apparent, referring 
to what Floyd Merrell has written about this section of the story will clarify this link. 
The coins supposedly having existed from the instant they were lost to the 
moment of their rediscovery would imply their continuous existence – the view of 
classical Western science – which was intuitively impossible for the Tlӧnians. 
They believed the coins ceased to exist once they were lost, i.e., unperceived, and 
popped into existence upon their being found. Idealism ruled – and the furniture 
of Tlӧn was presumably discontinuous: being was only upon being perceived. Or, 
in the quantum theoretical sense, a set of “superposed” waves is actualized into 
one of a number of probable events upon interaction. (Merrell 159) 
 
In his characteristically poetic manner, Merrell has restated the wave function in Borgesian 
terms; the Tlӧnians, who equate perceptibility with existence and, likewise, imperceptibility with 
nonexistence, appear to live, always, in the same paradigm as Schrӧdinger’s cat. The “parable of 
the nine coins” distills the entire Tlӧnian conception of reality into extremely basic terms, 
demonstrating that all possibilities exist simultaneously, suspended in a probability wave until 
such a time as they are actualized, either through observation or some other version of 
verification. In this way, as Merrell agrees, the coins both exist and do not exist: “the Tlӧnians 
predicament is, however baffling to our mind-set, that of Schrӧdinger’s cat and the inconceivable 
behavior of the quantum world.” (Merrell 160) 
 These paltry few coins are not the only sign of Borges’ employment of superposition in 
this story, however. As if to frame this smaller section, we find at the end of the story a distinct 
possibility that Tlӧn – this imagined, fictional parallel universe – may be coming to be 
superposed with our own, tangible world. 
Contact with Tlӧn, the habit of Tlӧn, has disintegrated this world… A scattered 
dynasty of recluses has changed the face of the earth – and their work continues. 
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If my projections are correct, a hundred years from now someone will discover 
the hundred volumes of The Second Encyclopedia of Tlӧn. At that, French and 
English and mere Spanish will disappear from the earth. The world will be Tlӧn. 
(CF 81) 
 
The more that the possibility of Tlӧn comes to be contemplated by humanity, the more that its 
wave function must be seen as uncollapsed (e,g. possible) and superposed with that of our own 
world. While perhaps simply intended by Borges as a moment of sly, meta-textual humor, this 
dilemma also has the function of reducing the reader’s own experienced reality ex libris to one of 
many other probable superposed states – if Tlӧn is as probable as Borges’ narrator’s world, can 
Borges’ fiction come to be overlaid onto our own? Is its wave function simply awaiting an 
external observer to verify and collapse it? If so, we might boldly look upon Borges’ reader as 
carrying the crucial role of actualizing a specific state out of all those superposed, just as the 
scientist in Schrӧdinger’s cat dilemma. The reality that would subsequently be brought into being 
is certainly problematic, although no less “real.” Allen Thiher, in a study of the interrelationship 
between fiction and science in the Modernist era, contributes the following commentary on Tlӧn: 
This fiction dramatizes the proposition that a well-wrought encyclopedia might 
replace all other systems of knowledge, and hence all other imagined universes, 
through the power that the encyclopedia has to confer order on that metaphysical 
dream called “reality.” The imagined encyclopedia describing a unique fictional 
cosmos, contrived by men desirous of greater order than can be found in their 
usual seedy universe, begins to supplant all other representations. The new 
encyclopedia and its orderings impose upon themselves as “reality.” If coherence 
is a fundamental criterion for accepting that a proposition is knowledge, then it is 
logical that an imaginary order may well be deemed superior to the universe 
known through fragmented sciences – as the narrator of “Tlӧn, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius” observes in looking at recent history. (Thiher 239-240) 
 
By creating a fictional order that seems more probable than the existing natural order of our own 
universe – thereby complicating the coherence of reality – Borges has, deliberately or not, toyed 
with superimposing successive probability waves. He has superposed the fictional and the real, 
leaving it up to the reader to bring one of these states into being through observation. 
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 Calvino, too, deals with these themes of probability, transferability and superposition in a 
story entitled “The Chase,” published in T zero. An exceptionally tense description of the 
narrator’s obstructed flight from his would-be murderer in dense city traffic, this story slowly 
metamorphoses the hunted into the hunter, eventually equating the two in a moment of 
probabilistic universality. As the narrator’s car lurches forward incrementally, so does that of his 
assailant, while they both continuously attempt to calculate the probability of making the next 
green light – waiting, in Schrӧdingerian terms, for the waveform to collapse into one outcome or 
another. “In short,” the narrator laments, “I and the man commissioned to kill me are as if 
immobilized in a space that moves on its own, we are soldered to this pseudo-space which breaks 
up and re-forms and on whose combinations our fate depends.” (Calvino 116) The probabilistic 
nature of this situation is explicitly stated, which strengthens the proposed link with quantum 
wave functions. 
 After a brief, motionless moment of optimism in which the narrator imagines the case of 
eventually ending up behind his pursuer, the drama continues: “If, however, the number of these 
interval-cars were to increase or diminish then our pursuit would once again be a real pursuit… 
both eventualities have some likelihood of taking place.” (ibid. 121) The equivalence of multiple 
possibilities and their immediate inability to be verified is, again, a direct connection with 
Schrӧdinger. In fact, a later statement by the narrator essentially dictates the basis of quantum 
probability:  
It is the bodies therefore that determine the surrounding space, and if this 
affirmation seems to contradict both my experience and my pursuer’s – since the 
two of us can’t determine anything at all, neither space to flee in nor space to 
pursue in – it is because we are dealing with a property not of single bodies but of 
the whole complex of bodies in their reciprocal relationships, in their moments of 
initiative and of indecision, of starting the motor, in their flashing of lights and 
honking and biting nails and constant angry shifts of gear: neutral, first, second, 
neutral; neutral, first, second, neutral… In short, each car is in the center of a 
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system of relationships which in practice is the equivalent of another, that is, the 
cars are interchangeable, I mean the cars each with its driver inside; each driver 
could perfectly well change places with another driver, I with my neighbors and 
my pursuer with his.” (ibid. 122-3) 
 
With this, Calvino is beginning to extend the equivalence of possibilities into the potential parity 
between other objects and people, which leads us into a further assumption of universality and 
superposed states of probability. The lines between “self” and “other” begin to blur: “On 
thinking it over, I deduce that if all cars are involved in pursuits, the pursuing property would 
have to be commutative, and anyone who pursues would have to be in his turn pursued and 
anyone who is pursued would also be pursuing.” (ibid. 125) 
 As the narrator’s pursuer moves into position directly behind him, these theorizations 
reach a fever pitch, culminating in a not-too-unexpected merging of the roles of pursuer and 
pursued. With the probability wave’s collapse imminent, the narrator submits to conjecture. 
Now that the signal is turning green and it is probable that in this very period of 
free movement I can succeed in pushing my way into the intersection where my 
fate will be decided, I realize the decisive element is not behind me but in my 
relationship with the man ahead of me. So, the only significant alternative is 
whether my condition of pursued man is destined to remain terminal and 
asymmetrical (which would seem proved by the fact that in the relationship with 
my pursuer I am unarmed) or if I too in my turn am a pursuer. (ibid. 126) 
 
At that, the narrator reaches into his glove box, finds a loaded pistol, fires a lethal shot at the man 
occupying the car in front of him – now (and always) his sworn enemy – and speeds into a cross 
street, only to be once again caught in the tide of traffic. We might confidently assume that this 
cycle is intended to continue endlessly, with all men playing all roles and, simultaneously, 
existing as both pursued and pursuer, both alive and dead. Kerstin Pilz has stated that “The 
Chase” 
…is about a car chase and the narrator’s calculations regarding the probabilities of 
his pursuer catching up with him as they move through dense traffic. His 
hypotheses lead him to the unsatisfactory conclusion that the distinction between 
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the pursuer and the pursued, the subject and the object is blurred… This 
conclusion points to the paradox of Calvino’s efforts to escape the limitations of 
an anthropomorphic vision of the world and his awareness of its impossibility, 
since any attempt to speak about the world, even in the abstract terms of formal 
logic, will always be subjective. (Pilz 44) 
 
While Pilz is quite correct in a literary sense, we will take a different, more quantum-minded 
approach: like Schrӧdinger’s unlucky feline, Calvino’s narrator and his pursuer exist in a state of 
superposition until their true natures are manifested in an observable way – in other words, 
verified. Until that moment, just as the cat is both alive and dead, both men are both pursued and 
pursuer; the unfortunate man in front of the narrator is both guilty and innocent. If we imagine 
their varied and intersecting trajectories and personal storylines as a set of equally probable, un-
collapsed waveforms, it becomes clear that no other story in the oeuvres of Borges and Calvino 
serves better to represent this idea.  
 
Quantum Entanglement – Coincidence, Simultaneity and Specularity 
We have seen that quantum effects on matter, space and time open the door to uncertain 
and unpredictable (and sometimes inexplicable) outcomes. An extension of these outcomes is 
known as action at a distance, which describes the phenomenon of two objects interacting with 
each other without any physical contact in space. An understandably skeptical and fearful 
Einstein famously called this action “spooky,” an adjective that has remained attached to 
subsequent explanations of “quantum entanglement,” as this action has come to be known in 
modern quantum theory. Brian Greene provides the most approachable introduction to this 
concept: 
It turns out, contrary to locality, that something we do over here (such as 
measuring certain properties of a particle) can be subtly entwined with something 
that happens over there (such as the outcome of measuring properties of another 
distant particle), without anything being sent from here to there… This sounds 
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like voodoo; Einstein, who was among the first physicists to recognize – and 
sharply criticize – this possible feature of quantum mechanics, called it 
“spooky.”… This means that space cannot be thought of as it once was: 
intervening space, regardless of how much there is, does not ensure that two 
objects are separate, since quantum mechanics allows an entanglement, a kind of 
connection, to exist between them. (Fabric 80) 
 
In essence, one particle can have an effect on another even if they are too far apart to 
communicate at light speed – this means, of course, that there must be some other unknown 
means by which particles communicate, a notion that disturbs modern science at its core. Brian 
Clegg, another astrophysicist who has written prolifically on quantum effects, describes the same 
phenomenon in his book on the subject: 
At [the] quantum level, it is possible to link particles together so completely that 
the linked objects (photons, electrons, and atoms, for instance) become, to all 
intents and purposes, part of the same thing. Even if these entangled particles are 
then separated to opposite sides of the universe, they retain this strange 
connection. Make a change to one particle, and that change is instantly reflected 
in the other(s) – however far apart they may be. (Clegg 2) 
 
Later in his book, Clegg goes on to add that “entanglement provides a secret link, an 
unfathomable bond between two particles.” (Clegg 90) All of this reinforces the idea that 
quantum theory suggests a mystical, almost anagogical aspect of reality in which two particles or 
objects have the potential to act upon each other without a known means of contact. In the case 
of quantum entanglement, in fact, these particles and objects mirror each other so closely that 
one effectively becomes the other at another location in space. Two particles, separated by 
unfathomable eons of space-time, can achieve perfect specularity. 
 All of this conceptualization is, of course, understandably nebulous without a description 
of the experimental verification process that led to its discovery. Fortunately, Clegg goes into 
such detail in his book: 
Einstein and his colleagues imagined a particle breaking down into two others, a 
common enough occurrence in quantum physics. The two new particles shoot off 
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in opposite directions, each with an equal and opposite momentum just as Newton 
had foretold should happen. The initial particle wasn’t moving, so the 
momentums of the two new particles had to cancel out, because you can’t produce 
momentum out of nowhere. What’s interesting about this setup is that each 
particle can tell us something about the other. Measure the distance one has 
traveled and you know how far the other has gone. Measure one particles 
momentum and you know the momentum of the other… Say we measure the 
momentum of the first particle. Because of the neat symmetry of the experiment, 
we immediately also know the momentum of the second particle. But according 
to quantum theory, neither particle had a fixed momentum until the first moment 
the particle was measured. Now, immediately, we know the value for both 
particles, however far apart they have traveled. At this stage comes the clincher. 
At the instant we measured the first particle’s momentum, how did the second 
particle “know” what momentum it should have? If its momentum was, until that 
moment, just a range of probabilities rather than a particular fixed value, what 
caused it to jump to a particular actual momentum – the same momentum as the 
first particle, but in the opposite direction?... It would seem that only by instant 
action at a distance that one particle could influence the other. After all, we could 
wait as long as we like before making the measurement, so the two particles could 
be light-years apart. Assuming (as Einstein did) that it’s impossible for any 
communication between the two instantaneously, the only deduction we can make 
is that the second particle already had that momentum.” (Clegg 34-35) 
 
The conclusion granted by this experiment, then, is not that momentum is transmitted from one 
particle to another, but rather that two entangled particles already have the same momentum. 
Because of the probabilistic nature of quantum theory, the value of this momentum is unknown 
to us until the moment of measurement, but despite our own ignorance the experiment appears to 
prove that a mirror-like symmetry between the two particles existed prior our observation. 
Bundling the most creative theorizations of Einstein, Heisenberg and Schrӧdinger into one 
concept, quantum entanglement represents the scientific equivalent of literary specularity or 
“mirroring.” Aside from demonstrating once again the shared conceptual foundations of science 
and fiction, this observation also returns us to the main subjects of our study; Borges and 
Calvino, as masters of the form, deliver numerous examples of what we might playfully deem 
“literary entanglement.”  
144 
 
 Most of Borges’ “entangled pairs” appear in The Aleph, a familiar collection of short 
stories that rely heavily on the device of specularity – more so, in fact, than the rest of his oeuvre.  
“The Theologians,” for example, contains two characters who, despite living as sworn enemies, 
are eventually shown to be the entangled equivalent of one another. The clerics Aurelian of 
Aquileia and John of Pannonia – each racing against the other to refute a heresy involving the 
circularity of time – could not be more different from the start. Aurelian, in his refutation, prefers 
“vast labyrinthine periods, made impassable by the piling-up of clauses upon clauses.” (CF 202) 
John, on the other hand, provides a discourse that the narrator describes as “almost ludicrously 
brief.” (ibid. 203) Borges has inserted signs of equivalence and specularity into John’s treatise, 
though – we are told that “John’s treatise was limpid, universal; it seemed written not by a 
particular person, but by any man – or perhaps all men.” (ibid. 203) Eventually, the Roman 
leaders of the Church choose John’s argument as the official stance on the heresy, much to 
Aurelian’s dismay. 
 Their feud continues; the narrator tells us that “Aurelian wrote not a word that was not 
aimed, however unconfessably, at besting John.” (ibid. 203) Heresy arises again, this time much 
more virulently: “It seemed to be everywhere; people said that in the diocese of Britain 
crucifixes had been turned upside down and in Cæsaria the image of the Lord had been 
supplanted by a mirror.” (ibid. 204) The mirror as the symbol par excellence of specularity once 
again alerts the reader to this theme, reinforcing the overarching entanglement of the two 
antagonists in the tale. Soon after, we encounter further mirroring: “In the hermetic books,” the 
narrator states, “it is written that ‘things below are as things above, and things above as things 
below”; the Zohar tells us that the lower world is a reflection of the higher.” (ibid. 204) Aspects 
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of this heresy seem to therefore point directly at a concept akin to that of quantum entanglement, 
joining couples and groups of objects and ideas in apparent symmetry. 
 Aurelian, in penning his response to this heresy, is suddenly seized by writer’s block. 
After a brief pause, he is seized by a compulsion:  
Then suddenly a sentence of twenty words came to his spirit. With joy he wrote it 
on the page; immediately afterward, he was disturbed by the sense that it was 
someone else’s. The next day, he remembered: he had read it many years ago in 
the Adversus Annulares, composed by John of Pannonia. (ibid. 206) 
 
With the words of his double flowing through him, Aurelian submits his response to Rome, 
including a caveat denouncing John of Pannonia for heresy. John is subsequently tried, convicted 
and condemned to be burned at the stake. Under an obligation to attend the execution, Aurelian 
witnesses the death of his double, and the full scope of their entanglement is made apparent: 
The pyre was about to consume [John], when Aurelian screwed up his courage to 
raise his eyes. The fiery gusts fell still; Aurelian saw for the first and last time the 
face of the man he hated. It reminded him of someone, but he couldn’t quite 
remember whom. Then, the flames swallowed him; he screamed and it seemed as 
though the fire itself were screaming. (ibid. 207) 
 
Years pass, and Aurelian, never forgetting his role in John of Pannonia’s execution, moves 
across the Earth, eventually settling in Hibernia. His end (and its aftermath) is in perfect 
symmetry with that of John;  
In Hibernia, in one of the huts of a monastery besieged by forest, he was surprised 
one night, toward dawn, by the sound of rain. He recalled a Roman night when 
that same punctilious sound had surprised him. At high noon, a lightning bolt set 
the trees afire, and Aurelian died as John had. The end of the story can only be 
told in metaphors, since it takes place in the kingdom of heaven, where time does 
not exist. One might say that Aurelian spoke with God and found that God takes 
so little interest in religious differences that He took him for John of Pannonia. 
That, however, would be to impute confusion to the divine intelligence. It is more 
correct to say that in paradise, Aurelian discovered that in the eyes of the 
unfathomable deity, he and John of Pannonia (the orthodox and the heretic, the 





Here, the case for entanglement between John and Aurelian is explicitly proven. Borges’ words 
do not simply suggest that these men were “similar,” or that their shared demise was coincidental 
– on the contrary, we are told unequivocally that they “were the same person.” Just as an 
entangled pair of particles share the same momentum and rotation, so too were John and 
Aurelian so indistinguishable from one another that God regarded them as one, single person. 
 This same technique is employed more indirectly in a rather obtuse tale from The Aleph: 
the flatly-named “Story of the Warrior and the Captive Maiden.” It begins with the brief 
biography of a 6
th
-century Lombard warrior named Droctulft, who became so enamored with the 
city of Ravenna that he abandoned his own culture and died passionately defending his new 
home. The tale abruptly shifts to that of Borges’ own grandmother, “an Englishwoman torn from 
her country and her people and carried to this far end of the earth [i.e. Argentina].” (ibid. 210) 
Borges’ grandmother encounters a woman dressed in indigenous Indian garb, but with curiously 
blonde hair. Speaking with her, it is revealed that she, too, had been transplanted in Argentina 
from England as a child, only to be taken from her family in an Indian raid and subsequently 
raised by the tribe. Borges’ grandmother is moved by this woman, who had eventually become 
the consort of a minor chieftain and had borne his children.  
Moved by outrage and pity, my grandmother urged her not to go back. She swore 
to help her, swore to rescue her children. The other woman answered that she was 
happy, and she returned that night to the desert. Francisco Borges was to die a 
short time later, in the Revolution of ’74; perhaps at that point my grandmother 
came to see that other woman, torn like herself from her own kind and 
transformed by that implacable continent, as a monstrous mirror of her own fate. 
(ibid. 210-11) 
 
The case for entanglement in this story is made soon after by the narrator. 
Thirteen hundred years and an ocean lie between the story of the life of the 
kidnapped maiden and the story of the life of Droctulft. Both, now, are 
irrecoverable. The figure of the barbarian who embraced the cause of Ravenna, 
and the figure of the European woman who chose the wilderness – they might 
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seem conflicting, contradictory. But both were transported by some secret 
impulse, an impulse deeper than reason, and both embraced that impulse that they 
would not have been able to explain. It may be that the stories I have told are one 
and the same story. (ibid. 211) 
 
Borges is able to equate these tales on the basis of not only their parallel narratives, but also 
through a shared “secret impulse”; can this invisible means of connection not be the same “secret 
link” or “unfathomable bond” that Brian Clegg has invoked in his description of quantum-
entangled particles? That this connection is “deeper than reason” – e.g., that it cannot be 
explained logically (or scientifically) – is only further evidence that the equivalence between 
literary specularity and quantum entanglement is significantly credible. 
 The specular images provided by Borges continue in a fiction entitled “Deutches 
Requiem,” which recounts the life and death of Otto Dietrich zur Linde, a Nazi concentration 
camp officer. A cruel and severe man, zur Linde applies a cold, philosophical approach to his 
torture of the Jews in his camp, most notably “the famous poet David Jerusalem.” (ibid. 232) 
After praising the efficacy and beauty of Jerusalem’s poems, zur Linde goes on explain how he 
governed this man in the camp. 
I was severe with him; I let neither compassion nor his fame make me soft. I had 
realized many years before I met David Jerusalem that everything in the world 
can be the seed of a possible hell; a face, a word, a compass, an advertisement for 
cigarettes – anything can drive a person insane if that person cannot manage to 
put it out of his mind. Wouldn’t a man be mad if he constantly had before his 
mind’s eye the map of Hungary? I decided to apply this principle to the 
disciplinary regimen of our house, and… In late 1942, Jerusalem went insane; on 
March 1, 1943, he succeeded in killing himself. (ibid. 232) 
 
What immediately follows this sadistic confession is striking in its opposition to what has been 
said – zur Linde, in a psychologically-minded soliloquy, begins to see himself in the person of 
David Jerusalem: 
I do not know whether Jerusalem understood that if I destroyed him, it was in 
order to destroy my own compassion. In my eyes, he was not a man, not even a 
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Jew; he had become a symbol of a detested region of my soul. I suffered with 
him, I died with him, I somehow have been lost with him; that was why I was 
implacable. (ibid. 232) 
 
With this fledgling specularity between the guard and the prisoner established, Borges begins to 
expand this entanglement to include all men and all nations, as the Third Reich begins to fall 
around zur Linde.  
Hitler thought he was fighting for a nation, but he was fighting for all nations, 
even for those he attacked and abominated. It does not matter that his ego was 
unaware of that; his blood, his will, knew. The world was dying of Judaism, and 
of that disease of Judaism that is belief in Christ; we proffered it violence and 
faith in the sword. That sword killed us, and we are like the wizard who weaves a 
labyrinth and is forced to wander through it till the end of his days, or like David, 
who sits in judgment on a stranger and sentences him to death, and then hears the 
revelation: Thou art that man. (ibid. 233-4) 
 
Though this statement reeks of odious prejudice and revisionist perspective, Borges’ 
intentionally despicable narrator has established an entanglement between the killer and the 
killed, the villain and the hero. The last paragraph of the story has zur Linde gazing, fittingly, 
into a mirror, Borges’ perennial symbol for equivalence and one that we have now come to note 
repeatedly in our analysis of literary entanglement. To zur Linde, he and David Jerusalem are the 
same person, just as Germany is any other country and the Nazi ideology is any other ethos. A 
distasteful merging of identity, to be sure, but one that effectively highlights an unfortunate 
consequence of this abstract concept.  
 While all of these examples have come from the same collection of stories, there is an 
earlier example of literary entanglement (as we have called it) in Borges’ body of work: “The 
Shape of the Sword,” found in Artifices (1944). In it, the narrator (“Borges,” as usual) comes to 
meet an Irishman with a ghastly facial scar who has taken up residence in Argentina. The bulk of 
the story is a recounting of how he obtained this scar during the war for Irish independence. The 
narrator saves an ardently vociferous, Communist rebel – John Vincent Moon – from death at the 
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hands of a soldier, only to discover that the fiery but bookish revolutionary is frightened and 
useless in battle. Their specularity is shown almost immediately: “It was then that I realized that 
he was a hopeless coward. I clumsily told him to take care of himself, then left. I was 
embarrassed by the man and his fear, shamed by him, as though I myself were the coward, not 
Vincent Moon.” (ibid. 141) Within days, the Irishman overhears Moon on the telephone, 
surreptitiously arranging for the Irishman’s arrest and his own guaranteed safety. In a fit of 
anger, the Irishman attacks Moon, and their equivalence as an entangled pair becomes explicit: 
Moon knew the house well, every bit as well as I. Once or twice I lost him, but I 
managed to corner him before the soldiers arrested me. From one of the general’s 
suits of armor, I seized a scimitar, and with that steel crescent left a flourish on his 
face forever – a half-moon of blood. (ibid 142) 
 
The befuddled narrator of the story asks for clarification: 
“And Moon?” I asked. “What became of Moon?” “He was paid his Judas silver 
and he ran off to Brazil. That evening, in the city square, I saw a dummy shot by a 
firing squad of drunks.” I waited vainly for the rest of the story. Finally, I asked 
him to go on. A groan made his entire body shiver; he gestured, feebly, gently, 
toward the curving, whitish scar. “Do you not believe me?” he stammered. “Do 
you not see set upon my face the mark of my iniquity? I have told you the story 
this way so that you would hear it out. It was I who betrayed the man who saved 
me and gave me shelter – it is I who is Vincent Moon.” (ibid. 142) 
 
Admittedly, the existence of a true entangled pair is less obvious in this tale than in the others – 
rather than existing as identical analogues of the same person, it seems that this man and his 
double may have merely switched places. The only clue to the contrary is the Irishman’s having 
witnessed the mock execution in the city square, despite his double having already left for Brazil 
– this could suggest that both men had witnessed all of each others’ experiences, which would 
require them to be entangled. In its brevity, this story is less satisfying in terms of proving our 
hypothesis, though it is nonetheless relevant and provocative. 
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 There are still other examples of entanglement in Borges’ works, but rather than repeat 
the same analysis on what would amount to identical narrative structures we will instead be 
better served by moving on to examples that can be found in Calvino’s fictions. The most 
compelling of these comes from a minor work, The Castle of Crossed Destinies, in the form of a 
combinatorial novella that narrates a frantic attempt by multiple mute narrators to tell 
overlapping stories. Since they cannot speak, they are limited to communicating by way of 
judicious selections from a single deck of tarot cards. 
The square is now entirely covered with cards and with stories. My story is also 
contained in it, though I can no longer say which it is, since their simultaneous 
interweaving has been so close. In fact, the task of deciphering the stories one by 
one has made me neglect until now the most salient peculiarity of our way of 
narrating, which is that each story runs into another story, and as one guest is 
advancing his strip, another, from the other end, advances in the opposite 
direction, because the stories told from left to right or from bottom to top can also 
be read from right to left or from top to bottom, and vice versa, bearing in mind 
that the same cards, presented in a different order, often change their meaning, 
and the same tarot is used at the same time by narrators who set forth from the 
four cardinal points. (Calvino 41) 
 
What follows from this point is a chaotic hodgepodge of half-told stories, each blending into the 
others and lending an atmosphere of generalized confusion. This chapter serves as a conclusion 
to the first “act” of the book, and so it is fitting that the cards that had served to organize and 
motivate the initial chapters might now be complicated by an inevitable increase in entropy. The 
chapter concludes shortly after the narrator struggles to logically work out his own tale’s 
resolution, which has become entangled with those of the others. 
Surely my own story is also contained in this pattern of cards, my past, present, 
and future, but I can no longer distinguish it from the others. The forest, the 
castle, the tarots have brought me to this point, where I have lost my story, 
confused it in the dust of the tales, become freed of it. What is left me is only the 





There could be perhaps no other way to end this tale, or this book; the experiment of narrating 
through random combinatorial selection provides enormous potential, but almost no logical 
structure. Regardless of this limitation, however, Calvino achieves a major success in equating 
the story of one with the stories of all others, essentially proving their entanglement by way of 
their shared probabilities. In The Castle of Crossed Destinies, the reader is simply not fortunate 
enough to witness the eventual collapse of the probability wave, and as such the stories therein 
all remain unverified and, therefore, possible. 
 A final example of literary entanglement is found in Calvino’s most famous work, 
Invisible Cities. The city of Zobeide, hewn from a dream shared by many, equates all of its 
builders: 
Men of various nations had an identical dream. They saw a woman running at 
night through an unknown city; she was seen from behind, with long hair, and she 
was naked. They dreamed of pursuing her. As they twisted and turned, each of 
them lost her forever. After the dream they set out in search of that city; they 
never found it, but they found one another; they decided to build a city like the 
one in the dream. (Calvino 45) 
 
At slightly more than one page in length, the description of Zobeide does not provide a large 
amount of detail with which to theorize – however, it seems that the city itself can be 
conceptualized as a staging ground for entangled pairs or groups. From a different angle, we 
might alternately consider that it is not the builders but their dreams that are entangled; if a 
dream is the result of the processes of a select portion of the brain, perhaps the whole man need 
not be entangled – after all, particles as small as electrons built the case for quantum 
entanglement in the first place. It must be stated that Calvino did not routinely employ the same 
technique of specularity that Borges did; here, however, we can definitively see a similar concept 
in action.  
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To conclude our discussion of quantum and literary entanglement, we will briefly touch 
upon one of its most intriguing possibilities: teleportation. Evergreen fodder for science fiction, 
teleportation has recently been theorized to be technically possible through the mystery of 
entanglement, albeit with certain limitations. Brian Greene explains: 
Remember, two entangled particles, say two photons, have a strange and intimate 
relationship. While each has only a certain probability of spinning one way or the 
other, and while each, when measured, seems to “choose” randomly between the 
various possibilities, whatever “choice” one makes the other immediately makes 
too, regardless of their spatial separation… Quantum entanglement could be used 
for quantum teleportation. You might not be able to send a message at a speed 
greater than that of light, but if you’ll settle for slower-than-light teleportation of a 
particle from here to there, entanglement’s the ticket. (Fabric 442-3) 
 
While promising at the subatomic level, the prospects for teleporting larger or more complex 
structures are less optimistic: 
Can we ever use teleportation on solid objects with structure – perhaps even life? 
Even for a single particle this is a nontrivial challenge. Teleportation experiments 
to date have focused on a single property of a particle – its spin, for instance – but 
to truly teleport a particle it would be necessary to teleport all the properties 
separately. (Clegg 212) 
 
Complex structures could therefore be potentially teleported property-by-property, which is not 
wholly disheartening for inanimate objects. For living things, though, this would be absolutely 
lethal: “To be teleported, every atom in your body would have to lose its quantum uniqueness. It 
would involve nothing less than total disintegration. Yes, the outcome would be a perfect copy 
with all your memories and personality, but would it be you?” (ibid. 218) The entangled literary 
pairs we have seen in our analysis had little or no difficulty in maintaining the “you” to which 
Brian Clegg is referring, but in reality this would be a philosophical quandary of the highest 
order. Nonetheless, such difficulties do not nullify the value of the dialogue between science and 
fiction that is being undertaken. Clegg seems to agree, echoing so many other scientists and 
philosophers that have already been cited in this study: 
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This doesn’t make all speculation worthless, though. Not only can it produce new 
and wonderful ideas – arguably all modern physics originates from a handful of 
vibrant speculations that challenged traditional science at the start of the twentieth 
century – but it can result in a very healthy shaking up of what can otherwise be 
entrenched and self-satisfied thinking. (ibid. 223)  
 
By not only considering but also manipulating and testing the impossible – in both scientific and 
literary arenas – humanity increases its chances of achieving creative and unexpected 
advancements in every field. 
 
Multiple Dimensions and Multiverses 
While quantum entanglement has presented a strong basis for comparison with literary 
specularity, the concept of the multiverse will in turn allow for a discussion of the presence of 
ramifying time and physically-adjacent paradigms in fiction. Borges’ “The Garden of Forking 
Paths” will stand as the most well-known example of this analysis, supplemented by Calvino’s 
story “T zero” and his novel Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore… In each of these works, the 
reader is presented with a vision of the potentiality inherent in choice; as each decision is made, 
all other possible outcomes to that decision branch out into divergent directions, with each 
existing separately from the other. This image is directly in line with the modern scientific 
concept of the multiverse, which theorizes that there exists the actual potential for an infinity of 
universes, each the embodiment of some slightly different arrangement of particles. Through this 
theory, every decision that has ever been made would have as an abode its own, unique universe. 
We can begin with some background on multiverse theory, of course – Brian Greene 
acknowledges the creative fecundity of this concept: 
[An] early version of parallel universes resonated with themes of separate lands or 
alternative histories that were being explored in literature, television, and film, 
creative forays that continue today. (My favorites since childhood include The 
Wizard of Oz, It’s a Wonderful Life, the Star Trek episode “The City of the Edge 
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of Forever,” the Borges story “The Garden of Forking Paths,” and, more recently, 
Sliding Doors and Run Lola Run.) Collectively, these and many other works of 
popular culture have helped integrate the concept of parallel realities into the 
zeitgeist and are responsible for fueling much public fascination with the topic. 
(Hidden 6-7) 
 
Based on what Greene has stated, we could make the assertion that it is science, in actuality, that 
is indebted to fiction, due to fiction’s role in generating such a cultural curiosity and public 
awareness of what amounts to a maddeningly difficult scientific theory. Art and literature, in 
their freedom from the burden of verifiability, can perform thought experiments using ideas 
taken from science even when science itself cannot. The themes and functions of these two 
disciplines are intertwined – science and literature are two elements of one apparatus that allows 
us to better understand the cosmos. 
 In The Hidden Reality, Brian Greene focuses specifically on multiverse theory, working 
from its origins through to the current criticisms against it. He admits, late in the work, that this 
theory’s basis is fundamentally a creative theorization: 
Is it scientifically justifiable to speak of a multiverse, an approach that invokes 
realms inaccessible not just in practice but, in many cases, even in principle? Is 
the notion of a multiverse testable or falsifiable? Can invoking a multiverse 
provide explanatory power of which we’d otherwise be deprived? If the answer to 
these questions is no, as detractors insist is the case, then multiverse proponents 
are assuming an unusual stance. Nontestable, nonfalsifiable proposals, invoking 
hidden realms beyond our capacity to access – these seem a far cry from what 
most of us would want to call science. (ibid. 189) 
 
After laying out such a disturbing case for the “scientific-ness” of multiverse theory, Greene 
goes on to justify the case for belief, stating that if a theory comes to be accepted as verifiable, 
the whole theory must be accepted – we cannot cherry-pick the elements that serve us and 
eschew those that are inconvenient or unexpected. Because of this, the multiverse conjecture 
falls very much within the bounds of science. Its proposed veracity stems from the tenets of basic 
science, strangely enough: “Basic physical principles establish that if the cosmos is infinitely 
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large, it is home to infinitely many parallel worlds – some identical to ours, some differing from 
ours, many bearing no resemblance to our world at all.” (ibid. 12) 
 Without delving too deeply into the overwhelmingly complex physics that define 
multiverse theory, we can briefly analyze how it is to be imagined: 
If space is large but finite, we can divide it into a large but finite number of such 
independent patches. If space is infinite, then there are an infinite number of 
independent patches. It’s this latter possibility that’s of particular allure… In any 
given patch the particles of matter (more precisely, matter and all forms of 
energy) can be arranged in only a finite number of different configurations… This 
means that conditions in the infinity of far-flung patches – in regions of space like 
the one we inhabit but distributed through a limitless cosmos – necessarily repeat. 
(ibid. 33) 
 
Aside from destabilizing the importance of our own universe, this explanation suggests an even 
more disturbing implication: 
Adhering to this perspective, we conclude that if the particle arrangement with 
which we’re familiar were duplicated in another patch – another cosmic horizon – 
the patch would look and feel like ours in every way. This means that if the 
universe is infinite in extent, you are not alone in whatever reaction you are now 
having to this view of reality. There are many perfect copies of you out there in 
the cosmos, feeling exactly the same way. And there’s no way to say which is 
really you. All versions are physically and hence mentally identical… Were you 
to visit these inexact copies, you’d find some that are barely distinguishable from 
ours, while in others the differences would range from obvious to exhilarating to 
shocking. Every decision you’ve ever made is tantamount to a particular particle 
arrangement. (ibid. 39) 
 
The multiverse, then, annihilates the uniqueness that humans consider a given in their perception 
of reality, and offers us instead the consolation of existing as only one of a literally infinite series 
of parallel universes. The psychological effect of contemplating this idea leads us headlong into 
a literary frame of mind – it is easy to see why writers of science fiction have so often relied on 
such concepts to mystify audiences. 
 Physicists have theorized that one way to access a parallel universe would be to carefully 
harness the space-time warping properties of a black hole – but not just any black hole will do. 
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Michio Kaku clarifies that only a rotating black hole could potentially provide access without 
obliterating the traveler. 
[Roy] Kerr found… that a massive rotating star does not collapse into a point. 
Instead, the spinning star flattens until it eventually is compressed into a ring, 
which has interesting properties. If a probe were shot into the ring from the side, it 
would hit the ring and be totally demolished… However, if a space probe were 
shot into the ring from the top or bottom, it would experience a large but finite 
curvature; that is, the gravitational force would not be infinite. This rather 
surprising conclusion from Kerr’s solution means that any space probe shot 
through a spinning black hole along its axis of rotation might, in principle, survive 
the enormous but finite gravitational fields at the center, and go right through to 
the mirror universe without being destroyed by infinite curvature. (Hyperspace 
226) 
    
While titillating, this possibility currently exists only in theory; human science is nowhere near 
capable of employing black holes in its endeavors, since there is still so much that we do not 
know about their properties. Fiction, however, is unfettered – free to pose and visualize, we can 
look to a number of works by Borges and Calvino for examples (both direct and indirect) of 
inspiration and experimentation relating to the concepts of multiverses and parallel dimensions. 
 Borges’ “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” rewrites the history of the classic work 
normally attributed to Miguel de Cervantes. Borges achieves this through an ingenious thought 
experiment that probes the limits of authorship and, probably inadvertently, tips into the same 
territory as the theory of parallel dimensions. His narrator, an associate of the deceased writer 
Pierre Menard, defends his friend’s oeuvre, listing all of his literary accomplishments and 
naming one work above all others;  
This work, perhaps the most significant writing of our time, consists of the ninth 
and thirty-eighth chapters of Part I of Don Quixote and a fragment of Chapter 
XXII. I know that such a claim is on the face of it absurd; justifying that 
“absurdity” shall be the primary object of this note… Pierre Menard did not want 
to compose another Quixote, which is surely easy enough – he wanted to 
compose the Quixote. Nor, surely, need one be obliged to note that his goal was 
never a mechanical transcription of the original; he had no intention of copying it. 
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His admirable ambition was to produce a number of pages which coincided – 
word for word and line for line – with those of Miguel de Cervantes.  (CF 90-91) 
 
Two men, then, appear to have organically produced an identical work. Rather than write an 
anachronistic, analogous work by way of his own experiences, Menard instead planned to live 
through all of Cervantes’ experiences, thereby achieving the same work at the end of this 
exercise. Borges’ narrator tells us that, in the end, “the Cervantes text and the Menard text are 
verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer.” (ibid. 94) While the absurdity of 
this statement is obviously intended by Borges as wry humor, it also confirms the notion that 
both authors – Menard and Cervantes – may exist in parallel but separate dimensions. If two 
ramifications of prior time led to the isolated and organic creation of identical Quixotes, we need 
only hearken back to Brian Greene’s comments to assert that both Quixotes do exist, albeit in 
separate universes; universes that, while largely identical, do have different particle 
arrangements – in this case, the substitution of Cervantes for Menard, and his placement in a 
different time period. Both situations carry an equal probability of existing in an infinite 
universe. 
 Floyd Merrell has commented on Borges’ comprehension of advanced scientific theories 
such as these, stating that it is “apparent that Borges… takes metaphysical doctrines, scientific 
theories, and other particular perspectives of the world at face value. Each is a world, none is The 
World.” (Merrell 9) Without explicit proof that Borges possessed an awareness of parallel 
dimensions, we can nonetheless claim a sort of convergence to be seen in his works; stories such 
as “Death and the Compass” and “The Other” demonstrate the same juxtaposition between 
parallel dimensions or paradigms. In “Death and the Compass,” a game of cat-and-mouse 
between a detective named Lӧnnrot and a serial murderer named Scharlach reaches its 
denouement in the Villa Triste-le-Roy; the villa is described as abounding in “pointless 
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symmetries and obsessive repetitions.” (CF 153) As if moving through an M.C. Escher painting, 
“Lӧnnrot explored the house. Through foyers that opened onto dining rooms and on through 
galleries, he would emerge into identical courtyards – often the same courtyard. He climbed 
dusty stairs to circular antechambers; he would recede infinitely in the facing mirrored walls…” 
(ibid. 153-54) After being ambushed by Scharlach, Lӧnnrot – who had previously imprisoned 
Scharlach’s brother, a criminal in his own right – learns that he is the victim of an elaborate trap, 
in which Scharlach has built a mental “labyrinth” around Lӧnnrot while he hunted the criminal. 
The story closes with an image of dual labyrinths: one envisioned by Lӧnnrot and another by 
Scharlach; while both exist by virtue of their having been conceived by each of the men, these 
mazes appear to also exist adjacent to one another, rather than overlaid upon each other. We 
might take this image to represent a moment of contact between two universes or dimensions – 
one in which Scharlach is the hunter, and another in which Scharlach is hunted; one universe in 
which Lӧnnrot is righteous, and another in which he is a criminal. The diametrically opposed 
perspectives of these two characters seem to be superposed in space and time, but their equally-
probably existence would require them to occupy separate and adjacent universes. 
 “The Other,” which opens The Book of Sand, presents a similar situation, albeit in a more 
contemplative and peaceful atmosphere. An aged Borges, taking a break from teaching in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, sits on a bench overlooking the Charles River. He is soon joined by 
another man who seems familiar; after a few carefully selected questions, Borges realizes that he 
is seated next to himself. “‘In that case,’ I resolutely said to him, ‘your name is Jorge Luis 
Borges. I too am Jorge Luis Borges. We are in 1969, in the city of Cambridge.’ ‘No,’ he 
answered in my own, slightly distant, voice, ‘I am here in Geneva, on a bench, a few steps from 
the Rhone.’” (ibid. 412) The younger Borges believes that this is simply a dream – his dream, to 
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be precise, while the older Borges more wisely suggests that the two of them may simply be 
separate manifestations of the same person. Eventually, following a series of attempted proofs of 
his veracity, the older Borges agrees that he himself may simply exist in the dream of the 
younger Borges.  
We parted without having touched one another… I have thought a great deal 
about this encounter, which I’ve never told anyone about. I believe I have 
discovered the key to it. The encounter was real, but the other man spoke to me in 
a dream, which was why he could forget me; I spoke to him while I was awake, 
and so I am still tormented by the memory. (ibid. 417) 
 
That these two versions of Borges did not make physical contact is crucial to our own hypothesis 
– young Borges and old Borges both existed in separate universes (or “branes,” to use the 
terminology of modern multiverse theories) that were somehow adjacent and visible to each 
other while remaining physically inaccessible. There is scientific merit to this position; John D. 
Barrow, in fact, contextualizes this phenomenon as the consequence of a truly infinite cosmos. 
We believe that the evolution of life is possible with non-zero probability because 
it has happened on earth by natural means. Hence, in an infinite universe there 
must exist an infinite number of living civilizations. Within them will exist copies 
of ourselves of all possible ages. When each of us dies, there will always exist 
elsewhere an infinite number of copies of ourselves, possessing all the same 
memories and experiences of our past lives but who will live on to the future. This 
succession will continue indefinitely into the future and so in some sense each of 
us ‘lives’ forever. (Barrow 158) 
 
In an infinite universe, then, there will be infinite versions of everyone and everything, including 
all ages, places and variations. The fictional component of Borges’ story is manifested more in 
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Fittingly, Barrow has also cited Borges’ usage of this phenomenon: “The Infinite Replication Paradox has been a 
source of fascination to writers as well as to scientists and philosophers. Jorge Luis Borges, the great Argentinian 
writer of short stories, was always fascinated by the possibilities it created.” (Barrow 166)  
160 
 
 While the tales that we have examined so far can be linked to multiverse theory in a 
largely abstract or indirect sense, there are two additional stories by Borges that present even 
more compelling cases for comparison with multiple/parallel universes. The first of these, “The 
Writing of the God,” will hew closely to what Brian Greene has referred to as a “holographic 
universe”: 
Reality – not its mere shadow – may take place on a distant boundary surface, 
while everything we witness in the three common spatial dimensions is a 
projection of that faraway unfolding. Reality, that is, may be akin to a hologram… 
Arguably the strangest parallel world entrant, the holographic principle envisions 
that all we experience may be fully and equivalently described as the comings and 
goings that take place at a thin and remote locus… A version of Plato’s shadow 
world – a parallel but thoroughly unfamiliar encapsulation of everyday 
phenomena – would be reality.” (Hidden 272) 
 
Such specularity is not out of place in Borges’ oeuvre, as was shown in the preceding chapter; 
incidentally, a reflection of notion can also be found in Calvino’s Invisible Cities, in a city called 
“Valdrada”: 
Thus the traveler, arriving, sees two cities: one erect above the lake, and the other 
reflected, upside-down. Nothing exists or happens in the one Valdrada that the 
other Valdrada does not repeat, because the city was so constructed that its every 
point would be reflected in its mirror, and the Valdrada down in the water 
contains not only all the flutings and juttings of the facades that rise above the 
lake, but also the rooms’ interiors with ceilings and floors, the perspective of the 
halls, the mirrors of the wardrobes. (Calvino 53)  
 
Greene’s further description of holographic multiverses echoes what is seen in this passage from 
Calvino, and paves the way for an analogous analysis of Borges’ “The Writing of the God”: 
For black holes, we found that the link between information and surface area goes 
beyond mere numerical accounting; there’s a concrete sense in which information 
is stored on their surfaces… since the information required to describe physical 
phenomena within any given region of space can be fully encoded by data on a 
surface that surrounds the region, then there’s reason to think that the surface is 
where the fundamental physical processes actually happen. Our familiar three-
dimensional reality… would then be likened to a holographic projection of those 
distant two-dimensional physical processes. If this line of reasoning is correct, 
then there are physical processes taking place on some distant surface that, much 
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like a puppeteer pulls strings, are fully linked to the processes taking place in my 
fingers, arms, and brain as I type these words at my desk. Our experiences here, 
and that distant reality there, would form the most interlocked of parallel worlds. 
Phenomena in the two – I’ll call them Holographic Parallel Universes – would be 
so fully joined that their respective evolutions would be as connected as me and 
my shadow. (Hidden 298-9) 
 
 In “The Writing of the God” (alternately translated as “The God’s Script” in some cases), 
Borges narrates the story of Tzinacán, a priest of the Aztec god Qaholom, who has been 
imprisoned by the conquering Spanish. He is trapped in a circular cell, with a stone wall dividing 
it into two halves; in the other half dwells a jaguar, which Tzinacán can make out through a 
small metal grate for just a few seconds a day, whenever his jailer delivers food and floods the 
chambers with light. To pass the time until his inevitable death, the priest attempts to remember 
all that he has ever known – in essence, to re-order himself, piece by piece. Eventually, he recalls 
a legend of Qaholom, one that recounts the god’s having hidden a magical phrase somewhere in 
the world. This phrase has the power to actualize the apocalypse and free Tzinacán from both his 
imprisonment and his life. After long meditations and intervening dreams, the priest is able to 
see a message written in the stripes of the jaguar – “It is a formula of fourteen random 
(apparently random) words,” he says, “and all I would have to do to become omnipotent is to 
speak it aloud.” (CF 253) But just as he gains the means to end both the world and his torture, he 
loses himself in the fullness and unity of the god, Qaholom. Tzinacán the man, it would seem, no 
longer exists.  
 While one critical aspect of this tale is indubitably the idea that, in experiencing the 
fullness of the universe, one must cease to differentiate oneself from all others, there is another 
element that will draw us back into our discussion of the holographic multiverse. Jerry Varsava 
has noted a particularly suggestive moment: “Tzinacán, the magician of the pyramid of 
Qaholom, in an epiphanic moment experiences the ineffable for which, he tells us, such “poor 
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and ambitious words” as “all, world, universe” serve as mere “shadows of simulacra.” (Varsava 
193) We cannot speak of simulacra, of course, without invoking Jean Baudrillard (and, perhaps, 
Plato before him); that “all, world, universe” may be nothing more than a hologram of a distinct, 
separate universe or multiversal region is a concept that can be clearly excavated from 
Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation. 
If… the universe is that of which there is no double, no equivalent in the mirror, 
then with the hologram we are already virtually in another universe: which is 
nothing but the mirrored equivalent of this one. But which universe is this one? 
The hologram… gives us the feeling, the vertigo of passing to the other side of 
our own body, to the side of the double, luminous clone, or dead twin that is never 
born in our place, and watches over us by anticipation. The hologram, perfect 
image and end of the imaginary… The universe itself, taken globally, is what 
cannot be represented, what does not have a possible compliment in the mirror, 
what has no equivalence in meaning (it is as absurd to give it a meaning, a weight 
of meaning, as to give it weight at all). Meaning, truth, the real cannot appear 
except locally, in a restricted horizon, they are partial objects, partial effects of the 
mirror and of equivalence. (Baudrillard 106-108) 
 
It is this “restricted horizon” that is transcended by Tzinacán by way of spiritual communion 
with a supernatural essence – pure fiction, in other words. As a universe is, by definition, that 
which has no double, we can perceive Qaholom’s phrase to be the “true” universe and Tzinicán’s 
reality (and ours) to be merely a projection or hologram of that greater reality. The link to 
modern physics’ holographic multiverse theory is therefore not tenuous.
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 “The Garden of Forking Paths” is arguably one of Borges’ most famous stories, and 
certainly the one most cited in popular scientific literature. It is most commonly linked with a 
modern physics hypothesis by Hugh Everett III that has come to be known as the “Many-Worlds 
Theory” (formally entitled the “Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”), which 
resolves the difficulty of probability waveform collapse through what amounts to the successive 
                                                          
28
This same holographic principle can also be seen in partial form in a much later story by Borges entitled “There 
Are More Things,” a horror-themed tale in the style of H.P. Lovecraft. Invoking the evergreen trope of transfinite 
numbers, it details the events surrounding the narrator’s encounter with an otherworldly abomination – the reflection 
of some “secret regions of astronomy or time” – in an abandoned house. (CF 442) 
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and exponential bifurcation of potentialities into equal, distinct and separate realities, or 
“worlds.” Brian Greene provides a bit of background on this concept: 
[Hugh Everett’s] analysis, which focused on a gaping hole that [Niels] Bohr, the 
grand master of quantum physics, had danced around but failed to fill, revealed 
that a proper understanding of the theory might require a vast network of parallel 
universes. Everett’s was one of the earliest mathematically motivated insights 
suggesting that we might be part of a multiverse. (Hidden 218) 
 
Later in The Hidden Reality, Greene further develops this explanation: 
In Everett’s approach, everything that is possible, quantum-mechanically 
speaking (that is, all those outcomes to which quantum mechanics assigns a 
nonzero probability), is realized in its own separate world. These are the “many 
worlds” of the Many Worlds approach to quantum mechanics. (ibid. 242)  
 
Everett’s novelty was not simply his employment of the concept of parallel universes to sort 
probabilities into separate outcomes, but rather his insistence that each outcome not only had the 
potential to exist but did exist, permanently, in its own version of reality. 
While highly controversial, Everett’s theory has fluidly (and sometimes 
anachronistically) connected quantum theorists with writers of fiction, with Borges and Calvino 
among them. Allen Thiher, a comparatist studying the intersection of science and fiction, has, in 
fact, commented on this very connection.
29
 
Theoretical cosmologists have perhaps not looked askance upon Borges in their 
verbal descriptions of their models. One can hardly avoid thinking of the 
Borgesian resonances found in the string theorists’ concept of the “multiverse,” in 
                                                          
29
Others have commented on this connection as well: Michio Kaku, for example, has stated that “Each universe is 
linked to every other through a network of forks in the road. Or, as the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges wrote 
in The Garden of Forking Paths, ‘time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures.’” (Hyperspace 262); Likewise, 
John D. Barrow has demonstrated his agreement with this assessment, stating that “Borges returned to the dilemma 
in The Garden of Forking Paths… This is a scenario reminiscent of the ‘many worlds’ interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, in which all possible histories actually occur.” (Barrow 168); And Alberto Rojo, in Borges científico, has 
drawn a direct textual connection between Everett and Borges: “Los dos autores presentan la idea central de maneras 
llamativamente parecidas. En la sección 5 (página 321) del artículo original, Everett dice (la traducción es mía): ‘La 
‘trayectoria’ de las configuraciones de la memoria de un observador que realiza una serie de mediciones no es una 
secuencia lineal de configuraciones de la memoria sino un árbol ramificándose [a branching tree], con todos los 
resultados posibles que existen simultáneamente.’ Y en ‘El Jardín…’, Borges dice: ‘En todas las ficciones, cada vez 
que un hombre se enfrenta con diversas alternativas, opta por una y elimina las otras; en la del casi inextricable 
Ts’ui Pên, opta – simultáneamente – por todas. Crea, así, diversos porvenires, diversos tiempos, que también 
proliferan y se bifurcan.’” (Borges científico 56-57)     
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which “the supposition that our entire universe is but one instance of an infinity of 
continually created universes…” – to cite almost at random a recent description 
from the journal Nature. Mathematical cosmologists can experimentally imagine 
an infinity of infinite universes. Drawing upon quantum mechanics they have hit 
upon one of Borges’ working axioms, to wit, that books themselves contain 
infinite numbers of universes of post-Einsteinian spacetime. A string theorist can 
thus feel at home in “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in which the narrator of the 
book within the book, Ts’ui Pên, “different from Newton and 
Schoepenhauer…did not believe in a uniform, absolute time. He believed in an 
infinite series of times, in a vertiginous and expanding network of parallel, 
convergent, and divergent times.” (Thiher 238-239) 
 
While densely suggestive, Borges’ tale is characteristically short and understated; it details a 
series of events surrounding an English professor named Yu Tsun – a self-described 
“connoisseur of mazes,” a German sympathizer, and the sole possessor of information regarding 
the location of a British artillery park – during World War I. The tale itself is a section allegedly 
taken from Tsun’s own notebooks, in which he describes his flight from a Captain Richard 
Madden, the allied officer charged with hunting him. The denouement of the plot occurs in a 
town called Fenton, at the home of a renowned Sinologist named Dr. Stephen Albert.  
 When Tsun arrives at Albert’s house, the history of Tsun’s great-grandfather (“Ts’ui 
Pen”) is recounted – he was a nobleman who had attempted to write a massive novel and 
“construct a labyrinth in which all men would lose their way.” (CF 122) He was murdered, 
which led to his works remaining unfinished, but Tsun describes his vision of such a maze in 
terms that can be linked to Hugh Everett’s theory. 
I pictured it as infinite – a labyrinth not of octagonal pavilions and paths that turn 
back upon themselves, but of rivers and provinces and kingdoms…. I imagined a 
labyrinth of labyrinths, a maze of mazes, a twisting, turning, ever-widening 
labyrinth that contained both past and future and somehow implied the stars. (ibid. 
122) 
 
This evocation of a maze that is overlaid onto reality itself is developed further in the remaining 
pages of Borges’ tale. Soon after his arrival, Albert invites Tsun to examine what he refers to as 
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“the garden of forking paths,” a marvel that he attributes to Tsun’s own great-grandfather. Still in 
flight from Madden, Tsun hesitantly agrees, and is shown a tall, lacquered writing cabinet – an 
object that suggests the generation of “a labyrinth of symbols… an invisible labyrinth of time.” 
(ibid. 124) This revelation leads Albert and Tsun to an understanding – the massive novel and 
the labyrinth that Ts’ui Pen had aimed to create were, in fact, one and the same. The epigraph on 
the novel left by Pen reads thus: “I leave to several futures (not to all) my garden of forking 
paths.” (ibid. 125) Further commentary by Albert makes apparent the direct connection with the 
Many-Worlds Interpretation. 
Almost instantly, I saw it – the garden of forking paths was the chaotic novel; the 
phrase ‘several futures (not all)’ suggested to me the image of a forking in time, 
rather than in space. A full rereading of the book confirmed my theory. In all 
fictions, each time a man meets diverse alternatives, he chooses one and 
eliminates the others; in the work of the virtually impossible-to-disentangle Ts’ui 
Pen, the character chooses – simultaneously – all of them. He creates, thereby, 
‘several futures,’ several times, which themselves proliferate and fork… In Ts’ui 
Pen’s novel, all the outcomes in fact occur; each is the starting point for further 
bifurcations. (ibid. 125) 
 
Just as in Hugh Everett’s theory, Pen’s supposition forks every decision, every event and every 
arrangement of subatomic particles into its own distinct and separate reality – all variations exist, 
and none of them do not exist. Albert goes on, edging ever closer to what has been echoed by 
modern physics; 
Unlike Newton and Schopenhauer, your ancestor did not believe in a uniform and 
absolute time; he believed in an infinite series of times, a growing, dizzying web 
of divergent, convergent and parallel times. That fabric of times that approach one 
another, fork, are snipped off, or are simply unknown for centuries, contains all 
possibilities. In most of those times, we do not exist; in some, you exist but I do 
not; in others, I do and you do not; in others still, we both do. In this one, which 
the favoring hand of chance has dealt me, you have come to my home; in another, 
when you come through my garden you find me dead; in another, I say these same 
words, but I am an error, a ghost… Time forks, perpetually, into countless futures. 




At this, the story abruptly ends; Yu Tsun, desperate to communicate to Germany the 
name of the town that houses the British artillery park (a town called “Albert”), murders Stephen 
Albert and allows himself to be arrested by Richard Madden. While the resolution of this tale 
does not necessarily echo Everett’s theory, the potential that, in another iteration of reality, Tsun 
may not murder Albert – or might even be murdered by Albert – is well-established. In Borges’ 
story, time (and, therefore, reality) forks and bifurcates just as it would in the Many-Worlds 
Interpretation of quantum physics. The marvel of this, of course, is that Borges’ story was 
published in 1941 – a full sixteen years prior to Everett’s first presentation of his theory. The 
fidelity with which Borges’ ideas are reproduced in Everett’s hypothesis is nothing short of 
astounding, and perhaps represents another moment where fiction’s unfettered creativity was 
able to produce a theoretical conjecture earlier than science could. 
 “The Garden of Forking Paths” can be easily linked to Calvino’s work by relating it to “T 
zero,” a lengthy story that analyzes a confrontation between a hunter and a lion in bifurcating, 
mathematical terms, essentially exploring the same collapse of probability waves that was 
discussed earlier in this study. Kirsten Pilz notes that  
The story explores the separate time frames, or fragments (  ,   ,   ,   ,    …) as 
absolutes in the space-time continuum of the universe, making possible the 
existence of parallel universes, or better, a layering of space and time. In this 
dazzling story about infinite probabilities and hypothesis, Calvino’s point of view 
is that of the scientist who contemplates and describes in the precise, rarefied and 
detached language of his or her field the highly-charged and traumatic moment in 
which the protagonist contemplates his own death. (Mapping 43) 
 
While absolutely functional as a means of mitigating emotional response through jargonized 
language, the structure of this tale also serves as a recapitulation of Hugh Everett III’s Many-
Worlds interpretation and as an analog to Borges’ bifurcating labyrinth of time. 
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 While the story itself is elementary – a hunter pulls a bowstring and lets fly an arrow 
toward a lion, unsure of what will occur next – the concepts utilized by the narrator in 
enumerating the variety of possible outcomes to the situation are advanced. He tells us that “so 
many and so complex are the factors that condition the parabolic movement both of arrows and 
of felines that I am unable for the moment to judge which of the eventualities is the more 
probable.” (T zero 96) Calvino’s narrator presents what is now known as the Cyclic Universe 
concept, wherein the universe is understood to be cycling endlessly between two extreme points 
in repeated collapse and expansion. Within this discussion, a statement is made that could almost 
be mistaken as a quotation from “The Garden of Forking Paths”: 
…from the space-time point where I now am there extends bundle of possibilities 
which, the more they proceed in time, the more they diverge, conelike, toward 
futures which are completely different from one another, and each time I find 
myself here with the arrow and the lion in the air will correspond to a different 
point X of intersection in their trajectories, each time the lion will be wounded in 
a different way, he will have a different agony or will find to a different extent 
new strength to react, or he won’t be wounded at all and will fling himself upon 
me each time in a different way leaving me possibilities of self-defense or not 
leaving them, and my victories and my defeats in the struggle with the lion prove 
to be potentially infinite… (ibid. 103) 
 
These potentialities, all existing in “conelike,” parallel futures, have equal validity and are 
equally plausible – they are in perfect symmetry, then, with what we have seen in Borges and 
Everett. Whether Calvino’s understanding of this idea came from one, the other or neither is 
unfortunately impossible to deduce, but the conceptual parity is nevertheless undeniable. 
 Other works by Calvino also echo the Many-Worlds Interpretation, or at the very least 
invoke the possibility of bifurcating, parallel futures; the well-known, shattered narrative of If on 
a Winter’s Night a Traveler… presents, again according to Kirsten Pilz, a “web of intersecting 
realities or universes.” 
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Yet all fragments link up into a continuous, irreversible trajectory in the form of 
the continuous sentence into which the separate titles can be linked, which in turn 
constitutes a new beginning. And while the novel is headed towards one future – 
the marriage of the male Reader and Ludmilla – this is rendered unpredictable 
with every bifurcation, or better interruption, which in turn indicates a multitude 
of possible futures. (Pilz 153-4) 
 
The Castle of Crossed Destinies, too, offers another example of this narrative device in the form 
of “The Waverer’s Tale.” One of the unnamed characters in the story, mute (as are all of the 
characters) and reduced to communicating through the combinatorial arrangement of tarot cards, 
shows himself to be paralyzed by a choice between two brides. He scales a tree to attempt to see 
where the two diverging roads lead, but is blinded by the sun; he travels to a large city “where all 
parts are joined, all choices balanced” (Calvino 58) in order to seek guidance, but is instead 
presented with even more choices; he travels to the sea and is broken down into his prime 
elements, but even this does not resolve his dilemma. At the tale’s conclusion, in an image that 
would not be out of place in Borges’ works, the poor man encounters his double: 
But is this really he or is it rather a double whom he saw coming through the 
forest, the moment he was restored to himself? “Who are you?” “I am the man 
who was to marry the girl you did not choose, who was to take the other road at 
the crossing, quench his thirst at the other well. By not choosing, you have 
prevented my choice.” “Where are you going?” “To an inn different from the one 
you will come upon.” “Where shall I see you again?” “Hanging from a gallows 
different from the one where you will have hanged yourself. Farewell.” (ibid. 63) 
 
The Waverer – as this unnamed man is known – had therefore, in attempting to halt the process 
of bifurcation through his refusal of choice, prevented all other possible futures from coming into 
existence. The only way to not have to choose, it would seem, is through the final choice of 
death. 
 Other traces of the concept of parallel, forking futures can also be found along the 
windswept route followed by Marco Polo in Calvino’s Invisible Cities. In the midst of a dialogue 
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with his liege, the great Kublai Khan, we are told of Polo’s perspective when he encounters a 
new land: 
Marco enters a city; he sees someone in a square living a life or an instant that 
could be his; he could now be in that man’s place, if he had stopped in time, long 
ago; or if, long ago, at a crossroads, instead of taking one road he had taken the 
opposite one, and after long wandering he had come to be in the place of that man 
in that square. By now, from that real or hypothetical past of his, he is excluded; 
he cannot stop; he must go on to another city, where another of his pasts awaits 
him, or something perhaps that had been a possible future of his and is now 
someone else’s present. Futures not achieved are only branches of the past: dead 
branches. (Calvino 29) 
 
What Polo comes across in his travels are not spontaneously generated futures, then, but 
branches that have grown independently from his past choices and converged with his own 
selected present. While there are many such examples to be found in the fictions of Borges and 
Calvino, enough has been said about the connections to Hugh Everett III and the theories of 
parallel universes – it would best serve our study to move on to a final section on the nature of 
time itself, specifically as it relates to the concept of the multiverse. 
 
Time and Timelessness 
 Borges never shied from explicitly probing the characteristics of time in his fictions and 
essays; “Time and J.W. Dunne,” as an example, is a plainly-worded rebuttal to Dunne’s 
erroneous conception of time as a fourth dimension of space. Borges explains that 
Dunne is an illustrious victim of that bad intellectual habit – denounced by 
Bergson – of conceiving of time as a fourth dimension of space. He postulates 
that the future toward which we must move already exists, but this postulate 
merely converts it into space and requires a second time (already conceived in 
spatial form, in the form of a line or river) and then a third and a millionth. Not 
one of Dunne’s four books fails to propose the infinite dimensions of time, but 




Aside from suggesting the by-now familiar Incompleteness Theorem of Kurt Gӧdel, here Borges 
is also making an astute statement that reflects his knowledge of current scientific thought: time 
is not a spatial dimension, at least not in the same way that the three familiar spatial dimensions 
are manifested. Time exists outside of spatial dimensions, and Floyd Merrell can lend support as 
to why this is: 
Every time-traveling field of presentation, i.e., an observer, is contained within a 
field one dimension larger, the larger field including events that are 
simultaneously “past,” “future,” and “present” to the smaller field. For example, 
our Time,   , is for us linear and trapped within three-dimensional space. To a 
four-dimensional observer, on the other hand, our time would be tantamount to 
another dimension of space at right angles to each of the three dimensions of our 
space, and this observer would see our past, present, and future in simultaneity. 
(Merrell 77) 
 
If Dunne has conceived of time as a river or a line, as Borges has suggested, then in order for it 
to be experienced by 3-dimensional beings it must exist separately from the spatial dimensions, 
and must not itself be another spatial dimension – if it were, we would experience the full 
simultaneity of all time without perceiving it as a flow or line. The same theme of the divisibility 
of time has also been seen in Calvino’s “T zero,” incidentally: the protagonist, unable to attain a 
4-dimensional view of the events occurring, is trapped in his 3-dimensional reality and forced to 
wait until each second passes, slowly unveiling the true succession of events. Time, here, is 
necessarily nestled within the three spatial dimensions, and does not itself constitute another 
dimension of space. 
 Likewise, if we consider Borges’ “The Circular Ruins” we will find a conception of time 
that appears as both infinite and cyclical to the 4-dimensional viewer (in this case, the “god of 
Fire”). To all others, however – including the main character and the son he will bring into being 
through a mental exercise – time is linear, and its horizon is clipped by the human limitation of 
three spatial dimensions. The plot of this tale is provocative: a sorcerer arrives at a remote temple 
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in a jungle after an arduous and exhausting journey; the sorcerer rests, using only his intelligence 
to bring into being a son as he sleeps; with the help of the god of Fire, his son is made flesh, and 
is sent further down the river to find and ignite yet another temple of the Fire god. The story 
concludes with the sorcerer’s humiliating realization that, in fact, he was himself the dream of 
yet another previous sorcerer, and that the line of sorcerers and sons stretches out in both 
directions to infinity.  
 Floyd Merrell has exerted no small effort in deconstructing the physical implications of 
this story, noting the following: 
The conditions of the son’s environment are reciprocally identical to those of the 
magician. Only the infinitely repetitive trees of the jungle separate one temple 
from another. Hence, the spatial trajectories of father and son compose two 
symmetrical oppositions, up(stream)/down(south) and down(stream)/up(north), 
which structurally produce a “cancellation effect.” As a result, the action of the 
story terminates simultaneously everywhere and nowhere: at the center of the 
charred ruins of a circular temple where the magician created his dream image… 
In contrast to these spatial indices, at the outset it appears that time is linear, and it 
accumulates with increasing torpidity. The magician required fourteen days to 
perfect the heart of his subject, one year to create the skeleton, a little less than 
two additional years to complete his project, and two more long years to prepare 
his son for “birth.” The son’s development, then, is first decelerated and finally 
halted altogether when the magician interpolates him into the world. However, 
this effort to annihilate the past is ultimately futile. Temporal recurrence is 
foretold by the magician’s impression that “all this had happened before.” If the 
obliteration of “simple location” of space coupled with vague images of spatial 
circularity implies a denial of linear movement, concomitantly, the attempt to 
annihilate the past and establish an eternal “now” stems from an implicit attempt 
to deny temporal irreversibility. (Merrell 34-35) 
This attempt, of course, is doomed to fail, as is evidenced by the sorcerer’s late attempt at self-
immolation as the temple is engulfed in flame. The full scope of his action’s futility sinks in 
when the roaring flames miraculously have no discernable effect on his body. Merrell expresses 
the interpretation that time may have “begun” when the sorcerer began creating his son, and that 
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time “ended” when the son was finally made flesh. Baudrillard figures well here, too, having 
stated that “by crossing into a space whose curvature is no longer that of the real, nor that of 
truth, the era of simulation is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referentials…” (Baudrillard 2) 
This “liquidation” is symmetrical with the annihilation of the temple by flame. 
 Upon deeper reflection, however, we will find that Merrell’s position is incomplete – if 
the process of continual regeneration and annihilation is conceived of as analogous to that of a 
circular universe (e.g. a universe that repeatedly contracts and expands from a zero-point), then 
time is not only stopped but also reversed and undone with each arrival at zero – this is known in 
physics as the Big Crunch. Rather than a linear succession of Big Bangs and Crunches that 
always move linearly forward in time, the circular universe is more akin to a palimpsest. With 
each new cycle, the previous data is overwritten; in effect, it never existed. If this is the case in 
“The Circular Ruins,” then Borges’ sorcerer is the embodiment of a denial of the linearity of 
time, since all of his work will have been undone at the peak of the universe’s reversal. Michio 
Kaku uses Kurt Gӧdel’s ideas to present an image that is similar to this conclusion: 
If one followed the path of a particle in a Gӧdel universe, eventually it would 
come back and meet itself in the past… Gӧdel showed that the river of time could 
be smoothly bent backward into a circle. Rivers, after all, have eddy currents and 
whirlpools. In the main, a river may flow forward, but at the edges there are 
always side pools where water flows in a circular motion. (Hyperspace 243) 
The aquatic metaphor here is especially apt, as the continuum joining all sorcerers and their sons 
is the story’s endless river, bridging all temples together over linear space and circular time. 
Borges’ own words suggest such circularity, as well – “From time to time, he was disturbed by a 
sense that all this had happened before…” (CF 99); and, later: “…for that which had occurred 
hundreds of years ago was being repeated now.” (ibid. 100) 
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 A final example of the Borgesian treatment of time can be found in one of his lesser-
known fictions, entitled “The Secret Miracle.” Jaromir Hladik, a Jewish writer from Prague, is 
captured by the Third Reich and sentenced to death. His oeuvre is a subtle hint on Borges’ part to 
the primacy of time in this story: 
He judged A Vindication of Eternity to be less unsatisfactory, perhaps. The first 
volume documents the diverse eternities that mankind has invented, from 
Parmenides’ static Being to Hinton’s modifiable past; the second denies (with 
Francis Bradley) that all the events of the universe constitute a temporal series. It 
argues that the number of humankind’s possible experiences is not infinite, and 
that a single “repetition” is sufficient to prove that time is a fallacy…. 
Unfortunately, no less fallacious are the arguments that prove that fallacy. (ibid. 
159) 
 
Hladik waits for his execution over several days, fretting over the nature of time; his mind 
eventually settles on the matter of his lamentably unfinished play, The Enemies, which is itself a 
reflection of the author’s meditations on time; the narrator tells us that “this play observed the 
unities of time, place and action.” (ibid. 159) Through each of these hints, Borges is preparing 
the reader for the real action of this tale, which lies in the events of Hladik’s execution; as the 
character stands against the wall of the execution yard and the Nazi sergeant raises his arm to 
signal a lethal salvo of gunfire, the narrator announces, simply, that “the physical universe 
stopped.” (ibid. 161)  
The weapons converged upon Hladik, but the men who were to kill him were 
immobile… Hladik attempted a scream, a syllable, the twisting of a hand. He 
realized that he was paralyzed. He could hear not the slightest murmur of the 
halted world. I am in hell, he thought, I am dead. Then I am mad, he thought. And 
then, time has halted… He had asked God for an entire year in which to finish his 
work; God in His omnipotence had granted him a year. God had performed for 
him a secret miracle: the German bullet would kill him, at the determined hour, 
but in Hladik’s mind a year would pass between the order to fire and the 
discharge of the rifles. (ibid. 161-2) 
 
While Borges suggests a patently metaphysical reason for this halt in the flow of physical time, 
our study will attempt a more scientific conjecture: the only known location in the universe at 
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which time can come to a stop is the singularity at the center of a black hole. The mass of such 
singularities is so immense that space becomes infinitely curved at their centers, thereby halting 
time. At the risk of seeming cheeky, we might consider the elevation of the “gravity” of Hladik’s 
situation – embodied in his impending death – as conceptually analogous to the massive gravity 
of a singularity. At both points, due to high gravity, time comes to a stop, either literally or 
figuratively. We would not be alone in making this connection – another scholar, Héctor 
Vucetich, shares our view: “Esta negación del tiempo de Borges, la afirmación de que presentes 
simultáneos representan historias temporales incompatibles, tiene contrapartes en varias de las 
ramas de la fisica moderna.” (Vucetich 66) 
 One could, of course, posit that what occurred to Hladik in this particular story is 
invalidated by the fact that it was purely mental, but Brian Greene creates space for flexibility in 
our interpretation. 
Each moment – each event or happening – exists, just as each point in space 
exists. Moments don’t momentarily come to life when illuminated by the 
“spotlight” of an observer’s present; that image aligns well with our intuition but 
fails to stand up to logical analysis. Instead, once illuminated, always illuminated. 
Moments don’t change. Moments are. Being illuminated is simply one of the 
many unchanging features that constitute a moment… If you time-traveled back 
to December 31, 1965, then you were there, you were always there, you will 
always be there, you were never not there. December 31, 1965, did not happen 
twice, with your missing the debut but attending the encore. (Fabric 452-3) 
 
Based on this understanding, the possibility remains for the (albeit fictional) “reality” of Hladik’s 
experience and our subsequent comparison of it to high-gravity singularities. Despite any 
dilation or compression of space-time, the relative “reality” of experiences is not invalidated. We 
can think of this in terms of the multiverse, as well; the moments that occur in this universe or 
time do not replace the moments that occur in another universe or time – they all exist, forever.  
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 While Calvino does not tend to address the issue of recursive or paused time in the same 
way as Borges (though some tales from Cosmicomics that we have already discussed come 
close), two examples from Invisible Cities will draw our analysis toward an equitable conclusion. 
In his description of the city of “Laudomia,” Calvino presents the by-now familiar 
conceptualization of reality as an overlaid simultaneity of past, present and future. With the 
parallel cities of living Laudomia, dead Laudomia and unborn (read: “future”) Laudomia all 
adjacent to one another, all times coexist in the same patch of space. 
The living of Laudomia frequent the house of the unborn to interrogate them; 
footsteps echo beneath the hollow domes; the questions are asked in silence; and 
it is always about themselves that the living ask, not about those who are to come. 
One man is concerned with leaving behind him an illustrious reputation, another 
wants his shame to be forgotten; all would like to follow the thread of their own 
actions’ consequences; but the more they sharpen their eyes, the less they can 
discern a continuous line. (Calvino 142) 
 
The invocation of this “continuous line” is not dissimilar to what was noted in Borges’ “The 
Circular Ruins,” just as the four-dimensional overlay of past-present-future is not far removed 
from that of “Time and J.W. Dunne”; Calvino is toying more abstractly with the same concepts 
as Borges, imbuing his own experimentation with his characteristic cynicism and melancholy. 
 The other example from Invisible Cities, “Berenice,” echoes a similar overlay of past, 
present and future, with an analogous 3-dimensional perspective on the part of its inhabitants. 
Between the “just” and “unjust” versions of Berenice that coexist, there is a third city – the future 
Berenice – “germinating.” 
From my words you will have reached the conclusion that the real Berenice is a 
temporal succession of different cities, alternately just and unjust. But what I 
wanted to warn you about is something else: all the future Berenices are already 
present in this instant, wrapped on within the other, confined, crammed, 




Again, the opposition of the linearity of time in three dimensions is juxtaposed with their 
coincidence in four dimensions – while this is obviously a concept that was dear to Calvino, it 
also functions as yet another unifying theme between he and Borges. 
 We will conclude this chapter with a brief statement on the feasibility of manipulating 
time, both in ways that have been illustrated by these authors and through the perennial trope of 
traveling through time. While categorically impossible according to both our current theories and 
present technology, this door is not necessarily bolted shut for future generations of humans. 
Michio Kaku has effectively summarized the current state of affairs: 
For any physicist who has seriously analyzed the mathematics of time travel 
within Einstein’s general theory of relativity, the final conclusion is, surprisingly 
enough, far from clear… Although time does slow down when you increase your 
velocity, you cannot go faster than the speed of light (and hence make time go 
backward) because special relativity states that your mass would become infinite 
in the process. Thus the faster-than-light travel method preferred by most science-
fiction writers contradicts the special theory of relativity. (Hyperspace 233) 
 
While humanity is far from overcoming this limitation, contemporary developments in physics 
(including string theory) are laying the foundation for future advances in the manipulation of 
space-time. Literature, for its own part, may eventually serve as it has before: as the unbridled, 








Part 2, Chapter 3: Self-symmetry, Post-humanity and Science-as-fiction 
  
Self-similarity 
The modern age of science has brought a new awareness of the exponential complexity of 
the universe around us. The study of self-similarity, which was codified and developed by 
Mitchell Feigenbaum and the late Benoit Mandelbrot and has come to be known colloquially as 
“Chaos Theory,” revolutionized the art of systemic projection and modeling. Kerstin Pilz, in an 
introduction to a study of self-similarity in Calvino, has presented a clear image of the current 
landscape in this field of study: 
The new sciences… focus on the way the macroscopic world really behaves: it is 
a complex, unruly, often nonlinear and indeterminate one, where microscopic 
causes can quickly produce macroscopic effects. However, these theories, unlike 
the implications of the somewhat misleading tem “chaos science,” are not 
concerned to show that chaotic systems exist, but that they display a deep relation 
with order. (Pilz XV) 
    
Despite its misleading moniker, Chaos Theory is, as Pilz emphasizes, much more concerned with 
the underlying order that props up the supposed unruliness of the universe. A major researcher in 
this discipline and the author of a field-defining history of Chaos Theory, James Gleick presents 
the following explanation of its development: 
Where chaos begins, classical science stops. For as long as the world has had 
physicists inquiring into the laws of nature, it has suffered a special ignorance 
about disorder in the atmosphere, in the turbulent sea, in the fluctuations of 
wildlife populations, in the oscillations of the heart and the brain. The irregular 
side of nature, the discontinuous and erratic side – these have been puzzles to 
science, or worse, monstrosities. But in the 1970s a few scientists in the United 
States and Europe began to find a way through disorder. (Gleick 3) 
 
This “erratic” or apparently unpredictable aspect of nature is precisely what is confronted in 
complexity science – Gleick defines the microscopic scale of Chaos Theory’s project: 
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In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events can have a point of 
crisis that could magnify small changes. But chaos meant that such points were 
everywhere. They were pervasive. In systems like the weather, sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions was an inescapable consequence of the way 
small scales intertwined with large. (Gleick 23) 
  
Such a confluence of myriad tiny anomalies eventually leads, in aggregate, to situations which 
earlier versions of the scientific method were powerless to resolve. This quandary immediately 
brings to mind the Sisyphean task of Calvino’s Mr. Palomar, who comes across these “points of 
crisis” with every attempt to condense nonlinear phenomena (ocean waves, flocks of birds, 
varieties of cheeses) into simplified, linear axioms.
30
 Incidentally, this same struggle is echoed in 
the historic toils of Blaise Pascal, Georg Cantor and the quantum physicists of the last century, 
all of whom have been discussed previously in this study.  
If so-called Chaos Theory’s defining principle is the recognition and subsequent 
modeling of natural self-similarity, then the literary equivalent of such a concept must be 
identified as mise en abyme, which sets a particular image inside of a smaller version of itself, 
with the suggestion that such scaling may continue on into infinity. Its function is that of 
introducing self-reflexivity and multiplicity in the image, but also of affecting an unsettling 
bewilderment and confusion in the reader. Across Borges’ considerable body of fiction, a 
number of tales employ self-similarity as a descriptive technique, several of which we have 
already analyzed: “The Cult of the Phoenix”; “The Circular Ruins”; “The Approach to Al-
Mu’tasim”; “The House of Asterion”; “The God’s Script”; “The Waiting.” As for Calvino’s 
employment of recursive self-scaling, we can look to Albert Sbragia’s commentary on the topic: 
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Interestingly, Benoit Mandelbrot seems to have shared Calvino’s interdisciplinary visage of the ideal intellectual. 
Gleick quotes him as having said, “Science would be ruined if (like sports) it were to put competition above 
everything else, and if it were to clarify the rules of competition by withdrawing entirely into narrowly defined 
specialties. The rare scholars who are nomads-by-choice are essential to the intellectual welfare of the settled 
disciplines.” (Gleick 90) 
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Synecdoche and mise en abyme are Calvino’s unruly tools in his attempt to impart 
order to his fictional universe… This is not surprising since synecdoche and mise 
en abyme are perhaps the purest examples of language’s tendency to constitute 
itself according to the principles of contiguity and similarity… Chaotic systems 
possess order in the form of periodic repetition of symmetries across scale levels. 
At the same time, initial aperiodic variations or contiguities are reintroduced and 
magnified at each scale level by the system’s own feedback mechanisms. It is 
something similar to find mise en abyme and synecdoche operating in the same 
system. The contiguous irregularities impart change and evolution to the bedrock 
of symmetrical order that holds the universe together. The result is creation. 
(Sbragia 301) 
 
Sbragia follows this perspicacious statement with a more specific citation of the contiguity found 
in two of Calvino’s works, Invisible Cities and The Nonexistent Knight.  
In Invisible Cities, the all-powerful despot Kublai Khan yearns for Marco Polo to 
provide him with the “tracery of a pattern” that will give meaning to the formless 
ruin of his empire. Agilulf, the nonexistent knight, arranges pine cones in precise 
geometrical forms to overcome the malaise that assails him at dawn, the hour in 
which the world seems to melt into the vague and ambiguous. Almost all of 
Calvino’s characters suffer from an acute hypersensitivity to the disorder of the 
world. (Sbragia 292) 
 
Polo’s journey ended before it began, of course, with the realization that in order to accurately 
map such a formless and shifting expanse one would need a map the same size of the earth itself, 
overlaid upon all things, all cities and all people. As a foil to Agilulf, the obsessive-compulsive, 
invisible horseman, Calvino gives us the comical character of Gurdulú – a man who is “without a 
name and with every possible name,” (Calvino 53) a “squire to the air” (ibid. 137) – who 
exclaims that the world around us, in its befuddling complexity, is “all soup.”
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 The Nonexistent Knight offers more than simple recursive gags and quips, however – 
Sbragia notes that Agilulf  
exists not by means of a metonymical presence within the world, but through 
sheer force of idea and will. The knight’s shield, with its herald of a cloaked coat 
of arms within a series of other cloaked coats of arms, attests to its owner’s 
metaphysical nature through recourse to what André Gide saw as the heraldic 
etymology of mise en abyme. (Sbragia 298) 
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The symbol par excellence for the unorthodox character of Agilulf is precisely that emblem of 
self-scaling/self-similarity that we have introduced, which ties together the overlapping concepts 
of both science and fiction. Other signs connecting these characters to the concepts of 
complexity science can be found within the context of The Nonexistent Knight – Kerstin Pilz has 
noted that 
Gurdulù, devoid of subjectivity, is incapable of separating himself from nature by 
conceiving an independent, rational relationship with the world. He identifies with 
the flux of organic matter and merges with the people or objects he comes in 
contact with, thereby assuming multiple and fluid identities. Agilulf, on the other 
hand, deprived of a physical self, is a symbol of pure rationality and of the 
abstraction that has replaced an organic, holistic conception of the world. (Pilz 10) 
 
Neither of these personages is complete – they each represent half of what would be a unifying 
conception of the universe; Gurdulú represents infinity as pure chaos, with no recurring patterns 
to be found anywhere in its totality, while Agilulf embodies the idea of infinity as pure order, 
presumably achieved through the self-scaling and endlessly replicating processes of complexity 
science.  
 In Mr. Palomar, Calvino has again embedded self-scaling and spiraling images – in fact, 
the structure of the book is itself a recursive pattern, with each chapter composed of three 
progressively more abstract and complex sections (nine chapters equaling 27 individual sections, 
with each component divisible by three). Jerry Varsava has identified a geometrical thread 
running through a number of these sections: 
[Palomar] ventures to three non-Western locales, extrapolating an important 
lesson from the events at each one. Visiting the famous garden of rocks and sand 
of the Ryoanji of Kyoto, Palomar finds himself incapable of following the Zen 
Buddhist imperative of shedding one’s personality in order to intuit “Absolute 
Self.” For Palomar, personality is an inextricable part of being. In gazing at the 
configuration of rocks and sand, he identifies two “nonhomogenous harmonies”: 
the harmony of capricious, unpatterned, natural forces, and the harmony of 
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regular human structures that “aspires to the rationality of a geometrical or 
musical composition, never definitive.” (Varsava 195) 
 
Sbragia has noted the same opposition in Palomar’s understanding of the universe as either 
“regular and ordered cosmos” or “chaotic proliferation.” (Sbragia 284) The error of this position, 
and presumably Calvino’s main point throughout the work, is that chaos and order are not 
separated but actually intrinsic to one another. That natural geometric patterns and human 
structures both aspire to the same type of coherence is simply evidence of man’s crucial position 
as nature’s mouthpiece; as Carl Sagan famously stated in the introductory episode of Cosmos: A 
Personal Voyage (1980), “we are a way for the cosmos to know itself.” Mr. Palomar is 
practically a satire of humans’ difficulty in accepting disorder and irregularity in their lives, as 
well as a reflection of the weakness of traditional science when confronted with the immense, 
spiraling complexity of nature. 
  This anguished struggle to categorize and simplify the universe is found throughout 
Palomar’s enterprises: the first section, “Reading a Wave,” introduces the reader to the central 
agon of the book, along with the main character’s anxious personality. 
Mr. Palomar is standing on the shore, looking at a wave. Not that he is lost in 
contemplation of the waves. He is not lost, because he is quite aware of what he is 
doing: he wants to look at a wave and he is looking at it… it is not “the waves” 
that he means to look at, but just one individual wave: in his desire to avoid vague 
sensations, he establishes for his every action a limited and precise object. 
(Calvino 3) 
 
This is simply not to be, however – as Palomar moves from unsuccessfully delineating individual 
waves (which cannot be done without inadvertently including a portion of the successive or 
preceding wave) into increasingly minute distinctions between discrete elements, he begins to 
feel a “slight dizziness.” (ibid. 7) Finally, he is overwhelmed and exasperated; “Mr. Palomar 
goes off along the beach, tense and nervous as when he came, and even more unsure about 
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everything.” (ibid. 8) Most of Palomar’s endeavors end in this way, with a sad resignation 
toward the ultimate impossibility of truly “knowing” any aspect of reality. Pilz has noted 
Calvino’s impetus for establishing this pattern: 
The difficulty of how to reconcile the multiple with the singular is of key 
importance in Calvino’s writing, creating a tension that motivates his incessant 
search for and reflection on method. He does so with an eye to the issues of 
contemporary science, namely chaos theory and complexity science which are 
similarly concerned with the problem of how to describe complex, irregular and 
turbulent forms in nature. (Pilz 66) 
 
“The Invasion of the Starlings” also demonstrates the same tension that Pilz has described; 
Palomar experiences a temporary moment of unity with a massive flock of birds, only to have 
this bond be immediately dissolved by his need for order. 
If he lingers for a few moments to observe the arrangement of the birds, one in 
relation to another, Mr. Palomar feels caught in a weft whose continuity extends, 
uniform and without rents, as if he, too, were part of this moving body composed 
of hundreds and hundreds of bodies, detached, but together forming a single 
object, like a cloud or a column of smoke or a jet of water – something, in other 
words, that even in the fluidity of its substance achieves a formal solidity of its 
own. But he has only to start following a single bird with his gaze and the 
disassociation of the elements returns. (Calvino 63) 
 
Palomar cannot be satisfied with collective nouns like “flock” or “tides” – his stodgy, formalist 
perspective requires an intimate knowledge of all individual elements, which is obviously 
impossible and leads to unceasing disappointment throughout the book. This cycle of failed 
scientific analysis and augmented anxiety only finds its end in “Learning to be Dead,” the final 
section of the book in which Palomar, riddled with acute anxiety, reaches his limit. “He decides 
that he will set himself to describing every instant of his life, and until he has described them all 
he will no longer think of being dead. At that moment he dies.” (ibid. 126)  
Despite offering such a pat, cynical solution to the problem of complexity in this 
particular case, Calvino has stated elsewhere that he considers himself “a ‘partisan’ of the 
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crystal, that is to say, a seeker of order within disorder.” (Six Memos 71) This same image of the 
crystal – itself, perhaps the best symbol in nature of the process of self-scaling replication – is 
presented in an eponymous chapter of T zero (“Crystals”). The story narrates a dialogue between 
the characters Qfwfq and Vug, in which they debate the existence and characteristics of an 
underlying universal order.   
I play the game, in other words, the game of pretending there’s an order in the 
dust, a regularity in the system, or an interpenetration of different systems, 
incongruous but still measurable, so that every graininess of disorder coincides 
with the faceting of an order which promptly crumbles… Of course, if he 
chooses, a person can also take it into his head to find an order in the stars, the 
galaxies, an order in the lighted windows of the empty skyscrapers where between 
nine and midnight the cleaning women wax the floors of the offices. Rationalize, 
that’s the big task: rationalize if you don’t want everything to come apart. 
(Calvino 30-33) 
 
Qfwfq’s counterpart Vug, however, has an appreciation for the anomalous, the violation of order 
that creates strangeness and, therefore, beauty. After the earth opens, spewing forth a mountain 
of varied gems and crystals, Vug becomes enamored with them, with the exception of the 
diamond, whose clarity demonstrates a perfection of symmetry and the absence of anomalous 
elements. 
In an aluminum crystal, where chance scatters some chrome atoms, the 
transparency is colored a dark red: so the rubies flowered beneath our footsteps. 
“You see?”Vug said. “Aren’t they beautiful?” We couldn’t walk through a valley 
of rubies without starting to quarrel again. “Yes,” I said, “because the regularity 
of the hexagon…” “Uff!” she said. “Would they be rubies without the intrusion of 
extraneous atoms? Answer me that!”…Vug seemed to take pleasure only in 
noting how minutely variegated the face of the world appeared… She wants to 
make me admit that real order carries impurity within itself, destruction. (Calvino 
36-37) 
 
Kerstin Pilz succinctly captures the central conflict of this tale:  
A representative of the logocentric tradition of Western thought which produced 
classical science, here Qfwfq is challenged by a new vision of order, a new form 
of rationality that emphasizes, rather than ignores, disorder…The tension between 
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the two characters points to Calvino’s own slow reorientation towards postmodern 
theories of science which emphasise indeterminism and chaos. (Pilz 46-47) 
 
Guy Raffa has also offered a similar analysis: 
Whereas Qfwfq takes positions consistent with basic assumptions of Newtonian 
science (e.g. reversible time, linear equations) and classical ideas of harmony and 
proportion, Vug’s embrace of asymmetries and unforeseen variations puts her in 
dialogue with the scientific and cultural paradigm shift that has been intriguingly 
(if controversially) popularized as ‘chaos theory’ and more accurately described 
as the study of ‘nonlinear dynamics’ or complex, ‘dissipative’ systems. (Raffa 
283) 
 
Chaos Theory has essentially come to prove the consistency of Vug’s position, which is that the 
truest underlying order of the universe is not bounded within the parameters of traditional 
Euclidean geometry. On the contrary, reality is “variegated” instead of smooth, with a rough, 
random unpredictability that is built into its self-replication process.  
 Benoit Mandelbrot, whom we have identified as one of the founders of complexity 
science, ushered a powerful new word into the scientific lexicon and defined a new branch of 
geometry. The “fractal” – a shorthand term for the clunkier “fractional dimension” – became a 
powerful new tool for mathematicians to wield in their attempts to codify the order of the natural 
universe. 
Mandelbrot moved beyond dimensions 0, 1, 2, 3… to a seeming impossibility: 
fractional dimensions. The notion is a conceptual high-wire act. For 
nonmathematicians it requires a willing suspension of disbelief. Yet it proves 
extraordinarily powerful. Fractional dimension becomes a way of measuring 
qualities that otherwise have no clear definition: the degree of roughness or 
brokenness or irregularity in an object… [Mandelbrot’s] claim was that the degree 
of irregularity remains constant over different scales. Surprisingly often, the claim 
turns out to be true. (Gleick 98) 
 
All of those variegated points (coastlines, leaves, snowflakes) that had resisted full mapping by 
traditional geometric rules could now be defined fractionally, allowing a savvy user to identify 
smaller and smaller patterns within literally any object in the universe. Gleick goes on: 
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The mind cannot visualize the whole infinite self-embedding of complexity. But 
to someone with a geometer’s way of thinking about form, this kind of repetition 
of structure on finer and finer scales can open a whole world… [Mandelbrot’s] 
studies of irregular patterns in natural processes and his exploration of infinitely 
complex shapes had an intellectual intersection: a quality of self-similarity. Above 
all, fractal meant self-similar. Self-similarity is symmetry across scale. It implies 
recursion, pattern inside of pattern. (Gleick 100-103) 
 
As has been demonstrated, this description of self-scaling is essentially identical to the literary 
device of mise en abyme. Just as we have previously described elements of Borges’ and 
Calvino’s writing as “entropic” in their tendency to increase in complexity and disorder, so could 
we also describe them as “fractal” in their employment of self-similar imagery and recursive 
patterns. Gleick has noted, in fact, that many disparate fields have begun to appropriate the terms 
of Chaos Theory: “Aspects of chaos – different aspects, usually – have been taken up by modern 
management theorists on the one hand, and postmodern literary theorists on the other. Both 
camps have found use for phrases like “orderly disorder,” especially popular in dissertation 
titles…” (Gleick 320) While intentionally ironic in his statement, Gleick also helpfully identifies 
the significance of the fractal through its primary utility across all arenas: “A fractal curve 
implies an organizing structure that lies hidden among the hideous complication of such shapes.” 
(Gleick 114) We can only imagine what poor, doomed Palomar might have achieved had he 
possessed the wherewithal to employ fractal geometry in his analyses of the cosmos! 
  Although we have focused heavily on Calvino’s works in this chapter – perhaps in 
compensation for having leaned overmuch on Borges in the previous one – Borges nevertheless 
shares Calvino’s penchant for deploying mise en abyme as a multiplicative, complicating 
mechanism.
32
 As “The Library of Babel” has already been discussed in great detail, we will 
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For as much as Borges was an influence on Calvino, we might even propose that Calvino learned this technique 
from his mentor. - MR 
186 
 
allow a quotation from Floyd Merrell to assist in joining Borges to our discourse on Chaos 
Theory. 
Interestingly enough, the hexagonal structure of each miniscule gallery in Borges’ 
Library reduplicated indefinitely such that the library appears to become more and 
more sphere-like as the sides of each hexagon become smaller relative to the 
whole… creates an image that raged in recent years going by the name of fractal 
geometry… Starting with an equilateral triangle, the first step yields three 
identical triangles on each side, making a six-pointed star, the second gives twelve 
more triangles, and the third an additional thirty-six to produce a “snowflake” 
image. At the theoretical upper limit we would have a continuous “curve” with an 
infinite number of infinitesimal barbs or excursions. Like Borges’ Library, the 
“curve” would be monstrous. It would be impossible to visualize. Possessing no 
tangent, it would change direction radically at each and every point. In a sense, it 
would be infinitely irregular, or infinitely regular, take your pick… (Merrell 200-
201) 
 
According to Merrell – who is no novice when it comes to advanced mathematics – Borges’ 
infamous library possesses a fractal shape that is both absolutely anomalous and perfectly 
ordered. As the natural generation of fractals is driven partially by random selection and 
variation, one cannot know for sure what qualities or orientation each successive branch will 
possess; for this reason, just as there exists an infinite variety of unique snowflakes, so would 
Borges’ library possess, at regular intervals, an endless variety of hexagonal galleries, each with 
their own unique arrangement of perforations, nooks and crannies.  
 Just as Merrell found fractals in the Library, so have critics Gabriel Schreiber and 
Roberto Umansky noted the presence of self-similarity in “The Garden of Forking Paths.” They 
begin by equating the term “bifurcation” with the concept of non-linear self-replication, while at 
the same time invoking a name from an earlier chapter of our own study: 
The term bifurcation was coined by [Henri] Poincaré to designate the emergence 
of several solutions from a given solution… From a bifurcation point several 
stable or unstable solution branches emerge. Successive bifurcations lead to an 
irregular and unpredictable time evolution of deterministic nonlinear systems, 




While still remaining abstract, Schreiber and Umansky have honed this concept enough for us to 
tentatively consider the fabled maze of Borges’ Ts’ui Pen a “fractal” or “chaotic labyrinth.” 
Borges’ character Dr. Stephen Albert explicitly states that Ts’ui Pen’s labyrinth forks “in time, 
not in space,” but Schreiber and Umansky make a clear distinction between the two terms: 
fractals involve space, and chaos involves time. (Schreiber 65) They continue: 
Though Borges devotes the garden of forking paths [sic] to bifurcation in time 
[and] not in space, to chaotic aspects and not to fractal geometric aspects, the 
latter appear… almost unnoticeably in the story… The objects seen, or let us say 
conceived, out of the window are clearly Euclidean: roofs and sun. Fractal 
appearances like clouds are regarded as a hindrance with regard to the purity of 
the Euclidean object… (ibid. 72) 
 
On the other hand, they also note that  
Borges looking out of the window to the fractal geometry of nature is radically 
different from the previous Euclidean view…Here the picture is composed of 
fractal objects: “trees, a mountain, water, rivers[,] etc.,” while Euclidean geometry 
is an interference. Euclidean objects are regarded as a hindrance with regard to the 
beauty of the fractal object. (ibid. 73) 
 
Schreiber and Umansky conclude by reemphasizing the primacy of fractal shapes in Borges’ 
oeuvre; “Beautiful ‘fractals’ with their self-similarity and scaling lows are scattered everywhere 
in Borges’ writings… Scaling features, self-similarities, and fractal topologies are the backbone 
of Borges’ writing.” (ibid. 74-77) While their essay seems somewhat incomplete, Schreiber and 
Umansky have nonetheless unearthed a remarkable pattern in “The Garden of Forking Paths,” 
which draws yet another connecting thread between Calvino, Borges and the most cutting-edge 
science of their time. 
 Before moving on to the next section of this study, it would be fitting to conclude our 
discussion of fractals with a final word about the man who invented them; James Gleick has 
warmly contextualized the importance of Mandelbrot’s innovation: 
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The shapes of classical geometry are lines and planes, circles and spheres, 
triangles and cones. They represent a powerful abstraction of reality, and they 
inspired a powerful philosophy of Platonic harmony. Euclid made of them a 
geometry that lasted two millennia, the only geometry still that most people ever 
learn. Artists found an ideal beauty in them, Ptolemaic astronomers built a theory 
of the universe out of them. But for understanding complexity, they turn out to be 
the wrong kind of abstraction. Clouds are not spheres, Mandelbrot is fond of 
saying. Mountains are not cones. Lightning does not travel in a straight line. The 
new geometry mirrors a universe that is rough, not rounded, scabrous, not smooth. 
It is a geometry of the pitted, pocked, and broken up, the twisted, tangled and 
intertwined… Mandelbrot’s work made a claim about the world, and the claim 
was that such odd shapes carry meaning. The pits and tangles are more than 
blemishes distorting the classic shapes of Euclidean geometry. They are often the 
keys to the essence of a thing. (Gleick 94) 
 
Mandelbrot’s nuanced awareness that nature’s foundation is comprised of innumerable tiny, 
independent elements – “initial conditions,” as he tended to call them (Gleick 23) – is in direct 
contact with the structural sensitivity shown by Jorge Luis Borges and Italo Calvino in their 
works of fiction. An interstitial section of Invisible Cities will illustrate this connection: 
“And yet I know,” [the Khan] would say, “that my empire is made of the stuff of 
crystals, its molecules arranged in a perfect pattern. Amid the surge of the 
elements, a splendid hard diamond takes shape, an immense, faceted, transparent 
mountain. Why do your travel impressions stop at disappointing appearances, 
never catching this implacable process? Why do you linger of inessential 
melancholies? Why do you hide from the emperor the grandeur of his destiny?” 
And Marco [Polo] answered: “While, at a sign from you, sire, the unique and final 
city raises its stainless walls, I am collecting the ashes of the other possible cities 
that vanish to make room for it, cities that can never be rebuilt or remembered. 
When you know at last the residue of unhappiness for which no precious stone 
can compensate, you will be able to calculate the exact number of carats toward 
which that final diamond must strive. Otherwise, your calculations will be 
mistaken from the very start.” (Calvino 60) 
 
The Khan and Polo, here, disagree on the method through which to map the empire – while the 
Khan would simply catalog the macroscopic, apparent symmetry of his realm, Polo instead 
mimics Mandelbrot’s method. Polo would focus his analysis on the “initial conditions” of the 
Khan’s empire – those cities that failed, those cities that never came into being, and those cities 
that have been forgotten – in order to better establish all of the tiny, hidden elements and events 
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that have led to the current state of the khanate. By employing the techniques of Chaos Theory 
and fractal geometry in projecting current and future behavior (a process now known 
colloquially as the “Butterfly Effect”), Polo shows himself as kin of Mandelbrot and Borges, 
both of whom engaged in the very same exercises, albeit in disparate fields. 
 
Post-humanity & Cybernetics 
 While many of the most famous advances in science have taken place in the areas of 
astrophysics and mathematics, there have been great leaps made in the biological and 
physiological sciences as well. Recent years have brought both confirmation and conjecture 
about the evolution and ultimate fate of the human body, with theorists attempting to plot the 
continued development of our species. Many have also begun to intervene in the evolutionary 
process through the fusion of machine and man – one need only consider the mechanical hearts, 
lungs and limbs that have propelled medicine into a new era. As this process of discovery and 
experimentation continues, our descendents may eventually see the concept of the human being 
redefined to include semi-humans, sentient machines and the perpetual darling of science fiction: 
the “cyborg.” 
 The concept of the fusion of man and machine is not new – while the last three decades 
have seen the introductions of Blade Runner, RoboCop, the Terminator and Darth Vader, the 
first known appearance of a literary cyborg can be found in “The Ablest Man in the World,” an 
1879 story by Edward Page Mitchell that recounts the insertion of a computer into a man’s head 
(an operation that renders him a genius). More recently, viewers of the television series Star 
Trek: The Next Generation were moved and compelled by the character of Data, a cybernetic 
organism (technically an “android”) that was comprised of a highly-adaptive artificial 
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intelligence, along with both organic tissue and a biomechatronic infrastructure. While his 
biological functions mimicked those of any normal human, his electronic mind was not pre-
programmed to understand complex emotions. Over time, during the course of his interactions 
with the humans on his crew, he began to learn to “feel” in the same way that human beings do. 
He eventually sacrificed his own life for those of his compatriots in a final act of altruism, that 
most inexplicable and counterintuitive of human emotions. We cannot know if science will ever 
be able to attain such a level of subtle prowess, but we can be sure that long before Star Trek 
both Borges and Calvino were aware of and intrigued by concepts that are not dissimilar to that 
of the man-made, synthetic organism. 
 In 1944, Jorge Luis Borges published a collection of fictions entitled Artifices that 
included the tales “Death and the Compass” and “The Secret Miracle,” which we have already 
analyzed in this study. This collection opened, however, with a rather inert story called “Funes, 
His Memory” (often alternately translated as “Funes the Memorious”), which introduces the 
character of Ireneo Funes, a young man who has been crippled by a horse and has subsequently – 
and unexpectedly – come to possess a flawless, practically electronic memory. From the start, 
Funes is presented as a cybernetic half-human, particularly in the emotional sense; Borges tells 
us that  
[Funes] had lived, he said, for nineteen years as though in a dream: he looked 
without seeing, heard without listening, forgot everything, or virtually everything. 
When he fell, he’d been knocked unconscious; when he came to again, the present 
was so rich, so clear, that it was almost unbearable, as were his oldest and even 
his most trivial memories… Now his perception and his memory were perfect. 
(CF 134-5) 
   
Gabriel Kreiman, a neuroscientist, published a piece on Borges’ character in the scientific 
journal Nature that confirms the assessment that Funes could be seen as a proto-cyborg. 
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Because of his prodigious memory, Funes always knows the precise time without 
having to consult his watch, learns languages after merely checking a dictionary 
and can enumerate all the people he has ever met. Although these abilities seem 
admirable, there is a catch. Every leaf of every tree that he has ever seen remains 
in his mind. It disturbs him that a front view of a face is assigned the same 
identity as the profile view. He is almost incapable of understanding or creating 
abstract ideas. (Kreiman 453) 
 
While we cannot confirm Borges’ explicit awareness of the term “cyborg” as a scientific 
concept, the literary antecedents found in popular and science fiction before and during his 
lifetime could certainly have drawn the awareness of such a broadly well-read man. In fact, 
Borges does describe Funes as “a precursor of the race of supermen,” a fact that is reinforced by 
Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus in their playfully-named Cy-Borges: Memories of the 
Posthuman in the Work of Jorge Luis Borges.  
Funes, in many respects, could be seen as an “embodiment”of the Nietzschean 
“overman” but also maybe as a posthuman in the sense that the narrator describes 
the infallibility of his memory – a perfect recording device that one might 
provocatively name “cyborg memory,” even if it of course lacks a hypermnesic 
technology. (Herbrechter 22) 
 
They also quite astutely cite another of Borges’ statements, one that we also isolated in our 
analysis of “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”: “sooner or later all men will do and know all 
things.” (ibid. 22) Such a statement, coupled with Borges’ previous invocation of the 
Zarathustran “superman,” provides us with just enough evidence to tentatively regard Funes as a 
Borgesian cyborg, at least in terms of pure processing power. Like Star Trek’s Data, Funes, “we 
must not forget, was virtually incapable of general, platonic ideas… He had effortlessly learned 
English, French, Portuguese, Latin. I suspect, nevertheless, that he was not very good at 
thinking.” (CF 136-7) 
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 Our assessment of Funes as a man possessing a brain like that of a computer must remain 
tentative, however; Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, a neuroscientist and bioengineer also writing in the 
journal Nature, raises the point that Funes could simply be functionally brain-damaged.  
In the story of Funes, Borges described very precisely the problems of distorted 
memory capacities well before neuroscience caught up. We now know that 
memory function is linked to a particular brain area, the hippocampus, which lies 
at the end of the neural pathway that processes sensory information. (Quian 
Quiroga 611) 
 
Quian Quiroga goes on, focusing on the operations of the neurons therein:  
It is thus possible that that these neurons link perception and memory by creating 
the abstract encoding we use to store memories – especially considering that we 
tend to remember concepts and forget irrelevant details. If these neurons are 
lacking, the ability to generate abstractions may be limited, leading to pathologies 
such as autism or characters like Funes. (ibid. 611) 
Funes’ condition is possible, then, in a purely organic way, and does not necessarily require the 
intercession of either poetic license or an electronic processor. Physicist Matthieu Ricard would 
appear to agree with Quian Quiroga’s diagnosis; if an injury to the cerebral cortex were 
sustained, a person could potentially shed their sense of self without losing their ability to 
process sensory information (or, again, could have this ability augmented, according to Quian 
Quiroga). 
If the memory was dependent on an “ego,” then those who freed themselves from 
the sense of having an ego would become amnesic! We must avoid confusing the 
conceptual notion of an “ego” with the stream of individual consciousness. The 
lack of an “ego” doesn’t stop the workings of memory that is imprinted in the 
cerebral system and that modifies its own gross consciousness. (Ricard 179) 
 
Is a memory system without an ego not simply a computer, though? If a cyborg can be defined as 
essentially an advanced computer – an incomplete, artificial intelligence – ensconced in organic 
tissue, then we might still abstractly consider Funes to be a literary cyborg.  
Even Calvino’s Palomar can be seen through this lens as an inversion of the cyborg, or at 
the very least as a human that strives to become a computer. Assailed and harrowed by a 
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persistent sense of anxiety and existential dread, Palomar is finally released from these human 
sensations through death. While we have already cited this moment in a previous discussion, it 
bears repeating now: “[Palomar] decides that he will set himself to describing every instant of his 
life, and until he has described them all he will no longer think of being dead. At that moment he 
dies.” (Calvino 126) In an exercise identical to that of Funes – the emotionless description of all 
memories, objects and events – Palomar destroys his ego, with the cost of also terminating his 
own life. In striving to become un-human, he annihilates himself, never to live in the same beige 
limbo that Funes knew. Funes, as well, finds his release in death – a death that is the only 
reminder to the reader that he is human, after all: “Ireneo Funes died in 1889 of pulmonary 
congestion.” (CF 137) 
We must also recall a 1967 lecture by Calvino entitled “Cybernetics and Ghosts,” both 
for its explicit invocation of cybernetics as well as for its proposed equivalence between the 
human brain and a computer. He begins with a comparison between mathematics and narrative 
that is very germane to our own argument: “On an equal level of civilization, the operations of 
narrative, like those of mathematics, cannot differ all that much from one people to another, but 
what can be constructed on the basis of these elementary processes can present unlimited 
combinations, permutations and transformations.” (Uses of Literature 6) As a human being 
employs his brain for the task of creating such combinations and connections, he can “feel the 
rapid passage of signals on the intricate circuits that connect the relays, the diodes, the transistors 
with which our skulls are crammed.” (ibid. 8)  
After invoking the work of the mechano-poetic Oulipo group, Calvino finally makes the 
leap into the philosophical by asking a pertinent question related to artificial intelligence: 
Having laid down these procedures and entrusted a computer with the task of 
carrying out these operations, will we have a machine capable of replacing the 
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poet and the author? Just as we already have machines that can read, machines 
that perform a linguistic analysis of literary texts, machines that make translations 
and summaries, will we also have machines capable of conceiving and composing 
poems and novels? (ibid. 12) 
 
We now know the answer to this question to be resoundingly affirmative – machines currently 
produce pulp novels and romances according to prescribed formulas and vocabulary banks, and 
human beings read these works often without any knowledge that they have been produced 
through the collaboration of a mechanical/combinatorial process and a human editor. This is not 
the “literature” that Calvino intends, however; he clarifies, stating that 
The true literature machine will be one that itself feels the need to produce 
disorder, as a reaction against its preceding production of order: a machine that 
will produce avant-garde work to free its circuits when they are choked by too 
long a production of classicism. In fact, given that developments in cybernetics 
lean toward machines capable of learning, of changing their own programs, of 
developing their own sensibilities and their own needs, nothing prevents us from 
foreseeing a literature machine that at a certain point feels unsatisfied with its own 
traditionalism and starts to propose new ways of writing, turning its own codes 
completely upside down. (ibid. 13) 
 
In the modern day, as was hinted at in the examples of cyborgs in popular fiction and film cited 
earlier, our culture has imagined an analogous cybernetic self-awareness in the form of Skynet, 
the global military defense matrix that activates itself and annihilates human life in the 
Terminator series. While Calvino’s ideal for cybernetic writing is far less pessimistic, the 
process leading to both outcomes is the same – an artificial intelligence reaches and passes the 
threshold for self-awareness and, like HAL in 2001: a Space Odyssey, becomes spontaneously 
able to modify its own code in order to make itself more efficient and creative (in Calvino’s 
example) or in order to ensure its own survival (in the case of Skynet). 
 While the militant scenario is certainly titillating, we must remain focused on Calvino’s 
more literary concerns; he concludes, after much analysis, that the standard for an author-cyborg 
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that might replace the human author would be extremely high, with a requirement that the cyborg 
also possess an ingrained societal awareness and personal history. 
Literature is a combinatorial game that pursues the possibilities implicit in its own 
material, independent of the personality of the poet, but it is a game that at a 
certain point is invested with an unexpected meaning, a meaning that is not patent 
on the linguistic plane on which we were working but has slipped in from another 
level, activating something that on that second level is of great concern to the 
author or his society. The literature machine can perform all the permutations 
possible on a given material, but the poetic result will be the particular effect of 
one of these permutations on a man endowed with a consciousness and an 
unconscious, that is, an empirical and historical man. It will be the shock that 
occurs only if the writing machine is surrounded by the hidden ghosts of the 
individual and of his society. (ibid. 22) 
 
The human and the cyborg appear to engage in the same processes when it comes to simply 
transcribing a narrative or poem, with the distinction only becoming apparent at the secondary, 
anagogical level of the text. This is not impossible – as artificial intelligence becomes 
increasingly refined and quantum computers come to replace the binary machines of the current 
age, the possibility of imbuing one of man’s creations with a human-like psyche multiplies 
exponentially. 
 More still can be said of Calvino’s fascination with the fusion of man and machine by 
way of a brief analysis of the appearance of computerized writer and reader of If on a Winter’s 
Night a Traveler… “Lotaria,” a university student who is writing a thesis on the novels of the 
narrator, Silas Flannery, informs the writer that the way in which she “reads” his works is 
opposed to the traditional way in which her sister Ludmilla reads them – a method that Lotaria 
deems “passive,” as well as “escapist and regressive.” (Calvino 185) Instead of wasting time on a 
linear reading of a book, Lotaria explains that “a suitably programmed computer can read a novel 
in a few minutes and record the list of all the words contained in the text, in order of frequency,” 
thereby granting her an “incalculable saving of time.” (ibid. 186) She then simply scans these 
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lists and pieces together an approximated narrative in her own mind. Such a cybernetic reading, 
which is nothing more than an electronic process that is subsequently and selectively audited by 
a human mind, will necessarily yield a conceptual result that differs from the one granted by a 
traditional reading. Lotaria, however, would not agree – she states that one need only “head 
straight for the words richest in meaning; they can give [the reader] a fairly precise notion of the 
work.” (ibid. 186)  
Flannery is both perplexed and disappointed by Lotaria’s style of reading, and begins to 
formulate a way of writing that might be better matched to this non-ideal reader. 
Now, every time I write a word, I see it spun around by the electronic brain, 
ranked according to its frequency, next to other words whose identity I cannot 
know, and so I wonder how many times I have used it, I feel the whole 
responsibility of writing weigh on those isolated syllables, I try to imagine what 
conclusions can be drawn from the fact that I have used the word once or fifty 
times… Perhaps instead of a book I could write lists of words, in alphabetical 
order, an avalanche of isolated words which expresses that truth I still do not 
know, and from which the computer, reversing its program, could construct the 
book, my book. (ibid. 189) 
 
Quintessentially postmodern, Flannery’s proposal would annihilate the authorial process as we 
know it, creating instead a system of combinatorial genesis that was hinted at in “Cybernetics 
and Ghosts” and Calvino’s experimentations with the Oulipo group. That this crisis is framed 
within Calvino’s fragmented and abortive narrative only serves to redouble the confusion and 
sense of meaninglessness that such a technique would present.  
While in general the study of post-human science (and fiction) has been devoted to the 
anatomical fusion of man and machine, it has also, at times, addressed the consequences of the 
eventual genesis of a race of omniscient cyborgs: if all men, through technology, come to know 
all things, then isn’t the idea of “all men” reduced to the same idea as just “one man?” Jean 
Baudrillard hinted at this concept in 1981, in Simulacra and Simulation: 
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Already, biophysioanatomical science, by dissecting the body into organs and 
functions, begins the process of the analytic decomposition of the body, and 
micromolecular genetics is nothing but the logical consequence, though at a much 
higher level of abstraction and simulation – at the nuclear level of the command 
cell, at the direct level of the genetic code, around which this whole 
phantasmagoria is organized… From the point of view of cybernetics and 
computer science, [each single organ] is the smallest undifferentiated element, 
each cell of a body becomes an “embryonic” prosthesis of this body. (Baudrillard 
98) 
 
Herbrechter and Umansky connect this same “embryonic” redundancy – yet another example of 
mise en abyme – to Borges: “The topos that ‘one man is all men,’ that one human is both the 
archetype, essence, and ‘end’ of all humanity is ubiquitous in Borges’s fictions and critical 
essays.” (Herbrechter 18) We have cited “Pierre Menard…” as proof of this, but more evidence 
can be found in “The Immortal” (in which, due to their immortality and the cyclical nature of the 
universe, all men have seen and known all things, thereby rendering them all identical copies of 
one man) and “The Cult of the Phoenix” (in which a secret cult has as its member every single 
human being in the world, and these members “resemble every man in the world.” [CF 172]). 
Borges and Calvino have indeed employed such post-human imagery throughout their works in 
order to address our shared humanity and to call into question the validity of our own senses of 
self. 
 Some concluding thoughts on the future of the literary and physical post-human can be 
found in Brian Greene’s The Hidden Reality –    
You engage the world through your senses, which stimulate your brain in ways 
your neural circuitry has evolved to interpret. If someone artificially stimulates 
your brain so as to elicit electrical crackles exactly like those produced by eating 
pizza, reading this sentence, or skydiving, the experience will be indistinguishable 
from the real thing. Experience is dictated by brain processes, not by what 
activates those processes. Going a step further, we can consider dispensing with 
the sloppiness of biological material altogether. Might all of your thoughts and 
experiences be nothing more than a simulation that leverages software and 
circuitry sufficiently elaborate to mimic ordinary brain function? Are you 
convinced of the reality of flesh, blood, and the physical world, when actually 
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your experience is only a crowd of electrical impulses firing through a hyper-
advanced supercomputer? (Greene 323) 
 
It is almost as if Greene has harvested these words directly from any one of the stories we have 
encountered in this study of Calvino and Borges, so often have these authors called into question 
the “realness” of human experiences. Greene goes on, tracing a line to the inevitable moment in 
which supercomputers will finally overtake the processing power of the human brain. 
One broad-brush prognosis holds that the surpassing of brainpower by computers 
will completely blur the boundary between humans and technology. Some 
anticipate a world run rampant with thinking and feeling machines, while those of 
us still based in old-fashioned biology routinely upload our brain content, safely 
storing knowledge and personalities in silico, complete with backup drives, for 
unlimited durations… A central assumption of this perspective is that conscious 
thought is not overlaid on a brain, but rather is the very sensation generated by a 
particular kind of information processing. Whether that processing happens within 
a three-pound biological mass or within the circuits of a computer is irrelevant. 
(ibid. 325-6) 
 
The material out of which our brains are fashioned, it would seem, is of no consequence – if our 
minds are simply organic computers, they carry, like computers made of silicon and steel, an 
upper limit on processing speed and efficiency. If the physical composition of the brain were to 
eventually become more inorganic than organic, Greene’s statement suggests that what we think 
or feel may or may not necessarily change. If our ability to understand and manipulate the brain 
evolves concurrently, then anything is possible: 
Although we are still very far from mastering this application of quantum 
mechanics, researchers have estimated that a quantum computer no bigger than a 
laptop has the potential to perform the equivalent of all human thought since the 
dawn of our species in a tiny fraction of a second… Generate circuits that carry 
the right information and you’ve generated parallel realities that are as real to 
their inhabitants as this one is to us. (Hidden 329-330) 
 
It remains to be seen if science will truly free us from the limitations of human consciousness; in 
a more dystopic turn, we could instead have our own, individual realities replaced with 
convincing simulations, much like that of the magician in Borges’ “The Circular Ruins.” 
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Herbrechter and Umansky have noted that in such a situation, “the system generating a reality is 
shown to be a part of the reality it makes…” (Herbrechter 18-19) Borges and Calvino have both 
repeatedly illustrated this concept through their fictions, which once again conclusively locates 
them at the intersection of science and literature.       
 
Conclusion: Science-as-fiction 
 The primary goal of this study has been to isolate and analyze the many appearances of 
scientific and mathematical themes in the works of Jorge Luis Borges and Italo Calvino, with the 
intention of drawing together both fields into one complementary and interdisciplinary 
continuum. The research undertaken toward this end has yielded an enormous number of 
connections and shared concepts between these disciplines, most of which have helped to 
illustrate both the methodological underpinnings of literary fiction as well as the creative and 
imaginative origins of many scientific theories. In the last decade, though, the scientific 
imagination has shown itself to be on equal footing with that of the literary. Advances in the 
studies of dark matter, black holes and the unifying theories of quantum physics have presented 
us with conjectures and explanations that, to the layman and physicist alike, are virtually 
indistinguishable from works of fiction. 
 Dark matter – a substance whose probable existence was derived from Einsteinian 
calculations toward the total mass of the universe – is a popular topic in the scientific news of the 
current day. While the calculations involved in theorizing its existence (along with the existence 
of its kinetic counterpart, dark energy) are stentorian in nature, Brian Greene – a man who, like 
his contemporary Neil DeGrasse Tyson (and Carl Sagan before them) has successfully made 
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scientific knowledge palatable and intriguing to an increasingly distracted populace – has 
provided us with a suitable introduction. He tells of current theorizations suggesting that 
a mere 5 percent of the universe’s heft comes from the constituents found in 
familiar matter – protons and neutrons (electrons account for less than .05 percent 
of ordinary matter’s mass) – while 25 percent comes from dark matter and 70 
percent from dark energy. But there is still significant uncertainty regarding the 
detailed identity of all this dark stuff… So, if not protons and neutrons, what 
constitutes the dark matter? As of today, no one knows, but there is no shortage of 
proposals. The candidates’ names run the gamut from axions to zinos, and 
whoever finds the answer will surely pay a visit to Stockholm. That no one has 
yet detected a dark matter particle places significant constraints on any proposal. 
The reason is that dark matter is not only situated out in space; it is distributed 
throughout the universe and so is also wafting by us here on earth. According to 
many of the proposals, right now billions of dark matter particles are shooting 
through your body every second, so viable candidates are only those particles that 
can pass through bulky matter without leaving a significant trace. (Fabric 432-3) 
 
Without slipping into a well-warranted hysteria, we might calmly re-state this explanation in 
more simplistic terms: according to our current calculations, ninety-five percent of the universe 
we inhabit is not only invisible, but imperceptible – and yet it continues to act upon us, 
constantly. Conversely, this statement also therefore introduces the disturbing proposition that 
human beings are only aware of five percent of the universe in which they live every day of their 
existence. A statement by DeGrasse Tyson echoes our understanding of these implications: 
At the end of the day, no matter how confident we are in our observations, our 
experiments, our data, or our theories, we must go home knowing that 85 percent 
of all the gravity in the cosmos comes from an unknown, mysterious force that 
remains completely undetected by all means we have ever devised to observe the 
universe. (Degrasse Tyson 20) 
 
Once again, it must be repeated that these are not statements being made in the privileged towers 
of literary criticism or fiction – these are scientific statements. That the current discourse in the 
“hard” sciences has effectively introduced a level of doubt and uncertainty that is equal to (or 
possibly greater than) that which is typically reserved for the hypothetical, un-empirical “soft” 
sciences is significant, although not wholly unexpected. After all, many thinkers – Pascal, Gӧdel, 
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Heisenberg, to wit – have historically debated the solidity of science’s claim to present any sort 
of universal or absolute truth. 
Further examples of scientific concepts that test the borders of verifiability are those of 
String Theory and M-Theory. While not brand-new concepts (as String Theory was first 
introduced in the late 1960s), they are still hotly debated and their subtle, infinitesimally-tiny 
components certainly tend toward the whimsical. Greene’s summary of String Theory is simple, 
yet suggestive of the full magnitude of this concept:  
We’ve seen that the standard view, prior to string theory, envisions nature’s 
fundamental ingredients as point particles – dots with no internal structure – 
governed by the equations of quantum field theory. With each distinct species of 
particle is associated a distinct species of field. String theory challenges this 
picture by suggesting that the particles are not dots. Instead the theory proposes 
that they’re tiny, stringlike, vibrating filaments… Look closely enough at any 
particle previously deemed elementary and you’ll find a miniscule vibrating 
string. Look deep inside an electron, and you’d find a string; look deep inside a 
quark, and you’d find a string. With even more precise observation, the theory 
argues, you’d notice that the strings within different kinds of particles are 
identical, the leitmotif of string unification, but vibrate in different patterns. 
(Hidden 91) 
 
What is being posited, then, is that the basis of the entire universe – the smallest possible 
building-block of reality – is a single variety of one-dimensional “string,” whose ability to 
vibrate in various patterns and at various frequencies has led to the existence of larger and more 
complex forms of matter. No one has ever observed such strings, nor can anyone hope to in the 
foreseeable future – they simply exist as the abstractions of intricate mathematical exercises. 
This lack of verifiability has not stopped physicists from building further theories upon its 
framework, however; M-Theory, which was drafted as a solution to the conflicting existence of 
no fewer than five separate strains of String Theory, presupposes the consistency and verity of 
what cannot yet be proven or seen. 
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In the 1980s, theorists realized that there was not one string theory, but rather five 
different versions… All five include the same gross features – vibrating strings 
and extra spatial dimensions… If perturbative calculations in one string theory 
can’t be undertaken because that theory’s coupling is too large, the calculations 
can be faithfully translated into the language of another formulation of string 
theory, one in which a perturbative approach succeeds because the coupling is 
small. Physicists call the transition between naïvely distinct theories duality. It has 
become one of the most pervasive themes in modern string theory research. By 
providing two mathematical descriptions of one and the same physics, duality 
doubles our calculational arsenal. Calculations that are impossibly difficult from 
one perspective become perfectly doable from another… All five string theories 
are linked through a network of such dualities. Their overarching union, called M-
theory…combines insights from all five formulations, stitched together through 
the various duality relationships, to gain a far more refined understanding of each. 
(Greene Hidden 124-27) 
 
While this alone seems perfectly reasonable and barely adds any credence to our suggestion that 
science may approach fiction as it makes increasingly bold conjectural leaps, Greene’s next 
statement makes the connection apparent:  
An allied revelation, just as flabbergasting to those who’d spent the better part of 
their professional lives working on the subject, was that the number of spatial 
dimensions the theory requires is not actually nine. It’s ten. And if we fold in the 
dimension of time, the total number of spacetime dimensions is eleven. (ibid. 128) 
 
Eleven spacetime dimensions are therefore required in order to resolve the world according to 
the equations of M-Theory, which is itself built upon the assumption that these sub-nanoscopic, 
curled-up dimensions are populated exclusively by invisible, vibrating strings. While these 
theories enjoy a strong following in the scientific world and, to date, represent humanity’s best 
guess as to the true nature of the universe, we must ask the following question: if the main 
explanation of the nature of the universe is conjectural, based on incomplete proofs and is 
impossible to conclusively verify, how exactly can science be wholly distinct from fiction? Is the 
distance between them found in their methodological approaches? Perhaps not, according to 
what we have seen of Calvino’s and Borges’ exercises in confronting the metaphysical and the 
impossible through soundly logical frameworks. As for their foundational precepts… well, 
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Gӧdel’s damning assessment of the incompleteness of any system that is formed by entities 
existing inside said system all but reduces humanity’s scientific and fictive enterprises to their 
lowest common denominator: the imagination. 
 
All in One Point – A Conclusion 
 In order to draw this considerable study to a close, a measure of recapitulation will, of 
course, be necessary. However, rather than attempt to distill such an enormous body of complex 
scientific thought into unsuitably brief passages, we will instead engage in a final summation of 
the underlying theme of this entire dissertation: the ideal of intellectual interdisciplinarity that is 
embodied in the works of Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges. By emphasizing once more the 
advantageous viewpoint permitted by an inclusive and manifold approach to human knowledge, 
we will hopefully provide a coherent and honed conclusion to this study. 
 Calvino’s trajectory from his earliest works – a body of writing largely preoccupied with 
political and revolutionary concerns – to his later, scientifically-informed discourses is well-
documented. In her work on Calvino’s scientific themes, Kerstin Pilz notes the peculiar 
“intellectual itinerary from his debut as a neorealist writer, which is followed by a period of 
crisis and a rethinking of theoretical positions, to the mid-Sixties when he reaches a point of 
arrival by turning explicitly to science and proposing literature as an interdisciplinary discourse.” 
(Pilz VXII) According to Pilz – an expert on this topic, and a scholar to whom our own research 
is greatly indebted – Calvino was clear in defining fiction’s links to other disciplines; he 
expressed in several essays that “literature is fundamentally connected with other forms of 
knowledge and thinking… It is science, not the new avant-gardes, that offers ‘replenishment’ for 
a literary genre that had ‘exhausted’ itself.” (ibid. 18-19) She confirms that Calvino’s greatest 
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influences – Queneau, Borges and Carroll – “likewise were inspired by a scientific approach that 
privileged a mathematical sense of composition and mental abstraction.” (ibid. 56) Calvino’s 
place within his own literary epoch is also contextualized by Pilz, along with a reiteration of 
science’s primacy throughout his mature oeuvre. 
For Calvino the end of “mourning” for a lost harmony comes through a turn 
toward science, notably information science, in order to derive from it a model 
that would lend unity to what has become fragmented. As becomes clear with the 
formal organization of Le Cosmicomiche, Calvino favours short texts (already 
evident in Marcovaldo). The short story or novella makes his novels into 
infinitely connectable matrices of self-contained stories. The short text, or petit 
récit is for Lyotard characteristic of the postmodern episteme, where the totalizing 
grand narratives of legitimation of knowledge have been replaced with “little 
narratives” which he sees as “the quintessential form of imaginative invention, 
most particularly in science.” (ibid. 23) 
 
Even the literary form employed by Calvino is drawn from science’s well, proving once again 
that his interdisciplinary bearing is truly one of the defining aspects of his creative output. 
 Borges is also found at the intersection of numerous fields of study and academic 
disciplines; his fictional experiments bundle together extraordinarily varied breeds of philosophy 
and science, as Floyd Merrell notes: 
What I do suggest is that Borges, like all writers, participates in an exceedingly 
complex cultural matrix. Out of this matrix, and revealed in the culturally aware 
intellectual’s work, one finds the product of a general climate of opinion…which 
potentially brings about a convergence of thought and speculation from various 
fields of endeavor… I submit [that] leading intellectuals from all walks are 
sensitive not only to the state of affairs in their chosen field of endeavor, but to 
contiguous fields as well, and they have the skill to incorporate this awareness 
into their work, at times even to bring about changes. Borges’ metaphysical 
stories and essays are such an imaginative response to the complexities, 
uncertainties, and ambiguities implicit in many contemporary modes of thought 
and conduct. (Merrell XIV) 
 
This “matrix” is formed through the collision of Borges’ exceptionally diverse intellectual 
interests, functioning as a level testing ground within which the author may call into question 
literally any aspect of human knowledge, exposing it to arguments and theorizations borrowed 
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from wholly unrelated disciplines. In Fiction Refracts Science, Allen Thiher demonstrates a 
similar understanding of experimental literary methodology:  
If some works of fiction can be called thought experiments – and not simply 
metaphorically – it is because some writers see their minds to be something like 
private laboratories wherein relationships and variables taken from the world can 
be imaginatively changed, and the putative outcomes of these transformations 
predicted in the imagination. These outcomes are then depicted experimentally in 
the fiction that ensues. Perhaps not all experimental writers self-consciously 
conceive of their work as thought experiments, but many do: Borges, Queneau, 
Serraute, Robbe-Grillet, and Calvino are cases in point. (Thiher 218) 
 
Zooming in on Borges specifically, Thiher goes on to define the complicating goal of Borges’ 
creative exercises: 
Especially in Borges, fiction takes the form of self-reflexive experiments that 
flaunt the rules of the game. These fictions often ironically demonstrate their own 
futility as self-contained forms of play. They also point up the near mathematical 
nature of fictions that self-consciously display the axioms generating them. With 
these experiments Borges aims at demonstrating the aporia of scientific theory or, 
more generally, the paradoxes of any self-referential epistemic project. (ibid. 219-
220) 
 
While working to dismantle his reader’s faith in the sacred foundations of human knowledge, 
Borges simultaneously equalizes the generative processes of science and fiction, lending the 
impression that they are one and the same. This interdisciplinary statement echoes one of Werner 
Heisenberg’s most well-known quotations (cited in Ricard, 4): “I consider the ambition of 
overcoming opposites, including also a synthesis embracing both rational understanding and the 
mystical experience of unity, to be the mythos, spoken or unspoken, of our present day and age.” 
Bearing this in mind, we can also restate the equivalence between science and fiction that has 
been recognized by literary critics and scientists alike. In an article appropriately entitled “Poetry 
and Science,” Peter Forbes, a science writer based at the University of London, makes a 
representative claim for acknowledging the “poetic” as it can be found in nature. 
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“Poetry and Science” at first suggests poems about science, but it can also help us 
to look at science from a different angle. Reading a scientific paper that opens up 
a new field has a similar effect to reading a significant new voice in poetry for the 
first time: you are not sure where it will lead. Take, for example, the paper by 
Joanna Aizenberg and colleagues which revealed the single-crystal microlens 
array in the brittle star Ophiocoma wendtii. The structure of the array itself is 
beautiful: it resembles the sort of organic blob architecture that is now 
fashionable. Each lens is microengineered to an astonishing degree: it corrects the 
spherical aberration of light by means of the classic Huygens/Descartes reversed-
curve rear surface, and the precise alignment of the crystal excludes double-
reflection effects. Then there was the synthetic DNA octahedron that featured on 
the cover of Nature in February 2004. I claim these finds as poetry. (Forbes 321) 
 
If the “poetic” can simply be defined as a creative exercise (natural or man-made) that generates 
or highlights any form of intellectual, scientific or philosophical novelty, then locating the poetic 
within scientific concepts should not ever be more difficult than would be finding it in works of 
fiction. 
 A final thought on bridging disciplines can be constructed by juxtaposing several 
succinct, but powerful quotations from several of the scholars and critics we have encountered 
over the course of this study. The first comes from Allen Thiher, who cautions that “science is 
almost always involved in any depiction of madness.” (Thiher 265) A similar problematization 
of scientific “truth” is presented by Matthieu Ricard, who appears to scold the Palomars of the 
world: “Like the prime cause, the idea of a closed circle is just an escape route for people who 
can’t bear the idea of infinity.” (Ricard 51) Michio Kaku, as well, casts a shadow on humanity’s 
typically hopeful conception of science: “The laws of physics tell us what is possible, not what is 
practical.” (Hyperspace 247) While these statements may initially come across as cynical or 
fatalistic, they need not be understood as such – if fiction and science were to work in concert, as 
was proposed by Calvino and demonstrated by Borges, then concepts that seem hopelessly bleak 
could instead be harnessed as fierce catalysts for human creativity. 
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 Ultimate unknowability is the shared fate of all human inquiry. Science and fiction are 
both human exercises, and both are equally limited by mankind’s inability to observe itself from 
outside of its own paradigm. So much can never be known – Brian Greene confirms as much in 
The Fabric of the Cosmos: 
We can’t ever know the exact location and exact velocity of even a single 
particle. We can’t predict with total certainty the outcome of even the simplest of 
experiments, let alone the evolution of the entire cosmos. Quantum mechanics 
shows that the best we can ever do is predict the probability that an experiment 
will turn out this way or that. And as quantum mechanics has been verified 
through decades of fantastically accurate experiments, the Newtonian cosmic 
clock, even with its Einsteinian updating, is an untenable metaphor; it is 
demonstrably not how the world works. (Greene 79) 
 
Kerstin Pilz concurs, adding a reminder of Calvino’s prescient sagacity – 
As Heisenberg has persuasively argued: “Natural science does not simply 
describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and 
ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning.” Thus 
both science and literature offer fictions about the relationship between the 
subject and the world, and while, as Calvino noted, it was in fact literature that 
problematised the observer’s subjectivity before science acknowledged its own 
limitations, literature can adopt the scientific method of minute observation and 
precise description in an attempt to reassess and possibly renew the relationship 
between human beings and the cosmos. (Pilz 63) 
 
Regarding Calvino’s function as a writer of fiction who has been fed on science, she also asserts 
that “by humanizing the cosmos to the extreme he makes familiar and thus accessible what is 
not, nor perhaps can ever be.” (ibid. 29) The function of any writer is not to resolve the 
limitations of human knowledge and consciousness, but rather to continue to create in spite of 
such limitations, with freedom and ingenuity. As for Borges’ function, Floyd Merrell’s words 
will suffice: “Perhaps, in the final analysis, Borges’ fictions, or any other fictions for that matter, 
are in some respects not necessarily any less ‘real’ than the scientist’s theories and models, 
derived from her freely wandering mind rather than directly from the ‘facts’ before her”. 
(Merrell 87) Rather than considering fiction and science to be equally “real” – a statement that 
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categorically cannot ever be proven, and that will lead to unending disappointment – it may be 
more advantageous for us to consider them as equally “false,” thereby releasing both from any 
expectation of absolute coherence and joining them, along with all other forms of human 
knowledge, into a single, larger continuum of ideas that carries exponentially greater generative 
potential.      
We will conclude by positing that, according to our research, science has in certain ways 
become fiction. It is our hope that, in the spirit of Italo Calvino and Jorge Luis Borges, both of 
whom worked so tirelessly toward an interdisciplinary ideal, fiction might in its own turn 
become science, thereby empowering humanity to think, theorize and dream ever more strangely, 
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